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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis is concerned with the treatment of heroin addiction between 1965 and 
1987.  It examines a series of conflicts between seemingly opposed forces: between 
the medical and the social, the specialist and the generalist, the public and the private 
provision of healthcare, and the short-term and the long-term prescription of drugs to 
addicts.  The establishment of specialised Drug Dependence Units (DDUs) in 1968 
demonstrated that addiction was seen as both a disease to be treated and a social 
problem to be controlled.  It is argued that the effects of this dynamic duality can be 
observed in the subsequent response to heroin addiction.  Tension existed between 
specialist consultant psychiatrists who treated addicts at hospital based DDUs and 
community based private and general practitioners involved in the treatment of 
addiction.  This was the result of contrasting approaches to addiction and its 
treatment.  Conflict between these groups was particularly evident in the General 
Medical Council’s (GMC) cases for serious professional misconduct in 1983 and 
again in 1986-1987 against Dr Ann Dally, a leading private practitioner involved in 
the treatment of addiction.  These cases highlighted the continuing differences 
between medical and social approaches to addiction but also demonstrated how these 
elements were inseparable and equally crucial to the formulation of drug treatment 
policy in this period.   
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Introduction 
Addiction, Drugs and History 
 
In order to examine the treatment of heroin addiction between 1965 and 1987 this 
thesis will consider a series of conflicts between seemingly diametrically opposed 
forces: between the medical and the social, the specialist and the generalist, the public 
and the private provision of healthcare, the short-term and the long-term prescription 
of drugs to addicts.  It will argue that though these conflicts were differentiated by 
content, form and tone they were all rooted in two aspects of addiction, a complex 
duality in which the condition was both a medical disease and a social problem.  To 
explore these two apparently separate, yet forever intertwined, aspects this thesis 
examines tensions between contrasting ways of responding to addiction through 
different kinds of treatment offered by different kinds of medical practitioners for 
different reasons.  Central to these practices was the relationship between the medical 
and the social.  Indeed, the very history of addiction cannot be understood outside of 
the changing politics of medical and social authority which perennially shaped the 
nature of the discussion.     
In 1968, at the behest of the Ministry of Health, a number of London teaching 
hospitals established Drug Dependence Units (DDUs) to both control the social 
problem of heroin addiction and provide treatment for the addict.  Initially, there was 
a distinct lack of knowledge about addiction and psychiatry came to fill a vacuum by 
claiming to offer a treatment-based solution to the problem of addiction.  Psychiatrists 
ran the DDUs and addiction rapidly became an area of psychiatric expertise.  Through 
these specialist clinics a particular view of addiction came to dominate, one that 
placed a premium on curing the addict of their disease.  This was in line with the 
principles of clinical medicine practised in the hospitals where the DDUs were 
 2
located.  However, in the 1980s a series of challenges were presented to the expert 
status of the DDU psychiatrist and the treatment they offered.  DDUs were 
increasingly unable or unwilling to handle rapidly rising numbers of heroin addicts.  
At the same time, some addicts grew dissatisfied with the treatment on offer at clinics, 
claiming that it did not meet their needs.  They began to seek out alternatives, by 
either buying drugs on the burgeoning black market or turning to other medical 
practitioners for help.  This period saw a dramatic increase in the involvement of the 
General Practitioner (GP) in the treatment of addiction.  This undermined the 
specialist nature of the treatment provided by the DDUs as it implied that a generalist 
could also provide adequate care.    
A simultaneous but different kind of threat to the expert status of the DDU 
psychiatrist was posed by the growing interest of private practitioners in the treatment 
of heroin addiction.  Many of these doctors were also psychiatrists, so the challenge 
they presented centred on the type of treatment on offer rather than on the authority of 
the psychiatrist as the principal expert on drug addiction.  Debates about the most 
appropriate way to treat heroin addiction came to dominate the field, as supporters of 
the rapid withdrawal of drugs from addicts sought to prevent the continued long-term 
prescription of drugs to addict patients, a practice that was often found in the 
treatment of addiction in private and general practice.  These doctors were more 
amenable to the long-term prescription of drugs to addicts (a practice termed 
‘maintenance’) than clinic-based psychiatrists because this method reflected their 
understanding of the treatment of disease.  Community based doctors tended to 
concentrate more on the needs of the patient rather than purely on the cure of disease, 
and this philosophy can be seen in their support for maintenance.  Maintenance 
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prescription seemed to benefit addicts by providing them with a fixed amount of the 
drug they claimed they needed in order to allow them to rebuild a stable life.   
Maintenance was also characterised as being more ‘social’; not only did it 
consider the needs of the patient, it also considered the needs of society: a stable 
addict with a regular supply of drugs was less of a problem to the community.  In 
contrast, DDU psychiatrists usually presented a more ‘medical’ view of addiction and 
its treatment by emphasising the rapid withdrawal of drugs from addict patients.  This 
practice was grounded in a hospital-based clinical conception of disease and its 
treatment that placed greater emphasis on curing the disease rather than on the patient 
as an individual.   Such a view is evident in the short-term prescription policies 
pursued by most clinics, which emphasised rapid withdrawal of drugs from the addict 
resulting in ‘cure’ – the patient being drug free.    
This method was dominant throughout the early to mid 1980s.  Short-term 
withdrawal held on to this position because it was practiced by DDU psychiatrists 
trying to preserve their status as the leading experts on the treatment of addiction by 
removing the non-DDU doctor (NHS and private, generalist and specialist) and 
maintenance treatment from the field.  By the end of the decade, however, clinical 
psychiatric opinion appeared to be changing; there was a growing acceptance that 
there was a place for both the non-clinic doctor and maintenance in the treatment of 
addiction.  This shift was provoked (in part) by concerns about incidences of HIV and 
AIDS amongst intravenous drug users and the desire to make treatment more 
‘attractive’ to addicts, so that the further spread of these conditions could be 
prevented, but was also motivated by the wider realisation that heroin addiction had 
important social dimensions which could not be ignored by medical practitioners 
offering treatment.  For the clinical psychiatrist to retain a role in the expanding drug 
 4
‘policy community’ he or she needed to demonstrate that they could combine the 
‘medical’ with the ‘social.’1   
 To an extent, this combination of medical and social existed in all attempts to 
deal with addiction: ‘social’ elements could be discerned in ‘medical’ practices and 
vice-versa.  Indeed, the notion that addiction was a problem requiring both medical 
and social approaches was by no means specific to the period under consideration.  
Both these elements can be discerned in responses to substances described as 
‘addictive’ throughout the twentieth century.  This does not, however, suggest that 
addiction was, or is, an invariant reality.  Indeed, a wider consideration of the history 
of addiction indicates that this is a malleable term moulded by a range of powerful 
forces.  Regardless of arguments about the ultimate flexibility of all concepts and 
language, the meaning of addiction has been more contested than other more stable 
terms.  Notions of addiction have changed over time, place and context: addiction is a 
construction that reflects the values, ideas and fears of the society in which it is, or 
was, created.  To demonstrate this, it is necessary to analyse the history and 
historiography of addiction.  This Introduction will consider historical approaches to 
addiction and relate these to theoretical understandings of some of the key issues 
involved, such as the role of expert knowledge in the creation of labels such as ‘the 
addict.’  From theory it will turn back to historiography to argue that though the 
current literature on the history of addictive substances is expanding, two areas have 
yet to be sufficiently developed: firstly, most historical analyses of drugs and British 
drug policy end in the mid-twentieth century, and secondly, much of the existing 
                                                 
1 The expansion in the range of groups and individuals involved in the development of drug policy in 
the 1980s has been described as the ‘policy community’ by Virginia Berridge in Opium and the 
People: Opiate Drug Use and Drug Control Policy in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century Britain, 
(Revised edn., London: Free Association Books, 1999) and V. Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug 
policy: continuity or change?’, in V. Berridge & P. Strong, AIDS and Contemporary History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 135-152, p. 141. 
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literature on this area lacks the insight that an engagement with theoretical approaches 
to addiction provides.  This thesis attempts (at least partially) to rectify this 
imbalance. 
 
1.  What was addiction?  The historiography of addiction 
According to Jessica Warner the ‘modern conception of alcohol addiction’ emerged 
during the seventeenth century.2  Contemporaries were aware that the regular 
consumption of alcoholic beverages could result in habitual drunkenness, a state, 
Warner argues, Stuart clergymen often described in terms of addiction.  She found 
that seventeenth-century sermons and religious writings on drunkenness asserted that 
drinkers could lose control of their behaviour, resulting in a compulsion to drink.  
Preachers referred to parishioners ‘addicted to drunkennese’ whose drinking had 
turned from ‘delight into necessitie.’3  There was, Warner argues, also a related 
tendency to describe habitual drunkenness as a disease and even as an epidemic.  This 
description emanated not from physicians, but from the clergy.  The disease concept 
of addiction was thus a moral rather than medical construction, created through 
clerical appeal to inner-discipline as a means of social control.4  In this, Warner may 
well be correct, but there are some problems with her analysis in other areas.  
Crucially, the contemporary understanding of what the term ‘addiction’ meant did not 
necessarily reflect the meaning Warner ascribes to it.  According to the Oxford 
English Dictionary, seventeenth-century usage of the word meant inclination, bent, 
                                                 
2 J. Warner, ‘ “Resolv’d to drink no more”: addiction as a pre-industrial construct’, Journal of Studies 
on Alcohol, 55, (1994) 685-691, p. 685.  
3 J. Downame, ‘A disswasion from the sin of drunkenness foure treatises tending to diswade all 
Christians from foure no lesse heinous then common sinnes: namely, the abuses of swearing, 
drunkennesse, whoredome and briberie’, 1609, quoted in Ibid. p. 687.   
4 Ibid. p. 690. 
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leaning, or penchant towards something, often a habit or a pursuit.5  Moreover, the 
illustrative quotations provided from this period suggest something rather more 
benign than Warner’s choice of examples indicate.  A work on Shakespeare, 
published in 1675, remarked on ‘His own proper Industry and Addiction to books.’6  
Although Warner does note the wide usage of the term, observing that during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century addiction ‘did not necessarily imply a loss of 
control over one’s drinking behaviour,’ the tenor of her article suggests otherwise.7  
She appears eager to relate early modern usage of ‘addiction’ to more recent 
understandings of the term, and is quick to describe seventeenth century drinkers in 
terms they may not have understood or used themselves.  For example, Warner states 
that drunks referred to in a sermon ‘are in fact addicts’ and contemporaries were not 
‘blinded to the addicts in their midst.’8   Despite referring to addiction as a ‘construct’ 
in the title of her paper Warner has a fixed idea of what addiction is, and therefore 
what it was; she does not appear to be sensitive to different understandings of 
addiction across time and space. 
 This is not a criticism that can be levelled at Harry Gene Levine whose article 
on the ‘discovery’ of addiction in America has set the tone for a number of critical 
considerations of the condition.9  Levine argues that the modern concept of 
alcoholism as a progressive disease dates from the end of the eighteenth century.  
Prior to this, the assumption was that people drank because they wanted to, not 
because they were compelled to.  Levine asserts that doctors associated with the 
temperance movement created the addiction paradigm in order to explain the 
                                                 
5 Oxford English Dictionary Online, http://dictionary.oed.com. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Warner, ‘“Resolv’d to drink no more”, p. 686. 
8 Ibid. p. 687, p. 688. 
9 Warner’s article is, in part, a response to this: H.G. Levine, ‘The discovery of addiction: changing 
conceptions of habitual drunkenness in America’, Journal of Studies on Alcohol, 39, (1978), 143-174. 
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overwhelming desire for drink amongst their patients.  These doctors thought that 
inebriety or habitual drunkenness was a disease derived from the consumption of 
alcoholic drinks.  Addiction was thus located in the drug as alcohol itself was held to 
be inherently addictive.  After the prohibition era, Levine notes a change in the 
addiction paradigm.  He argues that addiction was no longer located in alcohol, but in 
the alcoholic.  Levine considers this change to be ‘intraparadigmatic,’ as both notions 
of addiction held that the only cure was abstinence.10   
To explain the emergence of the concept of addiction Levine utilises a 
‘sociology of knowledge’ approach.  He uses Foucault and Weber to argue that the 
concept of addiction developed not just because it made sense to drunkards, but 
because it also made sense to large numbers of the middle classes who were trying to 
keep their own desires in check.  Thus: 
The invention of the concept of addiction, or the discovery of the phenomenon 
of addiction, at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, can be understood not as an independent medical or scientific 
discovery, but as part of the transformation in social thought grounded in 
fundamental changes in social life – in the structure of society.11 
 
Addiction was, therefore, a social construction; one that Levine feels is still relevant 
today, or at least at the time of the publication of his article in 1978, since he argues 
that the conditions which made addiction a reasonable way of interpreting behaviour 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth century did not disappear in the twentieth.  What was 
different, however, is what Levine calls ‘the degree of human interdependence’ which 
made it ‘possible to see the “social” nature of what had formerly been viewed as 
“individual” problems.’12  There are some difficulties with Levine’s equation of the 
disease concept of habitual drug and alcohol use with addiction.  Warner’s work, no 
matter how flawed in other areas, does indicate that the description of habitual 
                                                 
10 Ibid. pp. 143-145. 
11 Ibid. p. 166. 
12 Ibid. p. 166. 
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drunkenness as a disease predates the notion of addiction (disease based or 
otherwise).  This does not, however, detract from Levine’s insight on the development 
of a social dimension to addiction, a premise that will be expanded on in more detail 
below.   
Disease was also an essential element in the emergence of the concept of 
addiction in Britain.  Most historians date the ‘birth’ of addiction in the nineteenth 
century and whilst there is some disagreement about the precise point at which this 
occurred, all point to both moral and medical influences, bound together through the 
notion of disease.  The most thorough exploration of this theme is found in Geoffrey 
Harding’s Opiate Addiction, Morality and Medicine: From Moral Illness to 
Pathological Disease.13  Harding argues that addiction was initially constructed as a 
moral failing by organisations such as the Society for the Suppression of the Opium 
Trade (SSOT).  However, morality was connected to disease through the idea that the 
addict suffered from a ‘pathologically impaired moral faculty’; that the use of opium 
resulted in physical damage to the will.  Harding asserts that this made sense to the 
largely Quaker membership of the SSOT who believed that the moral faculty 
physically existed and could, therefore, be harmed by the use of ‘stimulants’ such as 
opium.14  Yet the SSOT were not the only body to describe compulsive opium use in 
terms of pathology and morality; this view also gained credence within the medical 
profession during the nineteenth century.  Doctors too began to refer to addiction as a 
‘moral pathological phenomenon,’ such that ‘by the late nineteenth century the effects 
of opium could be commonly understood, either directly or by implication, in terms of 
a pathologically debilitated moral faculty.’15  Harding notes that even those physicians 
                                                 
13 G. Harding, Opiate Addiction, Morality and Medicine: From Moral Illness to Pathological Disease 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988) 
14 Ibid. pp. 33-34. 
15 Ibid. pp. 54-55. 
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who believed that there was a physiological basis to addiction and continued to search 
(unsuccessfully) for this retained the notion that addiction was a disease of the will.16 
This combination of medical and moral approaches to addiction expressed 
through ‘disease’ has been emphasised by other commentators on the period.  Terry 
Parssinen and Karen Kerner argue that there was a broad consensus on the disease 
theory of addiction encompassing a range of voices and authorities.  Some referred to 
addiction as a ‘moral insanity,’ others to a ‘disease of the will,’ yet, ‘these definitions 
did not reflect fundamental disagreements…but rather differing emphases on parts of 
the same problem.’17  Virginia Berridge reaches a similar conclusion.  She asserts that 
‘medical as well as moral perceptions defined disease theory’; that ‘addiction was 
disease and vice.’18  Berridge addresses the question of how it was that medicine 
came to see addiction as a disease, as do Parssinen and Kerner.   They all point to the 
advent of the hypodermic syringe in 1856 as a significant moment, as the possibility 
of subcutaneous injection of large doses of morphia helped to bring the use of opiates 
to the attention of the medical profession.19  Parssinen and Kerner maintain the greater 
quantity of drug administered through injection resulted in the intensification of the 
physiological complaints associated with opiate use and that physicians felt guilty 
about creating addiction in their patients through incautious use of morphia.20  
Hypodermic use involved doctors in addiction to a greater extent than previously and 
                                                 
16 Ibid. pp. 63-64. 
17 T. Parssinen & K. Kerner, ‘Development of the disease model of drug addiction in Britain, 1870-
1926’, Medical History, 24, (1980) 275-296. 
18 V. Berridge, ‘Morality and medical science: concepts of narcotic addiction in Britain, 1820-1926’, 
Annals of Science, 36, (1979), 67-85, p. 72, p. 74.  See also Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 150-
151; V. Berridge, ‘Morbid cravings: the emergence of addiction’, British Journal of Addiction, 80, 
(1985) 233-243; V. Berridge, ‘Opium and the doctors: disease theory and policy’ in R.M. Murray & 
T.H. Turner (eds.), Lectures in the History of Psychiatry: The Squibb Series (London: Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, 1990) 101-114. 
19 Berridge, ‘Morality and medical science’, p. 73; Parssinen & Kerner, ‘Development of the disease 
model of addiction in Britain’, p. 275, pp. 290-291.  Berridge also discusses the impact of hypodermic 
syringes on the use of morphine in more detail in Opium and the People, pp. 135-149.  
20 Parssinen & Kerner, ‘Development of the disease model of addiction in Britain’, p. 291.  
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once doctors intervened, as Berridge points out, ‘medical involvement itself helped to 
define the problem and its contribution to disease views.’21   
Parssinen and Kerner also suggest a deeper cause to the development of the 
disease model of drug addiction.  They note that medical men during the nineteenth 
century appropriated certain functions previously exercised by priests: 
Physicians, the new guardians of morality, simply substituted new names for 
ancient evils: madness became mental illness; drunkenness became 
alcoholism; and the sin of Onan became masturbation.  The old sins to be 
confronted and overcome were, by the late nineteenth century, diseases to be 
cured.22 
 
Unfortunately, Parssinen and Kerner do not sufficiently develop this intriguing line of 
analysis.  This is, perhaps, unsurprising as they were writing at a time when the 
history of medicine was just beginning to move away from its positivist origins 
through its interaction with the sociology of medicine.  The suggestion that medical 
knowledge was not objective opened up disease categories for closer scrutiny.  Here, 
the work of French philosopher Michel Foucault has been particularly influential.23  
In The Birth of the Clinic Foucault developed the concept of the anatomo-clinical 
‘gaze,’ which created the body and placed disease within this.24  He argued that 
nineteenth and twentieth century anatomo-clinical medicine was based around what 
could be seen, about what was visible.  Doctors pointed to visible lesions within the 
body of the patient as the source of disease. They were, however, only able to ‘see’ 
                                                 
21 Berridge, ‘Morality and medical science’, p. 73.  
22 Parssinen & Kerner, ‘Development of the disease model of addiction in Britain’, p. 292. 
23 The influence of Foucault on the history of medicine is dealt with in C. Jones & R. Porter (eds.), 
Reassessing Foucault: Power Medicine and the Body (London: Routledge, 1994) and in A. Petersen & 
R. Bunton, Foucault, Health and Medicine (London: Routledge, 1997).  More general accounts of the 
influence of medical sociology on the history of medicine encompassing the work of Foucault to a 
greater or lesser degree can be found in articles contained in D. Porter (ed.), Social Medicine and 
Medical Sociology in the Twentieth Century (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997).  Dorothy Porter also 
considers changes in the approach to the history of medicine when discussing public health in the 
introduction to her work Health, Civilisation and the State: A History of Public Health From Ancient to 
Modern Times (London: Routledge, 1999).    
24 M. Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception (London: Tavistock 
Publications, 1973). 
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certain things, an alliance being ‘forged between words and things, enabling one to 
see [his italics] and to say.’25  The body and the disease within it, therefore, were a 
construction; a combination of what could be seen and what could be expressed.  The 
conventional understanding of the history of medicine as a quest to find pre-existing 
diseases was, therefore, invalid.   
Despite their apparent willingness to engage with what they see as the 
‘radical’ historiography of medicine a positivistic approach can be discerned in 
Parssinen and Kerner’s work on the origins of addiction.  For instance, they argue that 
‘opium’s addictive properties had been noted in the medical literature as early as 
1700, but medical men did not take these very seriously.’26  This suggests that 
addiction was a disease waiting to be ‘discovered.’  Berridge’s use of such language is 
more cautious, but the largely chronological structure of her work does indicate an 
element of progression, something that led Harding to criticise her (and Parssinen) for 
presenting an account directed towards the accumulation of rational thought.27  
Harding argues that he has utilised a different methodological approach to opiate use 
by drawing on the work of Foucault.  He asserts that he does not present a survey of 
the medical or moral responses to givens, or locate when opium dependence first 
became an issue for concern; instead he has tried to describe the social relations that 
made these medical/moral statements on opiate use possible.28  However, 
consideration of some of the most recent work on the concept of addiction would 
suggest that in many ways Harding made the same mistake for which he castigated 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. xii.   
26 Parssinen & Kerner, ‘Development of the disease model of addiction in Britain’, p. 275. 
27 Harding, Opiate Addiction, Morality and Medicine, pp. 83-84.  See also: V. Berridge & G. Edwards, 
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Berridge and Parssinen.  Mariana Valverde, Tim Hickman, Janet Farrell Brodie and 
Marc Redfield all argue that the ‘modern’ meaning of addiction is an essentially 
twentieth century concept.29  Valverde asserts that though the terms ‘addiction’ and 
‘addict’ were used before this period their meaning was much wider, so that 
‘addiction’ was not much different from habit.30  Indeed, the word addiction derives 
from the Latin addicere, which was a Roman legal term meaning a formal giving over 
or delivery by sentence of court: a surrender, or dedication, of any one to a master.  
As indicated above, ‘addiction’ was used from the seventeenth century to describe 
being given to a habit or pursuit, but the earliest recorded use of the term to mean ‘a 
compulsion to continue taking a drug as a result of taking it in the past’ was in 1906.  
It was then that the Journal of the American Medical Association opined: ‘It matters 
little whether one speaks of the opium habit, the opium disease or the opium 
addiction.’31  It is then, perhaps, wrong to speak of habitual drug and alcohol use in 
terms of ‘addiction’ before the early 1900s and more correct to describe these as 
addiction-like, or ‘practices later called addiction.’32  Harding, Berridge, Parssinen 
and Kerner are, therefore, guilty of projecting a twentieth century concept back onto 
an earlier period without fully appreciating the subtleties in differences of definition.  
Despite disparities in the location of the emergence of the concept of addiction 
ranging from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, most accounts hint at a 
surprising degree of continuity surrounding the conceptualisation of addiction as 
                                                 
29 M. Valverde, ‘ “Slavery from within”: the invention of alcoholism and the question of free will’, 
Social History, 22, (1997) 251-268, p. 257; M. Valverde, Diseases of the Will: Alcohol and the 
Dilemmas of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) pp. 5-9, pp. 38-42; T.A. 
Hickman, The Double Meaning of Addiction: Habitual Narcotic Use, Social Degradation and 
Professional Medical Authority in the United States, 1870-1920, Ph.D thesis, University of California, 
Irvine, 1997, p. 5; J. Farrell Brodie & M. Redfield ‘Introduction’ in J. Farrell Brodie & M. Redfield 
(eds.) High Anxieties: Cultural Studies in Addiction (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of 
California Press, 2002) p. 2.   
30 M. Valverde,  “Slavery from within”, p. 257. 
31 Oxford English Dictionary, http://dictionary.oed.com. 
32 M. Valverde, “Slavery from within”, p. 257. 
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medico-moral disease.  The work of Foucault has done much to illuminate the 
relationship between these two seemingly different authorities.  His histories of 
sexuality and of madness indicate that during the nineteenth century an inseparable 
bond was formed between morality and medicine.  In The History of Sexuality, 
Volume One Foucault details the transformation of sex into a discourse.  This 
discourse was governed by the endeavour to eliminate forms of sexuality not 
amenable to reproduction.33  The medical profession led Victorian attacks on 
‘deviant’ sexual practices.34   For example, doctors argued that masturbation caused 
insanity and blindness and that it was harmful to the body.  This reinforced, and at the 
same time partially eclipsed, notions that masturbation was sinful and damaging to 
morality.35  Health and moral purity became entwined.  The medical and the moral 
were not distinct; they were one and the same.  Parallels can clearly be drawn with 
nineteenth-century attitudes towards habitual drug use, where the moral and the 
medical supported one another in defining and responding to this.  The ‘moral-
pathological’ view of ‘addiction’ was thus part of a wider trend in which the medical 
and moral were inseparable.   
 Medicine’s intervention into areas such as sexuality and drug use was 
representative of a process Foucault described in Madness and Civilisation.36  He 
argued that the doctor first became involved with the insane not because they had the 
                                                 
33 M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume One: An Introduction (Middlesex: Penguin, 1990) p. 
36. 
34 There is an extensive literature on Victorian attempts to eliminate deviancy and regulate sexuality.  
See, for example, M. Mason, The Making of Victorian Sexuality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994); F. Mort, Dangerous Sexualities: Medico-Moral Politics in Great Britain Since 1830 (London & 
New York: Routledge, 1987); R. Porter & L. Hall, The Facts of Life: The Creation of Sexual 
Knowledge in Britain, 1650-1950 (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1995). 
35 For a discussion of Victorian responses to masturbation see above and R.P. Neuman, ‘Masturbation, 
madness and modern concepts of childhood and adolescence’, Journal of Social History, 8, (1975) 1-
27; R.P. Neuman, ‘The priests of the body and masturbatory insanity in the late nineteenth century’, 
Psychohistorical Review, 6, (1978) 21-32. 
36 M. Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2001). 
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‘objective’ skill and knowledge necessary to deal with madness, but as a result of his 
position in society as a moral authority: ‘It is not as a scientist that homo medicus has 
authority in the asylum, but as a wise man.  If the medical profession is required, it is 
as a juridical and moral guarantee, not in the name of science.’37  Similar forces were 
perhaps at play in medicine’s intervention into addiction.  The nineteenth century 
doctor concerned with addiction was as much a moral authority as he was a medical 
authority.  At first medicine could offer no more knowledge about addiction or a 
different approach to the condition than had already been developed by moralists, 
resulting in its appropriation of the pre-existing moral-pathological view.  However, 
as medicine embraced science and empirical method it began to offer a ‘rational’ view 
of addiction, one that resulted in a more ‘medical’ disease model of addiction, 
appearing to emphasise medicine over morality.  The Rolleston report (1926) into 
morphine and heroin addiction has been characterised as being the epitome of this 
view, but it could be argued that the medical view of addiction retained moral 
elements; that science masked an essentially moral discourse.38   
Foucault considered the effect of the development of medico-moral discourses 
in The History of Sexuality.  He asserted that these produced subjects: for example, a 
‘pedagogisation’ of children’s sexuality produced the masturbating child and the 
‘psychiatrisation’ of perverse behaviour produced the perverse adult.39  Medical 
knowledge and expertise accumulated around these subjects, so that an authority on 
                                                 
37 Ibid. p. 257.  There has also been a considerable amount of work on lunatic asylums in Britain and 
how here too physicians adopted ‘moral’ methods and made them ‘medical’.  See, for example, A. 
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38 The impact of the Rolleston report on views of addiction will be discussed in greater detail below, 
and in Chapter One.  For a discussion of the ‘medical’ view of addiction and the Rolleston report, see 
V. Berridge, “Stamping out addiction”: the work of the Rolleston Committee, 1924-1926’ in H. 
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addiction’, pp. 289-290.  
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the particular subject was created.  This is a theme that has been developed by Nikolas 
Rose, in Governing the Soul, where he is concerned with how we understand 
ourselves and how we are understood by those who administer, govern, control and 
police us.  He examines a form of knowledge he calls ‘psy,’ rising from psychology 
and affiliated professions, to see how humans make themselves the subjects, objects 
and targets of knowledge.40  Rose argues that regulation based on these ‘psy’ 
disciplines and practices created governable subjects by claiming to ‘know’ the 
individual.41  The role of regulation in the production of subjects has received 
attention from, among others, historians of sexuality.  Jeffery Weeks has explored 
how nineteenth-century regulation of homosexuality led to the ‘creation’ of the 
homosexual.42  Once more, parallels can potentially be drawn with the regulation of 
drug use.  Farrell Brodie and Redfield argue that: ‘Like the homosexual…the addict 
emerged with development, a little more than a century ago, of a medico-legal 
discourse capable of preconceiving human identity in the language of pathology.’43  
This opens up the possibility that twentieth-century regulation of drugs helped to 
construct addiction by creating the label ‘addict.’ 
For such an assertion to hold weight ‘addiction’ and the ‘addict’ must have a 
meaning that is agreed upon by all parties involved in regulation; medical, moral, 
political and so on.  The work of Valverde on the alcoholic in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century points to ways in which this identity was undermined, 
suggesting a challenge to ‘the by now conventional Foucauldian thesis regarding the 
                                                 
40 N. Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self (London: Free Association Books, 
1999) p. vii. 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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increasing power of governance through identity categories produced by experts.’44  
Valverde argues that the medicalisation of alcoholism was damaged by its conception 
as a disease of the will; alcoholism was not a disease because the only cure lay in the 
exercise of the patient’s will.  She asserts that the discourse of medical experts on 
alcoholism was constantly being undermined by references to vice and habit.45  
Valverde explores tensions between medical and moral approaches to addiction 
ignored by other commentators.  She argues that alcoholism was not a coherent 
diagnosis.  The medical profession could not agree on a universally accepted 
definition of alcoholism or approved treatment method.  The medicalisation of 
alcoholism could, therefore, be said to have failed, but, as Valverde points out, 
‘perpetually failing regulatory projects ought not to be simply dismissed as “failures”: 
they can be analysed in order to illuminate the structural dilemmas involved in 
disciplining “deviants” in a liberal society of “free” individuals.’46 
Valverde’s exposure of tensions within the medicalisation of alcoholism is 
particularly useful for an exploration of changes in addiction over the twentieth 
century.  Internal and external pressures on medical views of, and responses to, 
addiction will form a key theme of this thesis.  But, a wider consideration of the 
historiography of addiction has also indicated that a number of consistencies can be 
detected in ideas about the habitual use of drugs and alcohol since the seventeenth 
century, as medical and moral forces worked together, as well as in opposition, to 
define this as a disease.  This thesis will, therefore, consider both continuities and 
changes in the addiction paradigm.  There were a range of conflicts within 
understandings of and responses to addiction between 1960 and 1989, echoing past 
                                                 
44 Valverde, “Slavery from within”, p. 268. 
45 Ibid. p. 257.  See also Valverde, Diseases of the Will, pp. 24-28, pp. 59-67, pp. 68-75. 
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tensions as well as reflecting new ones created by the increasingly ‘social’ dimension 
to the debate over addiction.  Addiction became a social problem as a result of a 
dramatic increase in drug use numerically and by new cohorts of the population, as 
older, middle class, therapeutic users were overshadowed by young, working-class 
recreational users, but also because of wider changes in views of disease and public 
health.  This brought a range of agencies into addiction, presenting a challenge to the 
authority of the clinic-based psychiatrist who had largely been responsible for the 
treatment of this condition since the late 1960s.   
The fate of addiction in the mid-to late-twentieth century has not received as 
much academic consideration as in earlier periods.  Like Valverde, Carol Smart has 
criticised the medicalisation thesis as a way to explain ideas about addiction.47  She 
argues that scientific, legal and moral discourses have intermingled in responses to 
addiction since the nineteenth century; that no one force was solely responsible for the 
outcome of drug policy.  It would be wrong, she states, to see attempts to regulate 
drug use in the early twentieth century as the outcome of conflict between, on the one 
hand, doctors who saw addiction as a disease and, therefore, a medical problem and, 
on the other, the Home Office which saw it as a moral issue and, therefore, a social 
problem.  She asserts that the medical understanding of addiction was imbued with a 
sense of morality and that doctors did not work in opposition to the Home Office but 
with it.48  This unity, Smart argues, continued into the 1960s and beyond, and is 
explained by the fact that the same forms of ‘rational’ knowledge underlay social and 
medical views of addiction.49  Rachel Lart has criticised Smart for not recognising 
that there was a change in the way addiction was perceived as a threat to public 
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of Addiction, 79, (1984) 31-39. 
48 Ibid. pp. 35-36. 
49 Ibid. p. 37. 
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health.50  She argues that the medical understanding of addiction shifted between the 
1920s and the 1960s, a shift that can be seen in the definition of addiction provided in 
reports into heroin use.  The 1926 Rolleston report considered addiction to be a 
medical disease, whereas the second Brain report of 1965 suggested that addiction 
was a social disease.51  Lart contends that increased surveillance of the addict allowed 
authorities to see a bigger picture of addiction, to chart the course of disease within 
the social body.52  This paralleled broader changes in public health that stressed the 
relationship between individuals rather than the environment as a cause of disease.  
Lart considered further changes in perceptions of addiction during the 1970s and 
1980s in her doctorate.53  She asserts that in the 1970s the social disease of addiction 
was replaced with an individualised psychiatric understanding of the condition.  In the 
1980s this gave way to the concept of the ‘problem drug taker,’ a notion that widened 
the range of problems associated with drug use but also opened up drug use to 
something closer to a life-style than a disease by suggesting that drug use was a 
choice, not a compulsion.54   
These arguments require investigation in greater detail, but it is worth raising a 
few points at this stage.  Firstly, Lart’s characterisation of addiction as a social disease 
in the 1960s, a psychiatric disease in the 1970s and a lifestyle choice in the 1980s 
suggests a degree of coherence and agreement on addiction that was simply not 
present.  This periodisation might represent the dominant view in each decade, but by 
no means the only one.  Indeed, what perhaps dominates the history of addiction is the 
continuing and considerable conflicts over its treatment both within medicine itself 
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53 R. Lart, HIV and English Drug Policy, Ph.D thesis, University of London, 1996. 
54 Ibid. p. 50. 
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and between medicine and other interested bodies and authorities.  These tensions 
need to be explored in more detail.  Secondly, Lart’s emphasis on change ignores 
some important continuities.  The social dimension to addiction did not disappear 
with the intervention of psychiatry; it took on different forms or became the 
responsibility of other actors but continued to play a significant role in shaping 
responses to addiction.  Neither did disease-based understandings of addiction vanish 
with the creation of the ‘problem drug taker’; some may have described drug use as a 
lifestyle choice but this was something quite different to the disease of addiction.  
Lart’s periodisation is, however, useful as a guide to shifting ideas about addiction 
between 1960 and 1989, and will be referred to throughout this thesis.  
 
2.  What was a drug?  The historiography of drugs 
Work on the emergence or development of the concept of addiction is just one strand 
of a broader historiography that deals with patterns of drug use and regulation 
throughout the past.  As with addiction, there are problems with definitions.  Andrew 
Sherratt has stated that the term ‘drug’ ‘is used for a category of substances taken into 
the body for purposes other than nutrition: “drug”, in this sense, is opposed to 
“food”.’  Within this term there are, he asserts, two broad areas of meaning, 
‘medicinal preparations and chemically similar compounds consumed primarily for 
hedonistic purposes – where changes in body chemistry are sought for their 
psychological rather than physiological effects.’55  Even this distinction, however, 
masks a whole host of binary sub-divisions: legal/illegal, soft/hard, prescription/non-
prescription, socially acceptable/socially unacceptable, and so on.  And these 
categories are far from being fixed or stable: the meaning of ‘drug’ fluctuates over 
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time, space and context.  Cannabis, for example, is a substance that has oscillated 
between (and within) categories in the past century.  Before the 1920s it was a legal 
(if rarely used in Britain) drug.56  Between the 1920s and the 1950s it was illegal and 
largely socially unacceptable, used by a relatively small, mainly ethnic minority 
population.57  Cannabis remained illegal, but in the 1960s and 1970s it achieved a 
degree of acceptance amongst many young people as a recreational drug.  The 1990s 
saw increasing pressure for clinical trials of cannabis products for therapeutic 
purposes, as sufferers of conditions such as multiple sclerosis claimed the drug had 
beneficial effects.58  In 2004, cannabis was downgraded from a Class B to a Class C 
drug as a result of an Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs (ACMD) report 
which argued that cannabis was less harmful than other drugs placed in the same 
category created by the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1971.59  The government has been quick 
to point out that re-classification does not mean that the drug is legal; users could still 
face arrest and up to two years in prison for possession of cannabis.60    
 Boundaries within and between drug categories are, therefore, clearly 
permeable, defying neat compartmentalism.  Yet, the perceived effect of particular 
substances on the mind, morality, and/or body of the user has evidently played a 
significant role in determining the response towards these.  It is here that ‘addiction’ 
has been important.  Condemnation of a drug has often been linked to the suggestion 
that it was ‘addictive’; that it compelled the user to continue taking it despite 
potentially damaging consequences.  This section will consider historical approaches 
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to drugs that have at some time been considered ‘addictive,’ drawing out parallels and 
delineating contrasts in order to position the treatment of heroin addiction within a 
wider historiographical context.  It will be seen that the state came to play an 
increasing role in the regulation of a range of substances over the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.  Notions of individual and public health became crucial to this 
process.  There was, therefore, a significant level of cross-fertilisation of ideas about 
drug use and regulation despite the frequently contrasting regulatory experiences of 
these.  A consideration of historical approaches to drug use and regulation thus 
facilitates sensitivity to the common themes that relate to heroin as with all drugs, but 
also to its relative peculiarities.    
 There are a number of general works on the history of drugs that do allow 
comparisons to be made.  David Courtwright’s Forces of Habit is one of the most 
recent and erudite attempts to link ‘many separate histories in a big picture narrative 
of the discovery, interchange, and exploitation of the planet’s psychoactive 
resources.’61 Courtwright takes a composite approach to the trade, use and regulation 
of a range of psychoactive substances across the world by comparing what he terms 
the ‘big three’ – alcohol, tobacco and caffeine with the ‘little three’ – opium, cannabis 
and coca.  According to Courtwright, the scale of production, distribution, 
consumption and integration into cultures meant that the ‘big three’ were almost 
impervious to prohibition, whereas the ‘little three’ were less frequently consumed 
and reformers eventually succeeded in making these the subject of global restriction.62  
This switch to prohibition was prompted by objections to the non-medical use of 
drugs.  Courtwright argues that these fell into five categories: firstly, that users did 
direct harm to themselves or others; secondly, that non-medical use inspired criminal 
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violence; thirdly, religious disapproval; fourthly, the association of a drug with 
deviant or disliked groups and finally the perception that drug use endangered the 
future of the group.63  This is a valuable précis of the potential factors involved in the 
regulation of drugs, one that could be applied to a range of substances across time and 
space.  Forces of Habit is thus a useful introduction to the issues involved in 
responses to drugs. 
 Jan-Willem Gerristen has also considered the forces lying behind the 
regulation of drugs, noting in his history of alcohol and opiates The Control of Fuddle 
and Flash, that the state is usually concerned with the regulation of the consumption 
of drugs by ‘someone else,’ ‘often outsiders or newcomers: a younger generation, new 
immigrant groups or a combination of the two.’64  Gerristen compares patterns of 
regulation across time and between countries, looking particularly at England, the 
Netherlands and the USA.  His approach highlights contrasting systems of control; the 
prohibitive American Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914 has, for example, frequently 
been compared to the supposedly ‘liberal’ ‘British System’ of drug control which 
permitted the prescription of drugs to addicts.65  In addition, Gerristen’s focus on 
‘England’ rather than ‘Britain’ raises an interesting issue.  Though the two terms are 
often conflated when discussing the British drug policy, this was not the same across 
the entire British Isles.  For example, DDUs were not introduced in Scotland in 1968; 
the treatment of addicts remained in the hands of general psychiatrists and GPs 
throughout the 1970s, 1980s and beyond.  This anomaly has not been sufficiently 
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explored.  Indeed, it is to the USA that commentators have usually looked for 
contrasts with UK policy rather than to the home nations or other European 
countries.66  Further research into cross-national parallels is needed and would 
complement a growing literature on cross-cultural comparisons.  Two recent edited 
volumes Jordan Goodman, Paul Lovejoy and Andrew Sherratt’s Consuming Habits 
and Roy Porter and Mikaus Teich’s Drugs and Narcotics in History have focused on 
the use, as opposed to regulation, of drugs.67  Consuming Habits is wider in terms of 
geographical spread, analysing drug use throughout Europe, North and South 
America, Asia and Africa, whereas Drugs and Narcotics in History is more Euro-
centric.  Both books cover a broad range of time-periods from prehistory to the 
present day and both expand perceptions of what constitutes a drug by considering a 
diverse range of substances.  Such an approach suggests an interesting paradox 
between the continued cultural specificity of some substances such as qat or betel and 
the ubiquity of others, such as alcohol or tobacco.  This is perhaps because, as 
Goodman and Lovejoy indicate, ‘those substances that entered international 
commerce…as a result of their appropriation by Europeans in the early modern period 
are especially visible,’ but this does not solve the question of why Europeans took 
away some substances for consumption and not others.68  
In addition to these scholarly works, the history of drug use has attracted the 
publication of a number of largely anecdotal accounts such as Brian Inglis’ The 
Forbidden Game and more recently, Kevin Williamson’s Drugs and the Party Line 
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and Stuart Walton’s Out of It.69  These present interesting, if sometimes questionable, 
detail, but are generally short on analysis.  Furthermore, it is often easy to detect a 
political agenda which clouds the authors’ judgement.  Walton, for instance, is clearly 
in favour of the legalisation of drugs, seeking to liberate us from oppressive laws that 
deny our rights: ‘Intoxication belongs to all of us.  It is our birthright, our inheritance 
and our saving grace.’70  This leaves him insensitive to the very real problems created 
by drug use as he seeks to convince the reader of the benefits of intoxication. 
Most approaches to the history of drugs have been devoted to just one 
substance.  Of these, alcohol has received the most attention.  Some have considered 
the place of alcoholic drinks in conjunction with non-alcoholic beverages, such as 
John Burnett in Liquid Pleasures.71  Others have placed the consumption of alcohol in 
the framework of ‘bad habits,’ comparing this to activities such as gambling and 
swearing.72  Most, however, have concentrated on attempts to control drink and 
drinking during the nineteenth century.  Brian Harrison details the efforts of 
temperance reformers to curb drinking, particularly amongst the working-classes, in 
Drink and the Victorians.73  The temperance movement initially targeted individuals 
with a campaign of ‘moral suasion,’ persuading people not to drink alcohol.  
However, the formation of the United Kingdom Alliance in 1853 to campaign for 
prohibition of the trade in alcoholic drinks created a split in the movement between 
the ‘moral suasionists’ and the ‘legislative compulsionists.’74  A.E. Dingle considers 
the work of the United Kingdom Alliance in The Campaign For Prohibition in 
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Victorian England.75  The Alliance did not achieve a ban on the sale of alcohol and 
had little success in persuading Parliament to introduce stricter controls either, but this 
turn to the state rather than the individual to regulate drinking behaviour was a 
significant move.  This suggested that the government had a role to play in controlling 
alcohol consumption, an important precedent for the later regulation of drugs.  Indeed, 
meaningful controls on the sale of alcohol were swiftly followed by regulation of 
drugs: the 1915 Defence of the Realm Act that restricted pub opening hours and beer 
strength was extended in 1916 to prohibit the sale of cocaine, opium and other drugs 
to members of the armed forces without a prescription.76  Work on the regulation of 
alcohol and its place in society during the mid to late twentieth century is thinner on 
the ground than that of the nineteenth century.  Betsy Thom in Dealing With Drink 
provides one of the few accounts of policy towards alcohol in this period.77  Thom’s 
work, particularly on the establishment of specialist Alcohol Treatment Units and the 
creation, by the Kessel Committee, of the label ‘problem drinker’ indicates a 
significant level of cross-fertilisation between alcohol and drug policy which requires 
further investigation.78   
Analysis of policy towards tobacco in twentieth-century Britain has been more 
extensive, expanding considerably in recent years.  The regulation of tobacco has 
                                                 
75 A.E. Dingle, The Campaign For Prohibition in Victorian England (London: Croom Helm, 1980).  
See also A.E. Dingle, ‘Drink and working-class living standards in Britain, 1870-1914’ Economic 
History Review, 25 (1972) 608-622. 
76 This legislation will be discussed in greater detail below, and in Chapter One.  See V. Berridge, ‘War 
conditions and narcotics control: the passing of DORA 40B’, Journal of Social Policy, 7, (1978) 285-
304; V. Berridge, ‘Drugs and social policy: the establishment of drug control in Britain, 1900-1930’, 
British Journal of Addiction, 80, (1985) 233-243; V. Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 246-257; 
Kohn, Dope Girls, p. 29, p. 39, pp. 43-44. 
77 B. Thom, Dealing With Drink: Alcohol and Social Policy From Treatment to Management (London: 
Free Association Books, 1999).  Others have considered the place of alcohol in society, R. Baggott 
from a social policy perspective in R. Baggott, Alcohol, Politics and Social Policy (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1990) or using a political science approach such as J. Greenaway, Drink and British Politics 
Since 1830: A Study in Policy Making (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and J. Greenaway, 
‘Policy learning and the drink question in Britain, 1850-1950’, Political Studies, 46, (1998) 903-918. 
78 This is considered in this thesis in Chapter 1 pp. 59-60, and Chapter 2, p. 120.  B. Thom, Dealing 
With Drink, pp. 50-66, pp. 120-125; B. Thom & V. Berridge, ‘ “Special units for common problems”: 
the birth of alcohol treatment units in England’, Social History of Medicine, 8, (1995) 75-93.   
 26
centred predominantly on the potential damage to health caused by smoking.  Issues 
of smoking and health were considered at a symposium at the Wellcome Institute in 
1995, resulting in an edited collection of papers entitled Ashes to Ashes.  Matthew 
Hilton and Simon Nightingale examined the role of the anti-tobacco movement in the 
creation of the 1908 Children’s Act, which made it illegal to sell tobacco to anyone 
under the age of 16.  Once more, the extent of the relationship between morality and 
medicine is highlighted, as Hilton and Nightingale demonstrate that the anti-tobacco 
movement employed both religious and scientific arguments against the use of 
tobacco by juveniles.79  ‘Health’ was used to legitimate previously moral concerns.  In 
the same collection, Virginia Berridge explored the role of science in determining 
post-war policy and in more recent work she has also considered how policy ‘speaks’ 
to science, particularly through issues such as passive smoking.  The implied risk to 
the health of all, rather than the individual smoker, through passive smoking suggests 
a social dimension to the regulation of drugs in their broadest sense as the state 
intervenes to protect the health of non-smokers as well as smokers.80  Hilton also 
analyses the role of scientific and medical evidence in the creation of policy towards 
tobacco in Smoking and British Popular Culture.  His consideration of the reception 
of ideas about the damage to health posed by cigarettes and the place of smoking and 
smokers in popular culture does, however, suggest limitations to the power of appeals 
to health as more positive representations of smoking in media, such as film, 
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subverted or even inverted the anti-smoking message.81  This illustrates the complex 
and sometimes contradictory relationship between health and policy in relation to 
drugs and individual behaviour.  
Indeed, as James Mills has shown in relation to British policy on cannabis, 
damage to health was not always the most important factor in motivating the 
development of regulation to control drugs and drug taking.  Domestic policy on 
cannabis was shaped by international politics, the result of Egyptian insistence that 
the drug be included on the list of substances to be subjected to worldwide trade 
restrictions agreed at the Second Opium Conference in Geneva in 1924.82  Cannabis 
was subsequently regulated under the Poisons Schedule, despite medical and 
scientific opinion that suggested the drug was not substantially harmful to health.83  It 
is important to remember, however, as Mills indicates, that cannabis was rarely used 
in Britain before the 1950s, with substantial use only taking place in British colonies, 
particularly on the Indian sub-continent.  Cannabis was not considered a threat to 
British health because it was simply not used here on any scale.  
Mills’ book is the first to deal seriously with cannabis use in the past; most 
other accounts have tended to concentrate on largely apocryphal stories and 
conspiracy theories.84  Indeed, this has been the tone of many histories of drugs and 
drug use.  Work on the history of LSD in particular has emphasised links to the CIA 
and international espionage rather than concentrating on domestic use or regulation.85  
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There is, however, a growing body of academic work on the history of drugs that 
considers drug policy in more detail.  Of all the currently illegal drugs opium and its 
derivatives have received the most attention.  Berridge’s Opium and the People is an 
extensive and authoritative account of the use of opium in the nineteenth and (in the 
revised edition) early twentieth centuries.  Two key themes emerge that are central to 
more recent encounters with drugs.  Firstly, Berridge shows how the use of opium 
became a matter of public health as infant doping and self-poisoning with the drug 
posed a potential danger to the health of the population.  Secondly, Berridge indicates 
that ‘the question of who was using the drug – and how – was also important.’86  The 
belief that the working-classes were taking opium for its ‘stimulant’ properties in a 
‘non-medical’ context resulted in the construction of the ‘opium problem.’87  Opium 
use amongst the working-class was thought to be damaging to morality and 
detrimental to production, echoing elements of the temperance movement’s attack on 
alcohol.  This combination of public health and fears about working-class ‘stimulant’ 
use prompted the inclusion of opium on the list of poisons regulated by the 1868 
Pharmacy Act.88  But, as Berridge points out, upper-class social controllers largely 
misunderstood or misinterpreted working-class use of opium, that the boundaries 
between non-medical and medical use were blurred.89  Nonetheless, a distinction was 
made between ‘use’ (medical) and ‘abuse’ (non-medical) that persisted into the 
twentieth century and beyond.   
The Victorian relationship with drugs is also considered by Terry Parssinen in 
Secret Passions, Secret Remedies.  Parssinen covers essentially the same ground as 
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Berridge, though he does make more of the literary representation of opium, a theme 
that has been extensively explored by Alethea Hayter, and more recently in relation to 
a wider range of substances, by Sadie Plant and Marcus Boon.90  Martin Booth’s 
Opium: A History is a more journalistic account, tracing the drug from ancient times 
to the present day as well as emphasising the international dimensions to the history 
of opium, particularly through trade.91  There is considerably less work on the use of 
opiates and opioids in the twentieth century despite this being the era in which 
substantial regulation to control these was introduced for the first time.92  The work of 
Berridge again proves instructive.  In a series of articles, and in the revised edition of 
Opium and the People, she examines the regulation of drugs in early twentieth 
century Britain.  Though there was a fairly limited amount of what could be termed 
‘recreational’ use of drugs in this period, concerns were raised about cocaine use 
amongst troops, resulting in the introduction of the Defence of the Realm Act in 1916, 
which restricted the sale of opium, morphine, cocaine and other drugs to members of 
the armed forces.93  This was later extended to include the general population in a 
climate of ‘moral panic’ about the use of drugs through the Dangerous Drugs Act of 
1920.  It is here, perhaps, that Berridge could have made more of her material.  Marek 
Kohn, in Dope Girls, adds considerable illustrative flesh to Berridge’s outline sketch 
of the drug ‘underworld’ of early twentieth century London.94  Kohn deals with the 
popular response to drug taking in newspapers, fiction and film.  He argues that drug 
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stories and the panic about drug use were a way of articulating deeper fears about the 
changing social position of women and the immigration of racial minorities: in his 
terms, ‘drugs permit the terrors of the social subconscious to be voiced.’95  By 
drawing out the themes of race and gender that underpinned this moral panic Kohn 
more fully places responses to drugs in their social and cultural context. 
Kohn does not, however, pay much attention to medical reactions to opiate 
use, something Berridge analyses in more detail.  She examines the forces at work 
within the Rolleston committee of 1925, tasked with determining whether or not there 
was a medical case for the continued prescription of morphine and heroin to patients 
addicted to these.96  The committee decided that since addiction was a disease this 
was permissible (in certain circumstances), as prescription of the drug alleviated the 
condition.  This conclusion, and the report in which it was encapsulated, (the 
Rolleston report, 1926) has been a key reference point for accounts that deal with 
drug policy after the 1920s.  Richard Davenport-Hines considers the regulation of 
heroin and other drugs in the mid to late twentieth century in the context of a wider 
exploration of narcotics from 1500 to 2000, focusing primarily on British and 
American drug policy.97  His account of the post-Rolleston period makes use of 
selected government papers, newspaper reports, articles in medical journals and 
interviews with some leading protagonists.98  These do present a useful picture of 
events, but Davenport-Hines has been somewhat selective in his use of evidence and 
particularly his choice of interviewees.  Davenport-Hines has spoken to leading critics 
of drug policy between 1965 and 1989 such as Ann Dally, Dale Beckett and Kenneth 
Leech, but not to its defenders, such as Thomas Bewley or Martin Mitcheson.  Too 
                                                 
95 Ibid. p. 2. 
96 Berridge, “Stamping out addiction”, pp. 44-60; Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 271-278. 
97 R. Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion: A Global History of Narcotics 1500-2000 (London: 
Weinfield & Nicholson, 2001). 
98 Ibid.  See particularly pp. 319-330, pp. 367-383. 
 31
often, Davenport-Hines accepts the arguments of his subjects uncritically and uses 
their words to attack drug policy in this period without adequately presenting the 
alternative view.  The Pursuit of Oblivion does not sufficiently engage with both sides 
of the treatment debate in the 1980s.  In addition, though Davenport-Hines’ attempts 
to situate his analysis of policy towards heroin within a wider consideration of drug 
politics by, for example, relating shifting attitudes on the treatment of heroin addiction 
to the American led ‘war on drugs,’ does point to a wider political dimension, this is 
at the cost of ignoring the peculiarities of the treatment debate in Britain.  This was 
remarkably insular, with policy primarily being directed by clinicians not politicians, 
something Davenport-Hines fails to sufficiently emphasise.   
A stronger picture of the extent of medical involvement in policy emerges 
from Bing Spear’s Heroin Addiction Care and Control.99  Spear was the Chief 
Inspector of the Home Office Drugs Branch from 1977 until his retirement in 1986.  
His book presents an invaluable insider’s account of heroin addiction treatment in the 
period under consideration based primarily, but not exclusively, on his own 
observations and experiences as an actor in the shaping of policy.  This is the book’s 
great asset, but also its great flaw: it is not a balanced work of history but a personal 
account and Spear’s own view (which is nonetheless important) dominates 
throughout.  Heroin Addiction Care and Control is extremely detailed and well 
referenced.  Spear (and his posthumous editor, Joy Mott) utilise a range of 
government papers, Parliamentary debates and journal articles to support Spear’s 
contention that ‘the moral high ground was seized by a small group within the 
medical establishment, and by psychiatrists in particular, who, over the years 
succeeded in implanting their own ethical and judgemental views on treatment 
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policy.’100  Spear’s arguments will be dealt with in more detail throughout the thesis, 
but it is important to note that though his contention that policy was primarily directed 
by a small group of consultant psychiatrists is broadly correct, he does not provide a 
sufficient explanation as to how and why this group were able to direct policy.  This 
thesis aims to answer these key questions by considering the nature of clinical 
psychiatry’s claim to expertise. 
The benefits and drawbacks of Spear’s book illustrate a wider problem with 
sources that besets historical analysis of the recent past.  Whilst there is relatively 
little historical work on drug policy between 1960 and 1989, there is a plethora of 
other texts that deal with this subject published during the period in question and from 
a range of perspectives.  The boundary between primary and secondary sources, 
between active participant and historical commentator, is often indistinct.  For 
example, Professor of Jurisprudence, Arnold Trebach’s The Heroin Solution provides 
useful detail and historical analysis of the so-called ‘British System’ of heroin 
addiction treatment from the establishment of the Rolleston Committee to the end of 
the 1970s.101  But, the book was published in 1982 and it includes a section on 
Trebach’s vision for future treatment services.  Trebach was a supporter of the long-
term prescription of drugs to addicts and he clearly had a position on the debates he 
was describing.  This is also the case with numerous other texts: Edwin Schur’s 
Narcotic Addiction in Britain and America (1962); Max Glatt’s The Drug Scene in 
Great Britain (1967); Norman Imlah’s Drugs in Modern Society (1970); Jock 
Young’s The Drugtakers (1971); Horace Freeland Judson’s Heroin Addiction in 
Britain (1973); Gerry Stimson and Edna Oppenheimer’s Heroin Addiction: Treatment 
and Control in Britain (1982) and Marek Kohn’s Narcomania (1987), to name but a 
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few.102  All have a personal perspective; many played an active role in the processes 
they are describing.  The same can be said of more recent edited collections of articles 
on drug addiction treatment by academics that contain pieces by leading protagonists, 
such as John Strang and Michael Gossop’s Heroin Addiction and Drug Policy or 
Susanne MacGregor’s Drugs and British Society.103  Again, these need to be 
examined carefully and not accepted uncritically.  This body of work is extremely 
useful in building up a picture of heroin addiction treatment policy between 1965 and 
1987, but balanced historical analysis that engages with the wider issues involved is 
required.   
 
3.  Sources and thesis outline  
In order to expose and understand the processes that shaped heroin addiction 
treatment in this period this thesis will make use of a range of sources to examine 
heroin addiction treatment policy from the mid 1960s until the late 1980s, before HIV 
and AIDS.  The impact of AIDS on drug policy will be discussed in the Conclusion as 
a separate influence and as a way of reflecting back on the main issues discussed in 
the rest of the thesis.  Printed primary sources utilised throughout the thesis include 
books (such as those mentioned above), articles, letters and comment pieces in 
medical journals and newspapers, Parliamentary debates, committee reports and 
published oral history sources, particularly a series of interviews with leading 
protagonists conducted by the British Journal of Addiction (now called Addiction).  
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The thesis also makes use of a variety of types of archival material.  Chapter One 
utilises government papers (particularly those of the Ministry of Health) held at the 
Public Record Office.  This material is extremely useful for assessing how policy at 
the beginning of this period was formulated, but it has been much more difficult to 
find papers on the practical implementation of policy.  Hospitals have rarely retained 
administrative records and those that do exist are often closed for reasons of patient 
confidentiality.104  Of the 14 London teaching hospitals that established DDUs in the 
late 1960s only two had kept any record of this, and these were merely passing 
references in annual reports and governors’ meetings for St Thomas’ Hospital and the 
Westminster Hospital Group, held at the London Metropolitan Archive.  No 
administrative records for the clinics themselves could be found.105  This does not, 
however, mean that a picture of how these operated cannot be discerned.  Gerry 
Stimson and Edna Oppenheimer conducted an extensive study of London DDU 
operating procedures between 1969 and 1979 and Carol Smart carried out a national 
survey of DDU treatment policies in 1982.106  In addition, there are a number of 
accounts of clinic procedures and methods by the psychiatrists that ran these in 
contemporary medical journals.107 
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  Extensive use has been made of a collection of personal papers that reveal 
much about the debates within drug treatment policy in this period and provide 
material that is simply unavailable elsewhere.  Dr Ann Dally was an important figure 
in the treatment of heroin addiction in this period.  She was a leading private 
psychiatrist involved in the treatment of addiction, an outspoken critic of the clinics 
and short-term withdrawal, a vocal advocate of maintenance treatment, was the 
founder of an organisation to improve the position of the non-clinic doctor in the 
treatment of addiction, a member of a Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) working group on the production of guidelines of good practice and a 
frequent contributor to debates on the treatment of addiction in medical journals.  It 
was, however, Dally’s appearances before the General Medical Council (GMC) on 
two separate occasions for serious professional misconduct as a result of prescribing 
irresponsibly to addict patients, for which she was most renowned.  These cases will 
form the focus of Chapter Three and Chapter Five, but it is argued that they were 
brought within the context of a wider treatment debate; these cases were 
representative of disputes within the medical community about the treatment of 
addiction.  The nature and origin of these disputes will be discussed in Chapter Two 
and Chapter Four.  Again, these chapters make use of the Dally papers, coupled with 
analysis of two central reports on the treatment of heroin addiction, the ACMD’s 
Treatment and Rehabilitation and the DHSS’s Guidelines on Good Clinical Practice 
in the Treatment of Drug Misuse, and relevant articles, letters and comment pieces in 
medical journals and newspapers. 
 Using other sources in addition to the Dally archive is important because this 
collection clearly has limitations.  Dally’s papers are often only able to shed light on 
                                                                                                                                            
769; J. Love & M. Gossop, ‘The process of referral and disposal within a London drug dependence 
clinic’, British Journal of Addiction, 80, (1985) 435-440. 
 36
one side of the debate.  They can reveal much about the ‘defence’ of the GMC cases 
for example, but rather less about the ‘prosecution’ of these.  It is easier, therefore, to 
investigate Dally’s actions and motivations than to get at those of the GMC.  This 
problem is compounded by the fact that comparable papers illustrating the GMC’s 
perspective are currently unavailable.  It is possible that the introduction of the 
Freedom of Information Act in 2005 might open up access to these papers, if they 
have been retained, but they were unobtainable at the time of writing, and issues of 
patient confidentiality would probably prevent these being opened in any case.  
Subsequently, a focus on the Dally archive is justified for three reasons.  Firstly, an 
analysis of Dally’s view is in itself valid, as she was a key figure in the debate over 
the treatment of addiction in this period.  Understanding her position affords a crucial 
insight into one side of this debate.  Secondly, as indicated above, accessing the other 
side of the dispute is difficult.  There are no sources currently available which allow 
for an adequate analysis of the DDU or GMC point of view.  Finally, the Dally 
collection itself is now largely closed, as a result of patient confidentiality, for various 
time periods from 2076 to 2095.108  Material closed includes the transcripts of both 
the GMC cases and the papers relating to these.  Research for this thesis was 
conducted before the collection had been catalogued and with the depositor’s 
permission, so unlimited access was granted.  By making use of this material a unique 
and now largely unrecoverable (at least in living memory) perspective can be 
explored.   
Moreover, the nature of the Dally collection before it was catalogued would 
suggest that this is not as wholly one-sided as might be expected.  The haphazard 
organisation of material, the inclusion of irrelevant personal items and paraphernalia 
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such as knitting patterns, alongside important documents such as letters from the 
GMC, indicates that the collection was not carefully sorted before being deposited.  
Indeed, the presence of material that did not necessarily present Dally in a positive 
light, such as transcripts of interviews with Home Office Drugs Inspectors, would 
suggest that there was no deliberate attempt to limit the deposit to only those 
documents that would support a favourable analysis of Dally’s work.  Though any 
account of Dally’s actions based solely on Dally’s papers would naturally remain 
biased, relating these to other sources and setting them in context allows a more 
balanced picture to emerge.  That this remains more representative of one side of the 
debate than the other is understandable, and given the lack of other currently 
accessible sources, excusable.   
The thesis begins with a consideration of how forces characterised as either 
‘social’ or ‘medical’ shaped the development of heroin addiction treatment policy 
between 1960 and 1979.  Chapter One will argue that whilst both forces were 
important in directing policy, by the 1970s a particular view of addiction treatment 
based on principles of clinical practice was increasingly dominant.  ‘Social’ aspects of 
heroin addiction treatment were retained but took on different forms and were 
diverted to other areas.  This interaction between the social and the medical can be 
observed in three key areas considered in Chapter One: the introduction of the DDUs 
in 1968; the increasing involvement of psychiatry; and the changes in the treatment of 
addiction offered at the DDUs.  These had a number of significant implications which 
will be investigated in the rest of the thesis.  As the changes in treatment methods and 
practices rose from the clinical setting, DDU psychiatrists themselves became the 
leading authorities on the treatment of addiction.  This was vitally important in 
debates over who should be responsible for the treatment of addiction and what this 
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should comprise during the 1980s.  DDU psychiatrists were seen as the experts on the 
treatment of addiction and their views and methods were presented as orthodoxy.  A 
consensus on treatment amongst these doctors meant that the same type of treatment 
was offered to all addicts at all clinics.  DDUs became increasingly homogenous.  
However, this homogeneity inside the clinical sphere encouraged heterogeneity away 
from the DDU.  Increasing numbers of community-based physicians (in both private 
and general practice) encountered addicts as those dissatisfied with the treatment 
offered in clinics sought alternatives elsewhere.   
Chapter Two considers the resulting tension between specialists (hospital-
based DDU psychiatrists) and generalists (community-based general practitioners) 
over the treatment of addiction.  In part, this conflict was rooted in an older divide 
between specialism and generalism, aggravated by a renaissance in general practice 
revitalised by its encounter with biographical medicine.  Within the treatment of 
addiction, however, there were additional pressures on the relationship between 
specialist and generalist.  Although many specialists recognised that wider 
participation in the treatment of addiction by GPs was needed to cope with the 
increasing numbers of heroin addicts they wanted to control and direct this 
involvement as it posed a threat to their newly found expert status.  At the same time, 
the position of medicine as the leading authority on drug problems was at risk, as a 
greater range of agencies and different forms of expertise were beginning to 
participate in the development of policy.  Clinical psychiatrists needed to demonstrate 
that they were the experts on heroin addiction both to their colleagues within 
medicine and to other external bodies and individuals.  
An additional threat to this authority was posed by the growing involvement of 
private practitioners in the treatment of addiction.  Chapter Three contrasts state 
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provided care with the treatment of addiction in private practice.  The homogeneity of 
clinics drove some addicts away from treatment on the NHS altogether and they 
subsequently approached doctors in private practice for help.  However, psychiatrists 
working at NHS DDUs argued that the treatment of addiction in private practice was 
inappropriate, even dangerous.  They asserted that the payment of fees for treatment 
involving the prescription of opioid drugs was problematic.  Addicts might resort to 
selling some of their prescription in order to pay the doctor’s bill, and doctors might 
prescribe unnecessarily in order to continue receiving their fee.  These were issues 
raised during the Dally case, which came before the GMC in 1983.  Dally was 
accused of prescribing opioid drugs to an addict patient in an irresponsible manner.  
Closer analysis of the case and the context in which it was brought, however, reveals 
that this was part of an attack on the treatment of addiction in private practice led by 
DDU psychiatrists who saw private practitioners as a threat to their authority.  As 
many private practitioners involved in the treatment of heroin addiction were 
psychiatrists the threat they collectively posed was not to the existence of the 
treatment of addiction as an area of psychiatric expertise (as with GPs), but was 
instead an assault on the authority of the particular practices (and those who 
developed them) of the DDU.  The treatment of addiction in private psychiatric 
practice suggested that there was an alternative locus of expertise in the field, one that 
existed away from the clinic.   
The potency of this threat was enhanced by the fact that doctors involved in 
the treatment of addiction away from the clinic (whether in private or general 
practice) frequently offered a different type of treatment to addict patients.  Most 
DDUs practised short-term withdrawal treatment.  This comprised of the rapid 
withdrawal of the drug from the addict over a few weeks, at the end of which they 
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would be ‘drug-free’ or ‘abstinent.’  It could then be said that the addict was ‘cured’ 
as he or she was no longer taking their drug of addiction.  Many non-DDU doctors 
offered a different type of treatment.  Community-based physicians in private and 
general practice frequently advocated the long-term prescription of opioid drugs to 
addicts, a form of treatment known as ‘maintenance.’  Champions of maintenance 
argued that the addict could not be forced to come off drugs within a specified period, 
but needed encouragement and help to re-build a stable life before considering 
removal of the drug altogether.  This treatment was aimed not so much at getting the 
addict off drugs but was instead targeted at enhancing the social functioning of the 
patient; improving relationships, employment status and health. 
Chapter Four will examine the conflict between those who supported short-
term withdrawal and those who advocated maintenance for the treatment of heroin 
addiction.  It will argue that this dispute was underpinned by a wider clash between 
contrasting philosophies of medicine and views on the treatment of disease.  It was 
significant that supporters of short-term withdrawal were largely to be found in NHS 
DDUs and those who called for long-term maintenance were often in private or 
general practice.  The relative position of these groups, the environment in which they 
existed and the type of medicine they practised fundamentally affected their 
understanding of addiction and its treatment.  Doctors working in hospital-based 
DDUs practised clinical medicine.  This concerned the diagnosis, treatment and, most 
importantly of all, cure, of disease.  The short-term withdrawal treatment offered to 
addicts in DDUs conformed to these principles; a more ‘medical’ approach to 
addiction.  In contrast, private and general practitioners operating outside hospitals 
frequently practiced biographical medicine, an approach often characterised as 
‘social.’  Here more emphasis was placed on the experience of the sick individual, not 
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just on ridding them of disease.  This explains why private and general practitioners 
treating addicts developed treatment programmes concentrating on the needs of each 
patient and were less concerned with rapid removal of drugs and the ‘cure’ of their 
condition.   It is therefore argued that conflict over the treatment of addiction during 
the 1980s was caused as much by a clash between different approaches to sickness 
and disease as by specific concerns about who should treat the addict or how they 
should be treated. 
Caution, however, should be exercised as this divide can be overstated.  There 
were DDU doctors who supported maintenance and private and general practitioners 
who advocated short-term withdrawal.  Furthermore, rapid withdrawal remained the 
orthodox method of treatment in the mid 1980s and clinicians retained their dominant 
position within heroin addiction treatment policy.  This can be seen in the production 
of the Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment of Drug Misuse in 1984. 
Disputes within the working group tasked with the creation of the guidelines by the 
DHSS were a microcosm of the debate on the treatment of addiction.  Analysis of the 
workings of this committee and the report they produced illustrates the ascendancy of 
short-term withdrawal as the orthodox treatment method for addiction, as the 
dominance of the DDU psychiatrists in the wider treatment world was replicated in 
the committee room.  Voices in support of maintenance came from private and 
general practitioners on the working group, but their views were not included in the 
final report.  Indeed, the Guidelines suggested that the treatment of addiction was not 
a matter for debate; short-term withdrawal was the only acceptable method. 
The support the Guidelines enjoyed from the leading experts on drug addiction 
meant these rapidly acquired the status of rules.  The Guidelines were increasingly 
used in disciplinary hearings to determine whether or not a doctor was prescribing to 
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an addict patient irresponsibly.  Although it had always been intended that the 
Guidelines be used in such a manner, the one-sided nature of this document meant 
that it presented rapid withdrawal as the only acceptable way to treat addiction.  The 
Guidelines were thus a tool that could be used to enforce short-term withdrawal as the 
dominant method of treatment, which at the same time confirmed the supremacy of 
the DDU as the main source of this form of treatment.   The Guidelines were clearly 
used in this manner in the GMC’s second case against Dally for serious professional 
misconduct in 1986-1987.  Chapter Five will argue that the clash between 
biographical medicine and clinical medicine, and its manifestation as a conflict 
between maintenance and withdrawal within the treatment of addiction, was the 
broader context in which this case was constructed, examined and decided.  Despite 
its dominant position, the clinical approach to addiction practised by the DDUs and 
embodied in the Guidelines remained under threat from the independent doctor 
offering maintenance to addicts.  Clinical medicine needed to prove it had the 
‘solution’ to the problem of addiction by placing Dally, maintenance and biographical 
medicine on ‘trial.’  This would demonstrate the superiority of clinical approaches to 
disease and at the same time show that clinical medicine still had a role to play in the 
escalating ‘war on drugs.’  Dally’s second appearance before the GMC was, therefore, 
as with her first, of political significance.   
It is clear that there were some problems with the treatment Dally was 
offering, and these could have brought her to the attention of the GMC quite apart 
from any deliberate attempt to orchestrate a case against her, but these problems were 
constructed in a climate that understood short-term withdrawal to be the best method 
of treatment.  The case would not have been brought if this were not the increasingly 
dominant ideology, one that needed to squeeze out alternatives to ensure its 
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hegemony.  Analysis of the conduct of the GMC hearing indicates that the wider 
battle over the treatment of addiction ran throughout the case.  The hearing was less 
about Dally’s misdemeanours and more about confirming the treatment of addiction 
as a matter not for the community-based doctor offering long-term prescription.  It is 
all the more surprising, therefore, that whilst Dally was found guilty of irresponsible 
prescription to one patient, the GMC did not condemn her overall philosophy and 
methods.  The long-term prescription of opioid drugs to addicts was, to some extent, 
vindicated by this verdict.  Indeed, there were signs that a more widespread thawing 
of attitudes towards maintenance was taking place.  Leading DDU psychiatrists 
publicly stated that a case could be made for long-term prescription to some addicts.  
Former staunch advocates of rapid withdrawal began to accept that maintenance 
treatment could have beneficial effects for the addict and for society.  This can be 
partly attributed to a shift in the way addiction was viewed in the light of HIV and 
AIDS.  AIDS was construed as a greater threat to public health than heroin addiction, 
and a desire to prevent the spread of HIV amongst intravenous drug users, and from 
them to the general population, legitimated maintenance as a form of treatment 
believed to be ‘attractive’ to addicts.  However, as the Conclusion will demonstrate, 
AIDS resulted in the continuation of dominant trends rather than the foundation of an 
entirely new policy.  Clinical psychiatrists had to address the social elements of 
addiction rather than just the medical aspects if they were to preserve their expert 
status in an ever-widening drug ‘policy community.’  Thus, the ‘social’ and the 
‘medical’ continued to interact in the provision of treatment for addiction, just as they 
had in the past.    
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Chapter One 
 
Medical versus Social: Heroin Addiction Treatment Policy 1965-1979 
 
 
Introduction 
 
From a cursory glance at heroin addiction treatment policy between 1965 and 1979 it 
could be supposed that there were two discrete forces involved in the creation of 
distinct approaches to addiction.  Firstly, there was the ‘medical’ view in which ‘the 
addict should be regarded as a sick person’ and ‘should be treated as such.’1  
Secondly, there was a ‘social’ understanding that defined addiction as a problem 
requiring ‘control,’ as a ‘menace to the community.’2  Yet, the fact that both of these 
quotations are taken from the same source, the 1965 report of the second 
Interdepartmental Committee on Heroin Addiction (the Brain committee), indicates 
that medical and social understandings of, and approaches to, addiction were not 
mutually exclusive.  Indeed, the conflation of these two apparently separate forces 
was perfectly expressed by the Brain committee’s description of addiction as a 
‘socially infectious condition’; a label that simultaneously conjured up concern for 
both individual and collective health, for the disease of the addict and for the sickness 
of society.3  
The relationship between medical and social approaches to addiction, between 
treatment and control, was clearly complex and multi-faceted but not necessarily 
contradictory.  Such an interpretation contrasts with the stance of many previous 
commentators who have tended to stress either the social or the medical dimensions to 
heroin addiction treatment policy in this period.  Arnold Trebach, Gerry Stimson and 
Edna Oppenheimer have all emphasised the control elements inherent within the 
                                                 
1 Drug Addiction: The Second Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Heroin Addiction, 
(London: HMSO, 1965), p. 8. 
2 Ibid. p. 8. 
3 Ibid. p. 8. 
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‘British System’ after 1968.4  Others, such as Griffith Edwards and David Whynes 
have seen the creation and running of specialised Drug Dependence Units (DDUs) as 
an inherently medical response to a medical problem.5  This chapter will show that 
both elements were present and though tensions between medical and social 
approaches to addiction can be observed, these worked together as well as in 
opposition. 
The intricacies of this dynamic dialogue can be observed in three areas.  The 
first is the opening of the DDUs in 1968.  Here it is argued that the creation of 
specialised treatment centres was based on Brain’s reformulation of addiction as a 
social disease, a description that united medical and social concerns.  Though the 
‘British System’ of heroin addiction treatment had always encompassed social and 
medical elements this understanding brought the two elements even closer together.  
It was in this context that DDUs were tasked with treating the individual addict and at 
the same time preventing the spread of this condition within society.  However, 
putting this policy into practice was problematic, as the Ministry of Health received 
conflicting advice from the handful of existing ‘experts’ on the treatment of addiction.  
Furthermore, many of the hospitals and doctors asked to take on this role showed little 
enthusiasm for the policy of providing those addicts who did not wish to stop taking 
heroin with the drug in order to prevent the development of a black market.  This 
reluctance to take on a social role suggested a degree of tension between the dual aim 
of treatment of the diseased addict and control of the social problem of addiction.   
                                                 
4 Trebach, The Heroin Solution, p. 110; Stimson & Oppenheimer, Heroin Addiction, p. 61, pp. 94-113; 
G. Stimson, ‘Treatment or control? Dilemmas for staff in drug dependency clinics’, in D.J. West (ed.) 
Problems of Drug Abuse in Britain: Papers Presented to The Cropwood Round-Table Conference, 
(Cambridge: Institute of Criminology, 1978), 52-73. 
5 G. Edwards quoted in Judson, Heroin Addiction in Britain, p. 145; D.K Whynes, ‘Drug problems, 
drug policies’ in D.K. Whynes & P.T. Bean (eds.), Policing and Prescribing: The British System of 
Drug Control (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 1-14, p. 3.  
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Those who did take on the treatment of addiction at the DDUs were 
predominately psychiatrists.  The second section of this chapter considers the growing 
role played by psychiatrists in the response to addiction.  This process, which H.B. 
‘Bing’ Spear (former Chief Inspector of the Home Office Drugs Branch) referred to 
as the ‘psychiatrising’ of addiction treatment policy, can be observed in the advice the 
Ministry of Health received over how to deal with addiction.6  Instead of turning to 
the GPs who were thought to be responsible for the over-prescription of heroin, but 
who had nonetheless dealt with the majority of addicts, the Ministry appealed to 
psychiatrists like Thomas Bewley and Philip Connell.7  Spear argued that the 
experience of the addict-friendly GPs was ignored in favour of the ‘London 
psychiatric establishment,’ but was unable to offer any explanation for how addiction 
became the ‘fiefdom of the consultant psychiatrist’ beyond thinly veiled attacks on the 
influence of ‘medical politicians.’8  This is plainly inadequate.  The reasons behind 
the intervention of the psychiatrist require further exploration, as does the whole 
notion of the ‘psychiatrisation’ of addiction.  This section will contend that there is a 
need to look beyond the individuals involved to explain the growing role played by 
the psychiatrist in dealing with addiction.  Psychiatry as a whole was expanding in 
this period.  It is in the light of the increasing power and authority of psychiatry and 
the proliferation of what Nikolas Rose describes as ‘psy’ practices that explains the 
‘psychiatrisation’ of addiction as much as the actions of a small group of consultants.9  
Moreover, the psychiatrist was not alone in the field; from the late 1960s onwards 
there was a proliferation of bodies and individuals interested in the problems posed by 
                                                 
6 H.B. Spear, ‘The Early Years of the “British System” in practice’, in Strang & Gossop, Heroin 
Addiction and Drug Policy, 3-28, p. 24. 
7 T.H. Bewley, ‘Conversation with Thomas Bewley’, Addiction, 90, (1995) 883-892, p. 885; P.H. 
Connell, ‘Conversation with Philip Connell’, British Journal of Addiction, 85, (1990) 13-23, pp. 16-17.  
8 Spear, Heroin Addiction: Care and Control, pp. 189-193.  
9 Rose, Governing the Soul, pp. vii-viii.  
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addiction.  There were tensions between these groups and psychiatry, tensions that 
were underpinned by the continued conflict between the ‘medical’ and the ‘social.’   
Indeed, a close examination of the actual practices of the DDUs suggests that 
social dimensions to the treatment offered persisted despite an apparently more 
medical, or rather psychiatric, response.  The ‘psychiatrisation’ of addiction it seems, 
cannot be equated with ‘medicalisation.’  The final section of this chapter shows how 
strong social elements were retained within the treatment of addiction even as DDU 
psychiatrists tried to formulate a more ‘medical’ response to the condition through the 
prescription of orally administered methadone (an opioid substitute) to addicts in 
place of intravenous heroin.  Giving addicts methadone instead of heroin was 
perceived to be a more ‘therapeutic’ response as it was thought to lead more readily to 
the ‘cure’ of addiction; to the addict coming off drugs altogether.  At the same time, 
enhanced controls were being placed on the individual addict, suggesting the 
persistence of a social function for the treatment of addiction.  Practices such as 
asking addicts to sign a ‘good-behaviour contract’ spoke more of ‘control’ than 
‘treatment.’  DDUs thus continued to offer an amalgamation of the ‘medical’ and the 
‘social.’ 
 
1.  The ‘British System’ and the opening of the DDUs 10
1.1  The development of the ‘British System’ of drug addiction treatment and control  
 
The ‘British system’ of drug addiction treatment had always encompassed medical 
and social elements but until the 1960s these remained largely separate entities.  
Opiate-based preparations were freely available and widely used in the treatment of a 
range of common ailments throughout the nineteenth century.  As Virginia Berridge 
                                                 
10 This section is based heavily on an article published by the author.  See A. Mold, ‘The “British 
System” of heroin addiction treatment and the opening of the Drug Dependence Units, 1965-1970’, 
Social History of Medicine, (forthcoming, December 2004). 
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has indicated, the only constraints placed on the sale of opiates were the same ones 
that controlled other poisons.11  Specific regulation to control narcotic drugs as a 
distinct category was introduced during the First World War as anxiety about cocaine 
use amongst troops led to an extension of the Defence of the Realm Act in 1916.  This 
made it an offence for anyone other than a licensed medical practitioner to supply 
heroin or cocaine to a member of the armed forces.12  Regulation was initiated 
because drug use represented a social menace by undermining military efficiency.  
The remit of drug control legislation was later extended because of international 
pressure in a climate of panic about the recreational use of drugs.  A salacious drugs 
underworld was thought to exist, where evil Chinese men doped innocent young 
women and led them into a life of debauched slavery.  Drug use thus posed a threat to 
sexual and racial purity.13  Anxieties about the trade in, and use of, drugs were not 
confined to Britain.  American legislators were particularly vocal on this matter and 
pressed for international restrictions on the trade in narcotic drugs in addition to 
domestic policies.  Suppression of the traffic in opium and other drugs became one of 
the responsibilities of the League of Nations in 1919.  As a result of these 
international commitments the Dangerous Drugs Act was created in 1920.14  This 
extended the controls placed on the supply of drugs to soldiers to include the general 
population.  Buying, selling or being in possession of cocaine, heroin and other opiate 
drugs without a prescription became a criminal offence.  This, according to Berridge, 
was the beginning of an increasingly penal era of drug policy.15    
                                                 
11 Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 113-122.    
12 Ibid. pp. 246-257; Berridge, ‘War conditions and narcotics control’; Berridge, ‘Drugs and social 
policy’, pp. 17-29. 
13 Kohn, Dope Girls. 
14 Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 258-60; pp. 262-264. 
15 Ibid. pp. 264-247 
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Medicine, however, was not completely excluded from the debate.  Indeed, the 
period saw the production of the Rolleston Report which firmly established 
medicine’s interest in drug taking and addiction.  Concern about the amount of opiates 
being prescribed to patients prompted the government to consider the nature of 
addiction and the treatment required.  The Departmental Committee on Morphine and 
Heroin Addiction (the Rolleston Committee) was convened in 1924 to consider 
whether the prescription of morphine and heroin to addicts was medically viable.16  
The committee found that addicts were few in number, mostly middle-aged, middle-
class and had usually become addicted to morphine as a result of taking opiate-based 
drugs as part of a treatment for another illness.17  This undoubtedly influenced the 
committee’s recommendations and they defined addiction not as a vice or a crime, but 
as a disease.18  A medical response was legitimated whereby addicts could be 
prescribed drugs to treat their addiction, as with any other illness.  Addicts could, 
therefore, be maintained indefinitely on their drug of addiction under the care of a 
General Practitioner when previous attempts at withdrawing the drug had failed.  This 
was the so-called ‘British System,’ its liberal approach being justified by the small, 
apparently socially conformist addict population who did not constitute a ‘problem.’19  
By establishing addiction as a disease requiring medical treatment Rolleston carved 
out a distinct role for medicine in the control and regulation of drug use.  Medicine 
was responsible for the treatment of addiction that could result from drug taking, but 
there was also a penal system for dealing with the social consequences of the use of 
                                                 
16 Report of the Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction, (London: HMSO, 1926) 
p. 2.      
17 Ibid, pp. 9-13; Berridge, “Stamping out addiction”, pp. 52-53; Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 
271-278. 
18 Report of the Departmental Committee, p. 11. 
19 Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 277-278; Kohn, Narcomania, pp. 99-100. 
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drugs.  This was a ‘medico-legal alliance’ of ‘policing and prescribing’ where the 
medical and the penal had distinct, but co-existing roles.20
 The significance of the ‘British System’ established by Rolleston has been the 
subject of much debate, both by historians and by those who played a more direct role 
in shaping drug policy.  Britain, for many years, was the only country to allow the 
unsupervised prescription of injectable opiate drugs to addicts on a long-term basis.  
Other countries such as the Netherlands and Switzerland have only begun to adopt 
similar policies more recently.  Yet, it is likely that the importance of the ‘British 
System’ is as much symbolic as practical.  Berridge argues that the ‘British System’ 
represented an example of liberal drug policy to aspire to by reformers (particularly in 
the USA) seeking to change their own legislation, giving the appearance of more 
cohesion than was really justified.21  Those who were involved in the development of 
the ‘British System’ have also expressed doubts as to its existence.  Addiction 
specialist John Strang and psychologist Michael Gossop stated that the ‘British 
System’ was largely a ‘mythical creature.’  The ‘plain truth of the matter’ they 
asserted, ‘is that there is no British System.’ 22  There was no clear set of rules or 
coherent policy underpinning the ‘British System,’ rather this was a pragmatic, 
flexible set of responses to a constantly changing situation.23  Griffith Edwards 
(Director of the Addiction Research Unit) and ‘Bing’ Spear also deny that the ‘British 
System’ ever existed, or at least not in the way that many commentators have 
portrayed it.24  They argue that concentration on Rolleston’s justification for the 
prescription of drugs to addicts has ignored the elements of control within the ‘British 
                                                 
20 Berridge, Opium and the People, p. 278; Whynes, ‘Drug problems, drug policies’ p. 2. 
21 Ibid. pp. 277-278. 
22 J. Strang & M. Gossop ‘The “British System”: visionary anticipation or masterly inactivity?’, in  
Strang & Gossop, Heroin Addiction and British Drug Policy, 343-351, p. 343. 
23 Ibid. p. 349. 
24 G. Edwards, ‘Some years on: evolutions in the “British System”’, in West, Problems of Drug Abuse 
in Britain, 1-51.  Spear, ‘The early years of the “British System”, 6-27.  
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System,’ such as the enforcement of regulations concerning the supply and 
distribution of drugs.  Indeed, other protagonists, including Strang, have argued that 
the ‘British System’ was based on a medical approach within a penal framework.25  
Whilst it is clear that the ‘British System’ was more mirage than machine, its 
importance as a symbol, even though it is often misunderstood, persists.  
  
1.2  Re-evaluating the ‘British System’: the Brain Committee and the establishment of 
DDUs 
The ‘British System,’ such as it was, remained in place without review until 1958 
when the Brain Committee was appointed to re-assess Rolleston’s advice.26  The 
committee found that little had altered; addicts were still small in number and 
apparently socially conservative in nature.  This led them to conclude that no new 
measures needed to be introduced.27  Yet, almost as soon as the report was published, 
there seemed to be a dramatic rise in the prevalence of heroin addiction.28  The total 
number of addicts known to the Home Office between 1959 and 1964 had risen from 
454 to 753, 47 and 328 respectively being heroin addicts.29  Of more significance than 
the number of addicts was the type of person becoming addicted to drugs.  Firstly, 
addicts were younger: in 1959 11 per cent were under 35 years of age, but by 1964 40 
per cent were in this group.30  Secondly, the new addicts had started taking drugs for 
                                                 
25 J. Witton, F. Keaney & J. Strang, ‘Opiate addiction and the “British System”: looking back on the 
twentieth century and trying to see its shape in the future’ in J. Sheridan & J. Strang, Drug Misuse and 
Community Pharmacy (London: Taylor & Francis, 2003) 5-16, p. 7. 
26 Drug Addiction: Report of the Interdepartmental Committee, (London: HMSO, 1961) p. 3. 
27 Ibid. pp. 16-17. 
28 Kenneth Leech argues that these were not necessarily ‘new’ addicts, but existing addicts that had 
only just come to the attention of the Home Office.  K. Leech, ‘The junkies’ doctors and the London 
drug scene in the 1960s: some remembered fragments’ in Whynes & Bean, Policing and Prescribing, 
35-59, p. 36. 
29 See Figure 2, p. 97. 
30 Drug Addiction: Report of the Second Interdepartmental Committee, p. 5. 
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pleasure rather than as a consequence of medical treatment: 94 per cent of newly 
reported addicts in 1964 were of non-therapeutic origin.31    
The Brain Committee was hastily reconvened to review its findings.  Central 
to their recommendations was a different interpretation of addiction.  Whilst the 
committee accepted that ‘the addict should be regarded as a sick person and treated as 
such’ their proposals reveal concerns that ran beyond the treatment of the individual 
addict.32  The committee recommended that incidences of addiction be notified to a 
central authority, as with infectious diseases.  This analogy was felt to be particularly 
apt ‘for addiction is a socially infectious condition and its notification may offer a 
means for epidemiological assessment and control.’33  Epidemiological information 
had already proved crucial in highlighting the potential dangers to health of smoking 
tobacco.34  Brain’s report must, therefore, be read within a context of greater authority 
being given to epidemiology in this period, as this became an important way of 
describing and responding to disease.35  The ‘infectiousness’ of addiction was 
reflected in the key recommendation made by the committee: that treatment for heroin 
addiction should be located in specialised institutions, or treatment centres.  
Furthermore, as the source of most of the heroin and cocaine being used was found to 
come from over-prescription by GPs and private practitioners it was suggested that 
the ability to prescribe these drugs be confined to doctors working at the treatment 
centres.36  Doctors outside DDUs would still be able to prescribe heroin for pain 
                                                 
31 Public Record Office (hereafter PRO) MH 149/166, quoted in Home Office Memorandum presented 
to the Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, 1964.  
32 Drug Addiction: Report of the Second Interdepartmental Committee, p. 8. 
33 Ibid. p. 8. 
34 Hilton, Smoking in British Popular Culture, pp. 179-180; pp. 189-190. 
35 An epidemiological approach to heroin addiction can be discerned in a number of articles published 
after the second Brain report.  See, for example, T.H. Bewley, ‘Heroin and cocaine addiction’, Lancet, 
(10 April 1965) 808-810; H.B. Spear, The growth of heroin addiction in the United Kingdom’, British 
Journal of Addiction, 64, (1969), 245-255. 
36 Drug Addiction: Report of the Second Interdepartmental Committee, p. 9; PRO MH 149/165, Third 
meeting of the Second Interdepartmental Committee, 4 December 1964; PRO MH 149/166, Home 
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relief, but not for those patients addicted to the drug, a proposal that would restrict 
doctors’ freedom to prescribe drugs for the first time. 
Analysis of the second Brain report suggests that these recommendations were 
the result of a shift in the definition of, and response to, drug addiction.  As 
sociologists Gerry Stimson and Edna Oppenheimer argue ‘Hitherto most discussions 
had focused on the medical treatment of addicted individuals.  The new element 
introduced in the 1960s was the emphasis on the social control of addiction.’37  This 
change was attributed to a transformation in the population of addicts.  Addicts were 
younger and had become addicted not as the consequence of medical treatment, but as 
the result of ‘recreational’ drug use.  The ‘British medical leadership,’ according to 
commentator on heroin policy Arnold Trebach, could not countenance ‘the prospect 
of treating defiant young heroin addicts the same as the deserving aged and infirm.’38  
Heroin addiction was now a greater social problem.  This did not, however, herald in 
an era of enhanced social control over a population of addicts to the exclusion of 
medical treatment of the individual.  Drug addiction treatment and control policy after 
1968 was about just that: treatment and control.  This combination slotted neatly into 
the existing ‘British System’ as it aimed to both limit the drug problem and care for 
the addict.  What was new after Brain reported was a greater conflation of these goals.  
The emergence of this concept of addiction as a social disease was not based 
solely on the changed addict, but was also the result of shifting perceptions about the 
location of disease within society.  David Armstrong, in The Political Anatomy of the 
Body, maintains that the spread of contagious diseases like tuberculosis prompted 
                                                                                                                                            
Office Memorandum presented to the Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction, 1964.  Spear 
and Leech both argue that some of the doctors prescribing to addicts were unfairly blamed for the 
availability of heroin.  They assert a small group of GPs and private practitioners were treating addicts 
responsibly and not over-prescribing.  See: Leech, ‘The junkies’ doctors’, p. 39; Spear, Heroin 
Addiction Care and Control, pp. 126-130, pp. 144-148, pp. 292-293. 
37 Stimson & Oppenheimer, Heroin Addiction, p. 54.   
38 Trebach, The Heroin Solution, p. 174. 
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doctors to examine the relationships between people, and not just the environment, as 
a cause of disease.39  This encouraged the extension of the medical ‘gaze’ (a concept 
developed by Michel Foucault in The Birth of the Clinic) from the individual to the 
whole community.40  Disease was thus located not just in the individual body, but 
also in the social body.  Such a conceptualisation has been utilised by Rachel Lart to 
explain the comparable shifts in the location of addiction.41   She argues that the 
collation of records of prescriptions to addicts from 1934 onwards made the addict 
more visible through increasing surveillance, which enabled the observation of not 
just the individual addict, but of the pattern of disease within society.42  Locating 
disease in society allows for the intervention of government to protect that society and 
prevent disease from spreading.  This is central to long-standing notions of public 
health, but here too there was a shift in focus away from the environment to society, 
as campaigns began to target the health of the individual.43  It is clear that the Brain 
report was drawing on these concepts of public health when it argued that drug 
addiction, if allowed to spread, could become a ‘menace to the community.’44  This 
menace, however, was not just the risk of contracting a physiological disease, but as 
Carol Smart indicates, the threat that the behaviour of drug addicts represented to the 
fabric of society.45  The social threat that addicts posed was not just that they may 
spread their disease to others, but also a more general concern that underlies public 
health; that it was a waste of human resources.  Addiction was a disease that was 
                                                 
39 D. Armstrong, The Political Anatomy of the Body, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). 
40 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic. 
41 Lart, ‘Changing Images of the Addict and Addiction’, pp. 1-8 Lart elaborates on these themes in her 
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wasteful and unproductive, thus posing a threat to the economic, as well as social and 
physical health of the community.  The combination of medical and social ‘danger’ 
expressed in public health rhetoric necessitated both the treatment and control of drug 
addiction.  It is often very difficult to separate these as two distinct strands of drug 
addiction policy.  As Stimson has pointed out, staff at clinics fulfilled both treatment 
and control roles.46  Although these had always been the concern of drug policy the 
DDUs represented a closer union of what had been characterised as ‘medical’ and 
‘social’ responses.  This development was facilitated by broader changes in the 
perception and location of disease, enabling Brain and his colleagues to describe 
addiction as a ‘social’ disease. 
There is little evidence to suggest the wider medical profession were 
profoundly moved by this view of addiction.  Doctors were more concerned about the 
potential threat to their autonomy posed by the increased regulation of the treatment 
of addiction than deeper conceptual changes.  An editorial in the British Medical 
Journal found notification of addiction to the Home Office to be a ‘sound and 
acceptable’ idea but was concerned about the proposed restrictions to the right to 
prescribe freely.47  Their main objection was that ‘Because of the weakness – or 
worse – of a handful of doctors’ prescription was to be restricted and this would be ‘a 
grave step.’48  It seems that the British Medical Journal’s objection was based more 
on the defence of a principle than a specific complaint about the recommendations, as 
the article conceded that treatment centres were ‘acceptable’ and ‘Any practitioner 
with a case of addiction to heroin or cocaine will feel relieved if he knows he can send 
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such a patient for treatment elsewhere.’49  This was supported by the observation that 
few practitioners were actually willing to see addicts.  An investigation by The Times 
found there were only two dozen doctors in London prepared to treat addicts because 
of the trouble they caused, and as Stimson and Oppenheimer note, protests about the 
restriction of prescription were ‘muted’ because ‘the proposals would remove from 
the majority of doctors any need to do the medical “dirty work” of treating addicts.’50  
The Lancet raised even fewer objections to the Brain report than the British Medical 
Journal.  Whilst commenting that ‘It certainly seems very hard that the whole 
profession should suffer this limitation on its professional judgement’ it argued that 
doctors ‘might be wise to accept the limitation, which is likely to save much 
frustration in an area where therapy by non-specialists is virtually impossible.’51  The 
process which led the medical profession to accept restrictions to their powers of 
prescription was thus a dual one: on the one hand addiction was seen as a social 
problem and not, therefore, the responsibility of the doctor; but on the other, the 
treatment of addiction was being portrayed as an increasingly specialised area of 
medicine, beyond the capacities of the generalist.    
This complex inter-play between the social and medical can also be observed 
in the reaction to one of Brain’s other central recommendations – notification.  
Despite both the British Medical Journal and the Lancet accepting the need to notify 
addicts to a central authority, Ministry of Health files reveal that not all sections of the 
medical community were happy with this proposal.  The Scottish branch of the British 
Medical Association (BMA) were particularly displeased with notification 
commenting ‘it is very difficult for a doctor to accept that he can, and indeed must, 
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notify his patient without that patient’s consent.’52  Doctors, however, offered no 
organised resistance to notification.  Indeed, many were already informing the Home 
Office when they came into contact with an addict, so regulations introduced in 1968 
making it a legal requirement for doctors to notify the Chief Medical Officer aroused 
little comment.53  This lack of dissent over the issue of notification at first appears to 
be surprising given that it would seem to threaten the confidentiality of the doctor-
patient relationship, yet this can be explained by the new way in which addiction was 
portrayed.  By emphasising the social infectiousness of the disease of addiction the 
Brain committee encouraged doctors to see it in the same way as other dangerous 
communicable diseases, like tuberculosis.  Viewed in this light, noting incidences of 
addiction was an acceptable loss of a few patients’ rights for the good of society.  As a 
Home Office official remarked to Trebach, ‘Addicts have no rights simply because 
they are addicts.’54
Harmony on notification did not, however, mean that there was a broad 
consensus on how to approach heroin addiction more generally.  The Brain report 
placed the treatment centre at the centre of the response to drug addiction, but 
achieving agreement on exactly what this should be was difficult.  A Ministry of 
Health spokesman neatly summed up the situation in 1967 when he commented 
‘“there is an experimental feel about this whole policy.”’55  The Ministry were 
groping in the dark; they had little idea how to implement a policy that would control 
the spread of addiction at the same time as providing for the treatment of individual 
addicts.  Officials checked that Brain had really envisaged that clinics should have 
this dual function.  A secretary of the committee confirmed they had ‘intended that 
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treatment centres have two roles – treatment of addicts who desired cure (withdrawal 
of the drug, rehabilitation etc.) and the regular supply of heroin or other drugs to 
addicts who were not willing to accept treatment.’56  Brain clearly thought that clinics 
could both control the spread of addiction in the wider population and treat the 
individual addict.  
When the Ministry of Health consulted a number of experts on drug addiction, 
they found that this dual function appeared to be somewhat contradictory.  Although 
there were relatively few psychiatrists who had much experience of dealing with 
addiction in the mid 1960s those that did could roughly be divided into two camps.  
Some of the specialists consulted by officials recognised the social ‘danger’ of the 
spread of addiction and realised that not all addicts would be willing to come off 
drugs.  Such addicts needed drugs to avoid the development of withdrawal symptoms, 
and it was thought that providing them with drugs prevented them from seeking 
supplies on the black market.57  Doctors like Dale Beckett, who operated the Salter 
Unit for the treatment of drug addicts at Cane Hill Hospital, favoured a policy which 
would allow addicts who could not, or would not, give up heroin to be ‘maintained’ 
on the drug.58  This, it was hoped, would prevent the development of an illicit market 
and the worsening of social problems associated with addiction.   
Thomas Bewley represented a second school of thought.  He dismissed the 
prescription of heroin to addicts, arguing instead for transferring them to the synthetic 
opiate substitute, methadone.59  He placed a greater emphasis on ‘curing’ the 
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individual addict rather than allowing them to remain hooked on drugs.  The Ministry 
were unconvinced by this argument feeling that they were ‘faced not with a bad and a 
good solution but with in fact a choice of evils.  The great need was for containment 
in order to prevent the development of an international black market.’60  For this 
reason they decided that clinics would be permitted to prescribe heroin on a 
maintenance basis.  This was translated into policy through a Ministry of Health 
memorandum to doctors in 1967 which stated that ‘The aim is to contain the spread of 
heroin addiction by continuing to supply this drug in minimum quantities where this 
is necessary in the opinion of the doctor, and where possible to get the addict to 
accept withdrawal treatment.’61
 
1.3  Implementation: the purpose and practice of the DDUs 
The central purpose of clinic policy having been established, the Ministry of Health 
began negotiations with those who would be asked to implement it.  Brain had 
reported that most of the new drug addicts were to be found in London, so it seemed 
logical that attention be focused on the capital.62  The Ministry proposed that 
treatment of addiction should be offered in outpatient units set up in the London 
undergraduate teaching hospitals.63  This emphasis on outpatient treatment reflects a 
general trend towards non-residential care for psychiatric conditions and mirrors 
similar changes in the treatment of alcoholism.  As Betsy Thom has shown, Alcohol 
                                                                                                                                            
149/172, Meeting between representatives of the Ministry of Health and Dr Bewley and Dr Monro, 
1966. 
60 PRO MH 149/172, Meeting between representatives of the Ministry of Health and Dr Bewley and Dr 
Monro, 1966. 
61 PRO MH 150/369, HM 67 (16) ‘Treatment and Supervision of Heroin Addiction’, (March 1967).  
This memorandum is also summarised in R.V. Phillipson, ‘The implementation of the second report of 
the Interdepartmental Committee on Drug Addiction’ in R.V. Phillipson, (ed.) Modern Trends in Drug 
Dependence and Alcoholism (London: Butterworths, 1970), 75-89, pp. 84-89. 
62 Drug Addiction: Report of the Second Interdepartmental Committee, p. 8. 
63 PRO MH 149/172, Outline scheme for implementing the recommendations of the Brain Committee, 
31 October 1966. 
 60
Treatment Units established in 1962 initially offered treatment for alcoholism 
primarily on an inpatient basis, but by the latter half of the decade, alcoholics were 
increasingly being seen as outpatients.64  Although there were clear parallels with 
treatment provision for alcoholism, the creation of hospital-based treatment centres 
for heroin addiction contrasted with a more general reduction in the role of the 
institution in the provision of mental health services in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
in favour of a community-based approach.65  Heroin addiction seemed to require a 
centrally controlled, institutional response, as had earlier ‘social diseases’ such as 
tuberculosis and venereal disease.66    
Despite this apparent social imperative, officials found ‘little enthusiasm’ 
amongst staff at London teaching hospitals for the creation of outpatient addiction 
treatment centres.67  Throughout the spring of 1967 representatives of the Ministry of 
Health visited London teaching hospitals to assess their individual reactions to setting 
up outpatient clinics for addicts.68  These varied, but it is clear that there were three 
main concerns.  Firstly, many were sceptical about the Ministry’s suggestion that 
addicts be maintained on heroin if necessary.  Doctors at Guy’s Hospital did not want 
to ‘become a dispensing service on demand to addicts.’69  The board of St Mary’s 
Hospital were ‘dubious about the merits of “maintenance treatment”’ but were happy 
                                                 
64 Thom, Dealing With Drink, pp. 45- 66; Thom & Berridge, “Special units for common problems”: pp. 
75-93.    
65 D. Bennett, ‘The drive towards the community’, in G.E. Berrios & H. Freeman, (eds.) 150 Years of 
British Psychiatry, 1841-1991, (London: Royal College of Psychiatrists, 1991) 321-332; K. Jones, 
Asylums and After: A Revised History of the Mental Health Services From the Early Eighteenth 
Century to the 1990s, (London: Athlone Press, 1993) pp. 181-193; E. Shorter, A History of Psychiatry 
From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of Prozac, (New York: John Wiley & Sons Inc., 1997) pp. 277-
281; Berridge, Health and Society, pp. 30-32. 
66 See D. Evans, ‘Tackling the “hideous scourge”: the creation of the venereal disease treatment centres 
in early twentieth-century Britain’, Social History of Medicine, 5, (1992), 413-433 and for a discussion 
of the dispensaries established to treat tuberculosis see Armstrong, Political Anatomy of the Body, pp. 
7-18.   
67 PRO MH 160/709, Memorandum from Moyes (Ministry of Health) to Slater, 9 February 1967. 
68 PRO MH 160/709. 
69 PRO MH 160/709, Note of meeting between Winner (Ministry of Health) and Clark (Guy’s 
Hospital), 15 December 1966. 
 61
to co-operate if there were extra funds available.70  This highlights the second issue; 
cost.  Those hospitals that agreed to take on the outpatient treatment of addicts were 
unanimous that they would require an increase in funds to do so.  An official noted 
hospitals were ‘hardly likely to give this priority over other cherished projects, and if 
they were to do anything it would have to be on the basis of some additional money 
for the purpose.’71  Although the Ministry had previously anticipated that the running 
costs of the clinics would be ‘inconsiderable’ investigation proved this assumption 
incorrect. 72  An initial estimate of annual costs was in the region of £15,000 per 
clinic, approximately 20 per cent of the extra revenue allocation given to hospitals for 
projects in 1967/8.73  The Ministry’s initial tactic was to assure hospital boards that 
funding would be available if they began to run short towards the end of the financial 
year (this was in line with more general limitations to public spending), but by 
September 1967 grants covering full costs were being made to hospitals to set up 
clinics.74  The third problem raised by the teaching hospitals was that the new centres 
would need staff yet few doctors were prepared to treat addicts.  Furthermore, those 
that did were concerned about the effect this could have on their careers.  The House 
Governor of the Westminster Hospital warned ‘for the sake of his future no 
psychiatrist should be restricted to the subject of heroin addiction.’75  This sentiment 
was echoed by doctors from St Thomas’ hospital, who, in a letter to the Ministry 
argued that the treatment of addicts was ‘a demanding but limiting sphere of work and 
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no doctor should be encouraged to do this work and nothing else.’76  The Ministry of 
Health appeared reluctant to approve rises in staffing levels at a number of hospitals, 
maintaining that the clinics could be manned by existing employees.  This resulted in 
a dispute between officials and staff at Guy’s, resolved only when the existence of the 
unit was in ‘jeopardy.’77  What these negotiations reveal is that a fundamental 
scepticism existed amongst doctors working at the London teaching hospitals about 
the Ministry’s proposals.  Doctors were unsure about the merits of the service they 
were to offer as ‘treatment’ and were reluctant to become involved in a project that 
was more concerned with the social control of addiction.  This was recognised by 
Beckett, who observed in an article in New Society in 1967, that the development of 
DDUs was being held up by ‘the doubts of the hospital boards and the doctors who 
will run them’ and these doubts were the result of fundamental differences in 
approach.78  Beckett argued that psychiatrists are ‘orientated medically, not 
sociologically, as in line with their training.’79  Doctors, he implied, were more 
interested in curing the addict than attempting to control the social problem of 
addiction. 
The prolonged negotiations between the Ministry of Health and the teaching 
hospitals meant that the Government appeared slow to act upon the advice of the 
Brain Committee, stimulating party-political interest in heroin addiction.  Before 
1966, there had been a cross party consensus over the drugs issue, with members from 
both sides stressing the need for action.80  As time went on, however, members of the 
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Conservative Opposition began to express their frustration at the lack of progress.  
The Conservative MP for Ashford, William Deedes, (speaking as much from his own 
interest in the drugs problem than as a representative of any organised Tory policy on 
the issue) did not believe ‘that the Government have measured up to the situation’ 
branding the absence of action as ‘inexcusable tardiness.’81  The Health Minister, 
Kenneth Robinson denied this, maintaining that time had been well spent.82  Yet, 
there was little transparency outside Whitehall about what the Ministry of Health were 
actually planning to do about the drug ‘problem.’  The Sunday Times quoted 
Lawrence Abel, a doctor who had sat on the first Brain Committee and now 
represented the National Association on Drug Addiction, as remarking ‘“Anyone who 
finds out what the Ministry is planning is a miracle worker.”’83  The Guardian were 
no clearer about the provision of facilities for addicts several months later, citing a 
doctor ‘closely associated’ with the new system as saying that when this came into 
force ‘“there will be nothing but bloody chaos.”’84  This lack of clarity is hardly 
surprising given that the Ministry of Health itself was unsure about the policy it was 
to implement. 
The issue came to a head when a letter from a London GP complaining about 
the absence of facilities for drug addicts was published in The Times in July 1967.85  
Dr A.J. Hawes was struggling to cope with a flood of addict patients, but his chief 
concern was that he did not know where he could refer these patients when he was no 
longer able to treat them.  Hawes also sent a copy of his letter to the Ministry of 
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Health, where it caused much consternation.86  The hospitals that were in the process 
of setting up clinics had told the Ministry that they did not want the existence of these 
to become widely known before they were completed for fear of being ‘swamped’ by 
addicts. 87  When officials replied to Hawes, they gave him a list of hospitals 
providing ‘facilities’ for the treatment of addiction and warned him that until these 
were available ‘it would be premature, and unhelpful to addicts as a whole, to give 
any publicity to the units concerned.’88  Hawes ignored this advice, and after checking 
with the hospitals on the list about the ‘facilities’ they were said to have, wrote to The 
Times alleging that the Ministry had deliberately misled him.89  This made front-page 
news when it emerged that of the nine hospitals listed as offering treatment for drug 
addiction, only six of these provided outpatient treatment, and not all of these were 
available on a regular basis.  The situation was confused still further by the 
Government’s Spokesman on Health in the House of Lords, Baroness Philips, who 
stated in a speech to the House that there were eleven outpatient clinics in London, 
and plans for four more.90  A Ministry spokesman tried to excuse the gaffe by 
explaining that ‘facilities’ were different to ‘units,’ and these were not the same as 
‘centres’ or ‘clinics,’ and that the letter sent to Hawes was simply meant to give an 
idea of the hospitals where addicts could be treated by doctors ‘knowledgeable in 
their problems.’91  This prompted a spate of negative articles in the press.92  Hawes 
continued to be a thorn in the Ministry’s side, arguing in the Lancet that ‘I see not the 
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slightest reason why addict clinics should not be set up in every hospital in London 
and all large cities – and that within a week.’93
 The confusion over the location of the clinics is indicative of a wider 
confusion as to their purpose.  An editorial in the British Medical Journal in 1967 
asked ‘What are the realistic aims of treatment – cure or containment?’ a question 
they were still unable to answer in March 1968, just a month before the clinics 
opened.94  The Ministry of Health seemed to recognise there were contradictions in 
their policy.  In a report used for the basis of the memorandum Treatment and 
Supervision, an official noted that the clinics were expected to ‘try and contain heroin 
addiction and at the same time bring as many patients as possible under treatment.’95  
In this sense, the policy the Ministry were trying to implement encompassed both 
medical treatment and social control.  This was to have a number of implications for 
the practical ‘treatment’ of drug addiction in clinics, as what was good for the health 
of the individual addict was not necessarily good for society.  These apparent tensions 
between social control and medical treatment can be observed in the opening of the 
DDUs.  On the one hand, the memorandum that dictated how drug addiction was to 
be treated prioritised social control, emphasising the need to control addiction through 
control of prescription.96  For this reason doctors working at clinics would be allowed 
to prescribe heroin on a maintenance basis to stop the development of a black market 
and the spread of addiction.  On the other hand, clinics were established at key 
London hospitals run by psychiatrists and support staff.  The involvement of 
psychiatrists would indicate that there was a desire to ‘cure’ addicts of their addiction 
rather than just maintain them.   
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This dual policy was put into action in April 1968 when the Dangerous Drugs 
(Prescription to Addicts) Regulations were imposed.  Only those doctors in possession 
of a licence to prescribe Dangerous Drugs could prescribe heroin to addicts.  
Approximately 600 of these licenses were granted by the Home Secretary, almost 
universally to doctors working in clinics.  A total of 15 clinics opened in London, and 
by October there were 1,139 addict patients attending treatment centres, 80 per cent of 
these in the capital.97  The centres were all funded by the Ministry of Health, but 
facilities varied enormously.  What is more, the location and even the description of 
these indicate that drug addiction occupied an ambiguous space.  Some clinics were 
incorporated into the main body of the hospital, often as part of the psychiatric 
department and were clearly labelled ‘Drug Dependency Clinic.’  Others were hidden 
away in the bowels of the hospital, sometimes reached by a separate entrance and 
were more euphemistically entitled ‘Psychiatric Unit Annexe’ or ‘Special Psychiatric 
Clinic.’98  A county medical officer in Cambridgeshire described the drug addiction 
facilities in his region as the ‘containment unit.’99  Many hospitals had made it a 
condition of their accepting the establishment of a clinic that it would be in separate 
facilities or held at different times to other outpatient surgeries to avoid the ‘spread’ of 
addiction to other patients.  Dr Randall at Charing Cross Hospital, for example, 
insisted on holding the addiction clinic in the evenings to prevent mixing with 
‘ordinary’ patients, and addicts were asked to enter the hospital through the back 
door.100  Some psychiatrists working with addicts even claimed they were ostracised 
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by other staff.101  Addiction, it seemed, really was the ‘socially infectious condition’ 
depicted by Brain.  Martin Mitcheson, a psychiatrist at the drug clinic at University 
College Hospital, commented that ‘addiction has succeeded tuberculosis as a social 
disease and you hide addicts at the back of hospitals.’102    
 
2.  Psychiatry, addiction and research – the MRC, the ACDD and the ARU 
2.1  ‘Psychiatrising’ addiction 
Such a characterisation did not mean, however, that the social had superseded the 
medical in understandings of addiction.  Though addiction was described as a social 
disease the central response to this was articulated through a medical framework.  
Allied with descriptions of addiction as a social disease was an equally powerful, and 
not necessarily mutually exclusive, notion of addiction as a psychiatric condition.  
Psychiatry was becoming increasingly important in determining the response to drug 
addiction.  This coincided with a period of expansion and increasing self-confidence 
within British psychiatry more generally, a mood epitomised by the foundation of the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists in 1971.103  As Roy Porter remarked, the decline of the 
psychiatric institution in the latter part of the twentieth century ‘did not entail any 
withering away of psychiatry itself.  Far from it: there was to be marked and 
continued growth in the numbers receiving psychiatric treatment.’104  Indeed, as 
demonstrated by Rose, the post-war period saw the growth of a ‘therapeutic society’ 
where a whole range of ‘psy’ practices based on psychotherapeutic techniques offered 
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counsel to individuals for an equally large range of problems.105  Emphasis shifted 
from severe mental illnesses to seemingly less serious conditions that were believed to 
be more widespread such as depression, phobias, alcoholism and drug addiction.106  
Partly as a result of these conceptual changes the position of psychiatry within 
healthcare services shifted.  Treatment for mental illness was increasingly provided in 
the same way as for other disease: psychiatric hospitals were brought within the remit 
of the NHS in 1948 and mental health services were re-organised in the context of 
general medical services in the ‘Hospital Plan’ of 1962.107  The ‘Hospital Plan’ 
consolidated a drift towards community as opposed to hospital-based care for the 
mentally ill, a development which went some way to addressing the critique of the 
anti-psychiatrists whose most vociferous attacks were reserved for psychiatric 
institutions.108  
 Psychiatry was thus well placed conceptually and organisationally to take on 
the treatment of addiction.  Though it was Rolleston that had first suggested that 
addiction was more likely to be found in those with a history of ‘mental or nervous 
instability,’ Brain was later unequivocal that addiction was ‘an expression of mental 
disorder’ and the best place for the treatment of the addict was the psychiatric ward of 
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a general hospital.109  Indeed, by the late 1960s addiction was increasingly being seen 
as a disease without clear biological cause.  The Chairman of the Biological Council’s 
Coordinating Committee for Symposia on Drug Action suggested in his introduction 
to a paper session on the social and clinical aspects of drug abuse in 1968 that ‘there 
is little evidence to suggest that addiction is a disease in the biological sense.’  
Instead, ‘social and psychological factors may have determined the onset of drug 
use.’110  It appeared to officials that psychiatrists, long tasked with dealing with the 
seemingly similar disease of alcoholism, knew more about this kind of problem than 
any other medical specialty.111  Many of the doctors the Ministry of Health turned to 
for advice on the creation of the DDUs were psychiatrists with experience of treating 
alcoholics.  Max Glatt, a leading name in the treatment of alcoholism, together with 
other psychiatrists specialising in this area, was heavily involved in the establishment 
and early running of the DDUs.112  Few, however, of these doctors had actually seen 
many drug addicts.  Bewley told an interviewer from the journal Addiction that he 
became an ‘expert’ on addiction in 1964 when he had seen only 20 addict patients, but 
this was far more than any other doctor had seen.  He commented  ‘This was how I 
became an “expert.”  I knew little, but everyone else knew less.’113  Spear has been 
critical of the nature of this early expertise.  He argued that psychiatrists credited with 
expert status in this area by the Ministry of Health were a ‘Who’s Who of the London 
psychiatric establishment’; that doctors with any real experience of dealing with 
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addicts, including the over-prescribing GPs and a handful of unconventional 
psychiatrists, were not consulted.114   
To explain this, the processes that led to the creation of an area of expertise 
need to be considered.  For addiction to be thoroughly ‘psychiatrised’ psychiatry had 
to exclude generalists and those who did not adhere to the standard interpretation of 
addiction and its treatment in order to construct a unified body of expert knowledge.  
The exclusivity of addiction was reinforced by a change in the way the condition was 
described, as ‘addiction’ became ‘drug dependence.’  At the Medical Research 
Council (MRC) Conference on Research into Drug Dependence in 1968 the Deputy 
Chairman, Sir Harold Himsworth, proposed that ‘for the sake of semantic clarity the 
term “drug dependence” be used in place of all similar terms.’115  It is likely that the 
MRC were taking their lead from the World Health Organisation’s (WHO) Expert 
Committee on Addiction-Producing Drugs who proposed in 1965 that the term ‘drug 
dependence’ be used instead of ‘drug addiction,’ as this would eliminate the 
confusion of existing terminology.116  This linguistic shift was, however, more than 
simple clarification; it confirmed the ‘psychiatrisation’ of addiction by creating a 
psychiatric term for the condition.  Berridge has argued that ‘addiction’ seemed to 
place too much emphasis on the physical consequences of drug taking, whereas 
‘dependence’ was intended to convey the psychological aspects of this condition.117  
Both terms were used seemingly interchangeably during the 1960s and 1970s, but 
‘drug dependence’ was the more ‘official’ description – as exemplified by the use of 
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‘Drug Dependence Unit,’ ‘Advisory Committee on Drug Dependence’ and the MRC 
‘Working Parties on Drug Dependence.’   
The use of this term strongly suggests that the psychiatrisation of addiction 
was closely entwined with the formation of drug policy.  Indeed, further evidence for 
the increasingly powerful role played by psychiatrists can be found by examining 
their position in the establishment and running of a number of bodies tasked with 
investigating addiction and advising on appropriate methods of dealing with this.  
Psychiatrists dominated the MRC working group set up in 1968 to evaluate different 
methods of treatment for drug dependence and make recommendations on specific 
research projects to be funded by the Council.118  Although Anthony Dornhorst, a 
physiologist, chaired the group the rest of the party were nearly all psychiatrists: 
Connell, Bewley, Owens and Willis all ran DDUs and Gelder and Cawley worked at 
the Maudsley (the foremost psychiatric hospital in Britain).  The remaining members 
were Spicer, a medical statistician and D’Obran, a prison medical officer. 119   
Psychiatrists were also heavily represented on the Advisory Committee on 
Drug Dependence (ACDD).  The ACDD was convened in 1966 as a result of the 
Brain committee’s recommendation that a standing advisory committee be established 
to monitor the ‘whole problem of drug addiction.’120  It was tasked with keeping 
‘under review the misuse of narcotic and other drugs which are likely to produce 
dependence and to advise on remedial measures that might be taken.’121  The 
committee were appointed for three years initially, they were re-appointed in 1969, 
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and continued to operate until 1971 when the Advisory Council on the Misuse of 
Drugs (ACMD) was created through the Misuse of Drugs Act to replace them.122  It 
had been agreed that the committee be chaired by Lord Brain, but when he died later 
that year he was replaced by Sir Edward Wayne, Professor of Medicine at Glasgow 
University, and former Professor of Pharmacology and Therapeutics at Sheffield 
University.  Though the committee clearly contained the ‘broadly-based 
representation’ envisaged by Brain including two MPs, two journalists, one 
magistrate, one senior police officer, one retail pharmacist, one pharmacologist, one 
prison governor, one probation officer, one researcher into student problems, one 
sociologist, one headmaster, the general manager of the Glaxo Group and Baroness 
Wootton of Abinger, the fact that of the six doctors on the group half were 
psychiatrists was deeply significant.123  The initial membership of the ACDD thus 
reflected the diversity of groups and individuals becoming interested in drug addiction 
and at the same time reiterated the central importance being accorded to the 
psychiatrist in dealing with this condition. 
 
2.2  Researching addiction 
The establishment of the Addiction Research Unit (ARU) at the Institute of Psychiatry 
in 1967 also appeared to enhance the role of the psychiatrist.  The Institute was based 
at the Maudsley (which itself had an excellent reputation for psychiatric teaching and 
research) and under the leadership of Aubrey Lewis was credited with some of the 
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key developments in British psychiatry in this period.124  The creation of the ARU at 
such an important centre for psychiatry was indicative of the extent to which 
addiction was regarded as a psychiatric condition.  The Ministry of Health had also 
received a ‘reassuring response’ from Guy’s Hospital and University College Hospital 
about the possibility of setting up a unit but the Chief Medical Officer was in no doubt 
‘that the Maudsley is the right place for our main effort.’125  Headed by a psychiatrist 
(Griffith Edwards) and supported by a number of other consultant and academic 
psychiatrists the ARU was, on one level, another example of the increasing power and 
authority of the psychiatrist in dealing with addiction.126  However, a closer 
examination of the early research conducted by the unit points to the importance of 
the social sciences in assessing addiction, an occurrence that fostered tensions 
between clinical psychiatry and the social sciences, and between treatment and 
research which could be read as a resurgence of the conflict between the medical and 
the social. 
 In addition to its psychiatrically trained personnel the ARU also employed a 
team of social psychologists, social investigators and research assistants, so that by 
1969 they had 21 research staff.127  The inclusion of these social scientists in the work 
of the ARU indicates there were non-psychiatric approaches to addiction in this 
period.  Indeed, Smart argues that the ARU was a ‘manifestation of the optimism that 
flourished during the 1960s, which was based on a belief that (social) scientific work 
could discover the cause, and hence provide the remedy, to complex social 
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problems.’128  The existence of an alternative locus of expertise on addiction 
accompanied by a view of the condition that stressed its social rather than medical 
elements could have posed a threat to the exclusive authority of the psychiatrist, and 
there were tensions between those who conducted research into addiction and those 
who offered treatment for this condition. 
   This tension between treatment and research can be observed in the 
discrepancy between the kind of research projects proposed by the ARU and the MRC 
working groups and the actual studies conducted.  Initial research to be carried out at 
the ARU was intended to provide ‘basic data which can be expected to provide the 
answers needed for effective action to reverse the present upward trend in incidence 
[of addiction].’  Studies were to ‘evaluate, as soon as possible, the best methods for 
treating addicts and preventing further spread of addiction.’129  It was therefore 
proposed that not only should there be socio-psychological and epidemiological 
studies of addiction but also some research into treatment, including a study 
comparing the rapid withdrawal of drugs from addicts with continued prescription 
(maintenance).130  However, a report on the ARU’s first year suggests that the 
research being carried out at the unit was primarily concerned with the social context 
of heroin use rather than investigating treatment methods.  Projects begun or 
contemplated included: heroin use in a provincial town, a study on the effects of 
injected methedrine, a survey of drug taking amongst inner city London school 
children, a follow up study of persons known to use heroin, a study of heroin users 
and their siblings, an examination of the lifestyles of heroin addicts, an investigation 
into the natural history of heroin use in a provincial town and a study on the social 
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functioning of heroin users.131  There were no studies assessing the relative benefits 
of different forms of treatment.   
Nor was this research conducted under the auspices of the MRC, despite the 
council’s working group on treatment methods also identifying the evaluation of these 
as a high priority.  The group had pointed to two main areas requiring investigation.  
The first concerned the role of the DDUs.  Members of the working group pointed out 
‘that it was an article of faith that the treatment centre was a useful institution, serving 
a valuable purpose in the treatment and “cure” (however defined) of heroin addicts’ 
but, ‘the role and value’ of these ‘had never been objectively assessed, and that in 
view of the money and manpower being invested in them, it was of crucial 
importance to make some attempt to do this.’132  The second area they believed 
required investigation was the relative merits of prescribing methadone as opposed to 
heroin in the maintenance treatment of addicts.  The working group ‘hoped that 
regular methadone is less harmful than heroin in its physical and psychological 
effects, and may allow more opportunity for eventual withdrawal.’  They noted that 
‘These propositions require to be proved [sic], but the intention is therapeutic.’133  
This connection with methadone with a more ‘therapeutic’ approach to the treatment 
of heroin addiction will be discussed at greater length below, but it would appear that 
the Working Party had noted a shift in the prescription policies of clinics towards 
methadone as a replacement for heroin, and felt that this should be investigated.134
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A combined Home Office and MRC survey of research in progress on drug 
dependence presented to the Council in 1972 indicates that the work on the evaluation 
of treatment methods remained undone.  The report listed 108 projects, nine of which 
were ‘considered irrelevant to the problems under consideration’ and only 15 of the 
remaining 99 were on ‘general clinical aspects, including treatment.’135  Of these 15, 
three were concerned with drugs other than heroin, such as cannabis or 
methlyamphetamine.  The 12 studies that dealt with heroin and drug dependence more 
generally, with just one exception, were not concerned directly with treatment 
practices.136  There were descriptive studies, such as Bewley’s survey of heroin users 
attending three treatment centres.  There was a study on the effect of addiction on the 
addicts’ general health conducted by Professor Marks and an examination of the 
effects of drug addiction on pregnancy by Elizabeth Tylden.  There was even a 
comparative study comparing British and American treatment methods, but very little 
of this research was directed towards the practical treatment of addiction.137   
 This absence did not go unnoticed.  A review of British heroin addiction 
treatment policy ten years after the establishment of the clinics by Griffith Edwards, 
the director of the ARU, presented a dismal picture of the state of research into the 
treatment response to heroin addiction.  He asserted that ‘Discussion of the future of 
treatment policies is much handicapped by a lack of current information on what is 
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actually being done and what is actually effective.’138  There was no clinical trial 
either of maintenance versus withdrawal, or the relative values of prescribing 
methadone rather than heroin until Richard Hartnoll and Martin Mitcheson’s study on 
heroin maintenance was published in 1980.139  The implications of this highly 
contentious study will be discussed in detail below, but it is worth noting at this point 
that it was not until the National Treatment Outcome Research Study (NTORS) was 
initiated in 1995 that a thorough survey of the relative benefits of treatment methods 
was conducted.140  According to Edwards, important questions remained unanswered 
about the effectiveness of the strategies employed by the DDUs throughout the 1970s 
and into the 1980s.141  An assessment of the clinics and the services they offered was 
not conducted until 1982.  In her national survey of the DDUs sociologist Carol Smart   
noted that  
it is perhaps surprising that relatively little is known about how DDUs, 
especially those outside London, are staffed and organised and that even less 
is known about the broad treatment policy that individual DDUs might adopt.  
What studies we have of DDUs have tended to concentrate on London and 
have also tended to say more about the people using treatment centres than 
about DDUs themselves.  
 
Smart contended that her study would provide the kind of ‘empirical research’ so far 
lacking in the drug dependence field and on which policy decisions should, she 
asserted, be made.142   
Smart was not the sole proponent of such an argument. Gerry Stimson in his 
assessment of drug policy and research in the 1980s noted that ‘there has been a 
marked lack of research on treatment, then and now’ and that ‘treatment policies 
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proceed largely without empirical investigation.’143  Jayne Love and Michael Gossop 
in their examination of the processes of referral and disposal within a London DDU in 
1983 asserted that there was ‘surprisingly little detailed information about the 
operation of the drug clinics’ and not much was known about ‘what actually happens 
to the addict within a drug dependence clinic,’ that ‘few studies have looked at this 
issue on an empirical basis.’144  Dr David Owen, MP, in a lecture to the Society of 
Clinical Psychiatrists Research Fund in 1985 also bemoaned the ‘paucity of research’ 
and the way policy decisions were taken ‘ad hoc without a sustained medical strategy 
that was deeply rooted in medical and scientific evidence.’145   
An explanation for the absence of this kind of research and the apparent lack 
of an empirical basis to treatment policies lies in the nature of the relationship 
between clinical practice and research in this period.  The notion that research 
findings should strongly influence clinical practice is a relatively new concept.  Since 
the 1990s ‘evidence-based medicine’ has gained ground.146  Recent guidelines on 
good clinical practice (including those on the treatment of addiction) have made 
extensive use of evidence derived from research, but this was largely not the case in 
the 1970s and 1980s when these were much more closely based on clinical practice 
and experience.147  Treatment policy, as will be seen in the final section of this 
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chapter, evolved from the clinical setting and was directed by those psychiatrists 
actually involved in the treatment of addiction, not social scientists tasked with 
evaluating these.   
Indeed, there appeared to be a good deal of tension between those engaged in 
treatment and those conducting research.  At the same time as the ARU was 
established Connell created the Drug Dependence Clinical Research and Treatment 
Unit, also based at the Maudsley.148  The unit provided in and outpatient treatment for 
addiction as well as promoting research.149  There was obviously a degree of 
competition between this unit and the ARU.  Discussions amongst Ministry of Health 
officials over a proposed visit by the Duke of Edinburgh to the Maudsley stressed that 
if the Duke were to visit the hospital he must see both Edwards’ and Connell’s units 
‘as there is a certain amount of rivalry between the two and a visit to one and not the 
other might cause difficulty.’150  Connell’s dislike of the Institute of Psychiatry and 
his motives for setting up his own unit were revealed in an interview he gave to the 
British Journal of Addiction.  He asserted that including the term ‘research’ in his 
unit’s name meant that research could be  
funnelled to the unit under my direction, rather than things having to go 
through the Institute of Psychiatry, which I later learned to my cost was 
interested in furthering its own research and service interests rather than trying 
to make a contribution to a very complex and unrewarding field.151  
 
This suggests that Connell was not opposed to research per se; indeed, he had outlined 
the need for research into addiction on a number of occasions throughout the late 
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1960s, but rather he objected to research conducted by someone else into matters he 
did not consider important.152  For Connell and other clinical psychiatrists there was a 
sharp distinction between the research conducted by epidemiologists, sociologists and 
other social scientists ‘to produce by careful research, data relating to the causes of 
drug taking, methods of spread and suggestions relating to prevention’ and ‘the 
challenge to physicians to produce hard data relating to treatment programmes in 
order that [the] most effective methods can be delimited.’153  The implication was that 
social scientists investigated the ‘social’ side of addiction but the ‘medical’ side, 
research into and the development of treatment methods, was left to psychiatrists.   
 
3.  The development of clinical practice in the treatment of heroin addiction,  
3.1  Going to the clinic  
A consideration of the development of clinical practice in the treatment of addiction 
strongly supports the notion that such a divide existed.  Treatment policy between 
1968 and 1979 developed under the direction of psychiatrists with little input from 
social scientists, politicians, government officials, or any other bodies and individuals.   
This should not, however, necessarily be read as a victory for the ‘medical’ over the 
‘social’; these two forces continued to interact and work together to shape the 
treatment of addiction.  This can be observed in the way the DDUs operated and the 
way they dealt with their addict patients.  When the clinics opened in April 1968 the 
doctors running them were woefully inexperienced.  As has already been noted, there 
was a distinct lack of expertise in dealing with drug addiction, and subsequently many 
clinic doctors had never encountered a heroin addict prior to the establishment of the 
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DDUs.154  The first problem that presented itself to clinic staff was how to determine 
if a patient was addicted to heroin, and if they were, how much should be prescribed.  
Gardner and Connell at the Bethlem and Maudsley found that a positive urine test for 
the presence of opiate drugs could assist in diagnosis, but this did not prove that the 
patient was an addict, nor did it indicate what dose was required to prevent the onset 
of withdrawal symptoms.155  Determining the correct amount to prescribe to an addict 
was a crucial decision, but there was no reliable test on which to base this 
assessment.156  In their study of DDU practices Stimson and Oppenheimer found that 
in order to arrive at a dose clinic psychiatrists questioned addicts about their use of 
drugs, checked for needle marks and conducted urine tests, but that the most reliable 
method for assessing dosage level was to admit the addict to hospital where reactions 
to different amounts of opiates could be closely monitored.  However, this seemed to 
be a rare occurrence, as inpatient admission was costly and time-consuming, and 
many DDUs lacked the facilities to admit patients for this purpose.157  The most 
common way of determining the amount to prescribe, according to Stimson and 
Oppenheimer, was for the doctor to ask the addict what they would like to be 
prescribed, and then divide it by two.  This decision was based not on any ‘scientific’ 
evidence, but on ‘a simple rule of thumb.’158  It is likely that these unreliable methods 
of dosage determination, coupled with doctors’ inexperience, led to the over-
prescription of heroin to addicts attending clinics in the first year of their operation.159
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 Doctors working at DDUs found that addicts were unlike patients that they 
had encountered in other areas of medicine.  Margaret Tripp, a psychiatrist who ran 
the DDU at St Clement’s Hospital between 1968 and 1971, noted that many addicts 
did not consider themselves to be ‘sick.’160  This had implications for the doctor-
patient relationship (between clinician and addict) and the treatment offered as part of 
this.  Being, or allowing, oneself to be labelled as ‘sick’ conferred certain attributes.  
Talcott Parsons in The Social System developed one of the most important models 
describing the social expectations and obligations of taking on the sick role.161  He 
found that becoming sick allowed an individual to be excused from the performance 
of normal social obligations and also exempted that person from responsibility for 
their own state.  However, these were contingent on two obligations: to want to get 
well as soon as possible, and to seek technically competent help and cooperate with 
medical experts.162  Although Parsons’ formulation has been criticised, few have been 
able to offer a viable alternative and his basic assumptions about expectations and 
obligations seem to hold true.163   
The addict-patient often failed to fulfil the two basic obligations expected of 
them and this affected their relationship with the doctor, and thus the doctors’ view of 
their condition and its treatment.  Stimson and Oppenheimer found that addicts 
frequently went to clinics because they wanted a clean, legitimate, regular supply of 
drugs ‘but such attendance did not, for many, commit them to seeing that they needed 
“treatment” in the sense of medical help, a “cure”, and eventual abstinence.’164  What 
is more, addicts were often in direct conflict with DDU doctors, demanding, cajoling, 
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threatening and pleading with staff to be prescribed more drugs.165  If addicts did not 
want to get well, and did not co-operate with medical staff their status as ‘sick’ was 
clearly dubious.  Questioning the sickness of the addict threatened the disease-based 
nature of addiction and thus the doctor’s role in ‘treating’ this.  Many doctors working 
in clinics raised these same issues.  ‘Treatment’ in the early years of the DDUs varied 
widely from clinic to clinic.166  Some clinics prescribed intravenous heroin, others 
prescribed intravenous methadone, others would only give addicts oral methadone.  
There were even variations within clinics, with some patients receiving prescriptions 
for heroin and others methadone.  Still others were not offered drugs at all, but instead 
were given psychotherapy, group therapy and or occupational therapy.167   
More significant than the range of treatments initially on offer at the DDUs 
was the rationale behind these.  Stimson and Oppenheimer noted that ‘treatment’ was 
‘often a euphemism for other goals and we have to look not just at what was done to 
or for the patients, but also at the clinicians motivations in so acting.’168  They found 
that many of the psychiatrists they spoke to in 1976 regarded their work as ‘control’ 
or ‘containment’ of the drug problem, and talked about the ‘benefits to society’ of 
their work.  Therapy was still a concern, but Stimson and Oppenheimer felt it was 
unusual to see such a concern for social control within medical practice.169  Treatment 
of the addict and social control of addiction through clinical practice came then not 
just from the stated dual purpose of the clinics, but also from the treatment setting.  
Doctors found that it was difficult to ‘treat’ a ‘patient’ who did not accept that he or 
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she was sick.  Their work then took on the function of social control.  However, some 
clinicians were uncomfortable with their role as social controllers.  A clinic doctor 
interviewed by Stimson and Oppenheimer said that they resented having to act like 
‘policemen with white coats on.’170  If psychiatrists were simply handing out 
prescriptions to addicts with no attempt to get them off drugs they could be said to be 
‘overpaid grocer[s]’ or ‘dealers by appointment to H.M. Government.’171  Many DDU 
doctors disliked prescribing heroin to addicts on a maintenance basis because it 
conflicted with ‘therapeutic ideals, for patients who were maintained, it was argued, 
were not being cured of their addiction.’172  Prescribing heroin to heroin addicts might 
benefit society but it did not appear to cure the individual addict of their disease.  
 
3.2  Treatment, control and the shift from intravenous heroin to orally administered 
methadone 
A change in the prescription polices of the DDUs in the early 1970s suggested a 
rejection of the social control of addiction through maintenance and a resurgence of a 
more ‘medical’ form of treatment directed towards the ‘cure’ of addiction.  There was 
a discernable shift away from the prescription of injectable heroin, first to injectable 
methadone, and then later to orally administered methadone.  In July 1968 2,690 
grams of heroin was prescribed to patients attending DDUs.  By December 1970, this 
amount had fallen to 1,358 grams.173  It was estimated that between 60 and 80 per 
cent of addicts were receiving prescriptions for heroin, or heroin and methadone in 
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1968, compared to 31 per cent of addicts in 1970.174  At the same time as the amount 
of heroin being prescribed and the proportion of addicts receiving prescriptions for 
this drug were falling, the amount of methadone prescribed and percentage of addicts 
taking opiate substitutes increased.  In August 1969, 918 grams of methadone was 
prescribed by clinics to addicts, but just 16 months later, in December 1970, this 
increased to 1,131 grams.175  This meant that in 1970 51 per cent of addicts were 
receiving prescriptions for methadone or other heroin substitutes.176  Over the decade 
this trend continued, so that by 1978 71 per cent of addicts were being prescribed 
methadone, and just nine per cent were receiving scripts for heroin, or heroin and 
methadone.177  Thus, there was a definite move away from the prescription of heroin 
to addicts towards the prescription of substitute drugs such as methadone between 
1968 and 1978. 
 This shift was not based on a policy decision taken by government ministers, 
civil servants or advisory bodies such as the ACDD; it evolved through clinical 
practice.178  Clinic doctors gradually began to prescribe less heroin and more 
methadone to their addict patients.  This development requires explanation on two 
levels.  Firstly, to explain how methadone replaced heroin as the main drug being 
prescribed to addicts and secondly, to understand why this change took place.  
Prescribing methadone rather than heroin did have a number of advantages.  Its longer 
half-life meant that it could be taken less frequently, allowing the addict a more 
‘normal’ life without the constant interruptions of having to inject.179  Injectable 
methadone was cheaper than injectable heroin, although surprisingly little reference is 
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made to this in the contemporary literature, suggesting that this was not a major factor 
in the decision to adopt the drug.180  Methadone could also be administered orally, 
thus removing the dangers of infection that came with intravenous injection.181
Methadone’s ‘image’ however, was as important as the practical benefits its 
use conferred.  Vincent Dole and Marie Nyswander pioneered the use of methadone 
in the treatment of heroin addiction in New York during the mid 1960s.182  Dole and 
Nyswander prescribed heroin addicts orally administered methadone on a 
maintenance basis, a move that was seen as progressive and ‘trail-blazing’ against the 
backdrop of the much more tightly regulated addiction treatment in the USA, where 
prescription of heroin to addicts was prohibited and all previous efforts had been 
directed at curing addiction, not maintaining it.183  This project came to the notice of 
British drug addiction specialists, such as Bewley, who reviewed it in conjunction 
with other American work.184  Yet, Dole and Nyswander’s experiment initially 
seemed to offer little in terms of direct applicability to treatment in DDUs.  Firstly, 
Dole and Nyswander gave addicts methadone orally, which had to be taken in front of 
the doctor or nurse, whereas British addicts in the early days of the clinics were 
accustomed to prescriptions of injectable heroin to be consumed in private.185  
Secondly, Dole and Nyswander claimed that if methadone were taken at sufficiently 
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high doses it would saturate the addicts’ nerves and prevent them from getting ‘high’ 
if they took heroin whilst also being prescribed methadone.186  British experts were 
sceptical about this ‘methadone blockade,’ and it was suggested that this would not 
work with British addicts, as they were already accustomed to higher doses of 
heroin.187  Dole and Nyswander’s experiment’s real importance for British drug 
treatment was that it gave methadone a ‘respectable image.’188  According to Strang, 
Ruben, Farrell and Gossop, methadone ‘in public and professional eyes’ was a 
‘medicinal drug’ whereas heroin was a ‘drug of abuse.’189  Prescribing addicts 
methadone had the appearance of being a more medical approach, having acquired 
this status from its use in the USA, and also because it was not the drug most addicts 
were taking before they presented for medical treatment.  Prescribing methadone thus 
differentiated what DDUs were prescribing from addicts’ own self-medication with 
illicit heroin.  
 A study evaluating the prescription of these two drugs to addicts appeared to 
many DDU psychiatrists to endorse the prescription of methadone to addict-patients.  
In 1972 Martin Mitcheson and Richard Hartnoll conducted a randomised controlled 
trial at University College Hospital DDU to compare the prescription of injectable 
heroin to addicts with the prescription of oral methadone.  Over a three-year period a 
total of 96 addicts were randomly allocated into two groups, the first were prescribed 
heroin on a maintenance basis (HM) the second were prescribed oral methadone on a 
maintenance basis (OM). 190  Hartnoll and Mitcheson assessed patients at the end of 
the trial period on drop out rate, illicit opiate use, frequency of injection, non-opiate 
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use, involvement with drug subculture, employment, health and criminal activity.  
Amongst the most significant of their findings was that 90 per cent of the HM group 
were still injecting heroin one year later, compared to 57 per cent of the OM group.191  
Hartnoll and his colleagues interpreted this to mean that prescribing heroin to addicts 
maintained the ‘status quo,’ with the addict showing little signs of change in lifestyle 
or in coming off drugs, whereas prescribing methadone to addicts instead ‘may be 
seen as a more active policy of confrontation that is associated with greater 
change.’192  There were, however, other consequences of refusing to prescribe heroin 
to addicts and giving them methadone instead.  Hartnoll and Mitcheson noted that 70 
per cent of the OM group were convicted of a crime during the trial period, compared 
with only half of the HM group.193  They also found that 76 per cent of the HM group 
were still visiting the clinic one year later, whereas only 29 per cent of the OM group 
were regularly attending.194  This would indicate that prescribing heroin led to less 
criminal activity amongst addicts and also resulted in more of them remaining in 
contact with treatment services when compared with prescription of methadone.   
The study’s authors were rather guarded in their conclusions.  Hartnoll and his 
colleagues argued that their findings should ‘contribute to a more informed 
discussion’ of treatment options ‘rather than provide an unequivocable [sic.] answer’ 
and that these needed to be considered in conjunction with the desired treatment 
outcome and who it should benefit; society, or the individual.195  This was not, 
however, how the study was received.  Mitcheson observed that his research was 
‘perceived by many staff in London clinics as clear evidence for replacing injectable 
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heroin maintenance with oral prescribing’ and ‘this probably reflected the already 
formulated opinion that the policy of prescribing injectable drugs was, either or both, 
unhelpful to the patient and/or insupportable to therapeutically inclined staff.’196   
This assertion is supported by the relative amounts of heroin and methadone being 
prescribed; the figures quoted above indicate that methadone was already beginning 
to replace heroin as the primary drug being prescribed to addicts by clinics before the 
study was published in 1980.  As Hartnoll and Mitcheson presented their findings 
prior to publication it is likely that many clinic doctors knew of the study and its 
results as early as 1976, but this was still after the switch to methadone had been 
made.197  Indeed, Mitcheson felt the study was ‘used as an after-the-decision 
confirmation.’198  Stimson and Oppenheimer found that although most clinic doctors 
had heard of the study, few had actually read it, nor did they appreciate the caution 
that Hartnoll and his associates had expressed about the direct applicability of their 
results to a treatment situation.  Instead, ‘What concerned them more, as several 
consultants indicated, was that here was scientific justification for a policy change 
that was already emerging from the work context.’199
 This remark hints at another reason for the change from the prescription of 
heroin to the prescription of oral methadone – clinical frustration.  Psychiatrists 
working in treatment centres began to question the value of prescribing heroin to 
addicts on a number of grounds.  By the mid 1970s it was clear that clinics were no 
longer able to undercut the black market by prescribing heroin to addicts.200  Illicit 
‘Chinese’ heroin could be bought in London’s West End from 1967, but its popularity 
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grew as clinics took over the treatment of addicts and the availability of 
pharmaceutical heroin decreased.201  There were other concerns that sprang directly 
from the treatment situation.  As already indicated, addicts could be ‘difficult’ patients 
and this coupled with the lack of therapeutic success resulting from treatment 
(Stimson and Oppenheimer found that only 38 per cent of their sample of addict-
patients had become abstinent in ten years) led to ‘battle-fatigue,’ ‘stagnation’ and 
‘frustration’ amongst ‘demoralised’ clinic staff.202  This prompted a move towards the 
prescription of methadone instead of heroin to addicts, as methadone was seen to be 
more ‘respectable,’ ‘therapeutic’ and could be used in a more ‘confrontational’ 
treatment response designed to provoke change in addict behaviour.203  The 
introduction of methadone, it was hoped, would ‘cure’ addicts.   
 A greater emphasis on the ‘cure’ of addiction was given additional importance 
by the changing administrative context in which the DDUs operated.  Increasing 
evaluation of the DDUs encouraged a response that more readily moved addicts 
through the clinic system, resulting in ‘cure.’  In 1975 the ACMD set up a working 
group to review the treatment facilities provided by the DDUs, producing an interim 
report in 1977.204  Though the report made few recommendations, recognising that a 
much wider investigation of treatment services was required, (the resulting report, 
Treatment and Rehabilitation is discussed in more detail in Chapter Two) it 
represented a more evaluative approach to the work of the DDUs.  As drug use began 
to rise exponentially, attention refocused on the success or otherwise of the DDUs in 
dealing with drug addiction.  An editorial in the Lancet in 1982 opined that the policy 
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of long-term prescription to some patients left the DDUs ‘in a position akin to that of 
a geriatric ward with its beds blocked.’205  Addict patients were not leaving the DDU 
as they were not being ‘cured.’  The prescription of oral methadone on a fixed term 
basis seemed to offer a chance to reverse this trend by providing a more 
‘confrontational’ response, provoking change in the addict, leading to their ‘cure’ and 
subsequent removal from DDU patient lists.  The administrative and financial 
implication of this was not lost on Mitcheson; he noted that the ‘prior introduction of 
time limited prescribing [in the 1970s] may…have subsequently enabled clinics to 
respond to the increased number of new referrals [in the early 1980s], without 
necessitating increasing staff and budgets.’206  
Despite these non-medical factors involved in the adoption of the prescription 
of methadone by the DDUs this was largely interpreted as a more ‘medical’ response 
because of its emphasis on ‘cure.’  Moreover, it was an approach that was not just 
‘medical’ but seen as specifically ‘psychiatric.’  In her study of DDU practices Smart 
found that 90 per cent of the clinics surveyed thought that individual psychotherapy 
was either a ‘very important’ or an ‘important’ part of the treatment they offered, 
compared to the 97 per cent that believed heroin maintenance was not important or 
not their policy.207  Lart asserted that this was indicative of a shift in emphasis on the 
part of DDU psychiatrists from trying to contain the epidemic of drug use to focus on 
the addicts they saw.  Methadone was thus a way of ‘Challenging those patients 
[addicts] therapeutically, and perhaps changing some of them.’  That: ‘“curing” them 
of the disease of addiction, was more important than trying to control society’s drug 
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use.’208  However, this characterisation ignores the retention of a strong social 
dimension to the treatment provided by the DDUs.  DDUs did not just offer treatment 
for addiction: they attempted to control the spread of this condition by placing strict 
controls on the behaviour of addict-patients.  Addicts were required to pick up 
prescriptions on a daily basis so they would never have a surplus that could be sold to 
other addicts.209  Addicts were asked to sign ‘contracts’ agreeing to attend regular 
treatment sessions, reduce their drug dosage by fixed amounts and be drug-free by a 
certain date.210  The introduction of these methods would suggest that DDU 
psychiatrists did not entirely reject their role as social controllers, but at the same time 
enhanced control measures also had some value as ‘treatment’, providing the addict 
with a structure, stability and targets. 211  Treatment and control, the ‘medical’ and the 
‘social,’ were thus bound even more tightly together through DDU practices. 
 
Implications: growing homogeneity in the treatment of addiction 
In contrast to their early heterogeneous response to addiction the DDUs gradually 
became more homogenous, so that by the end of the 1970s all clinics offered 
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essentially the same treatment to addict-patients.212  Replacing intravenously 
administered heroin with oral methadone became the orthodox method of treatment 
for new patients presenting at DDUs from 1976/7.213  Stimson and Oppenheimer 
found in 1978 that there were only three clinics in London that would prescribe 
injectable drugs to new patients.214  Consensus on this issue was based around an 
informal code of practice and maintained through peer pressure within the group of 
London DDU consultants.215  These doctors met regularly from 1968 onwards, first at 
the Department of Health and Social Security and later at the Home Office, to discuss 
treatment policies.216  Spear, who attended these meetings, stated that ceasing the 
prescription of injectable drugs to addicts was first mooted in 1975 when the proposal 
was greeted with general acceptance amongst clinic psychiatrists.217  Although some 
doctors continued to prescribe injectable heroin to addicts during this period, this 
became less and less common.  James Willis, consultant psychiatrist at Guy’s 
Hospital DDU, argued that the situation deteriorated into a ‘race’ to see who could 
prescribe the least heroin.218  Influential DDU psychiatrists such as Connell called for 
‘a uniform approach’ to the prescription of drugs to stop addicts ‘shopping around’ 
for extra, or larger supplies of drugs.219  Uniformity on prescription rapidly turned 
into uniformity on treatment as all DDUs offered essentially the same approach.  But, 
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as clinics narrowed the range of treatment on offer they also narrowed the range of 
addicts who could be treated successfully.  A handful of doctors recognised that 
greater uniformity in DDU treatment policies might discourage some addicts from 
attending clinics altogether.220  Stimson and Oppenheimer spoke to a consultant who 
prescribed only oral methadone, but admitted that this was something of a ‘cul-de-
sac’ response, as it disregarded individual difference and treated all addicts the 
same.221   
Addicts who did not find suitable the treatment response put forward by the 
DDUs sought drugs, and/or treatment, elsewhere.  The ACMD’s 1982 report 
Treatment and Rehabilitation found that in 1970 46 per cent of notifications of heroin 
addiction came from treatment centres, 48 per cent from prison medical officers and 
just six per cent from GPs.  By 1981 the proportion of notifications from treatment 
centres had fallen to 36 per cent, as had those by prison medical officers to 16 per 
cent, but GPs now accounted for 48 per cent of notifications (Figure 1).222  
 
Figure 1: Source of first notifications of heroin addiction, 1970, 1975, 1980 and 1981 
 
 1970 1975 1980 1981 
Treatment 
Centres (DDUs) 
163 
(46%) 
202 
(40%) 
463 
(39%) 
602 
(36%) 
GPs 20 
 
(6%) 
118 
(23%) 
499 
(42%) 
791 
(48%) 
Prison Medical 
Officers 
170 
(48%) 
191 
(37%) 
219 
(19%) 
267 
(16%) 
 
Source: ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 120 
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This shift towards the generalist was, stated the report, an ‘unplanned development’ 
over which there were a ‘number of causes for concern.’223  The issues raised by this 
development require thorough exploration and will be dealt with in Chapter Two, but 
it is clear that there was a growing trend towards the involvement of doctors outside 
the DDUs in treating addiction from the late 1970s and into the early 1980s: that the 
very homogeneity of the clinic response led to heterogeneity in the treatment of 
addiction outside the DDU.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Specialist versus Generalist: the Changing Response to Heroin Addiction 
1979-1985 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter examines tensions between specialists (hospital-based DDU 
psychiatrists) and generalists (community-based General Practitioners) in the 
treatment of addiction.  A threat to the newly created expert status of the psychiatrist 
was posed by the growing involvement of the GP in this area.  The participation of the 
generalist suggested the specialist approach was either flawed or unnecessary.  This 
threat was all the more potent given that it occurred at a time when the dominance of 
medicine in defining the response to drug use appeared to be challenged.  According 
to sociologists Susanne MacGregor and Betsy Ettorre an increase in the size and 
nature of drug use in the 1980s coupled with ‘the failure of the existing treatment 
system’ resulted in a ‘crisis of drug misuse.’1  The existence of this ‘crisis’ prompted 
a dramatic increase in the attention devoted to drug problems by a range of different 
agencies.  Politicians, local authorities, law enforcement agencies, voluntary 
organisations and the media all became involved in dealing with the consequences of 
drug use as never before.  This led Gerry Stimson to argue that medicine was being 
displaced from its central role in determining the direction of drug policy.2  Medicine 
(or more specifically clinical psychiatry) had to compete for a position within what 
Berridge has described as the drug ‘policy community,’ made up of ‘revisionist 
doctors, the voluntary agencies, researchers and, most crucially, like-minded civil 
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servants within the Department of Health.’3  The reaction of clinical psychiatry to its 
new position within the ‘policy community’ and the changed drug problem of the 
1980s require further exploration, as this was a central component of the context to a 
series of other conflicts within the treatment of addiction highlighted by this thesis. 
 Key themes in the formulation of a response to heroin addiction in the 1980s 
can be discerned in Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs’ (ACMD) 1982 report 
Treatment and Rehabilitation.  The ACMD found that treatment provision for addicts 
was largely inadequate.  There were too few clinics and too many addicts.  Addicts 
were seeking alternatives, either on the black market or by turning to private or 
general practitioners for help.  GPs now accounted for the largest proportion of 
notifications to the Home Office of instances of addiction.  This, the ACMD noted, 
was an unforeseen and unplanned development.4  Close scrutiny of the Council’s 
reaction to this development reveals that whilst Treatment and Rehabilitation claimed 
to present a pluralist view of addiction treatment, encouraging a range of medical and 
non-medical agencies to become involved in dealing with what it described as 
‘problem drug use,’ the report contained a powerful sub-text that reinforced the 
specialist nature of treatment for heroin addiction.  Under the influence of DDU 
psychiatrists the ACMD recommended that though GPs might have a role to play in 
the treatment of addiction this should only be under the close supervision of experts in 
the field.  This could be seen as an essentially defensive move, as drug addiction 
specialists sought to protect their expert status by affording the generalist a fairly 
limited role and insisting that this be under their direction. 
 Tensions between specialists and generalists within medical practice, were of 
course, nothing ‘new,’ but the divide between the hospital-based consultant and the 
                                                 
3 Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy: continuity or change?’, p. 141. 
4 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 51. 
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community-based GP was strengthened in this period.  There was something of a 
resurgence of generalism in the 1970s and 1980s after a long drift towards specialism.  
General practice was revitalised through its encounter with biographical medicine, 
which placed the patient instead of the disease at the centre of therapeutic endeavour.  
Here, attention focused less on the diagnosis of disease than on the meaning of illness, 
less on the body and more on the patient him or herself.  This gave the work of the GP 
new meaning and significance, helping to reinvigorate general practice and elevate its 
status.  Increasingly self-confident and self-reliant GPs therefore posed a greater 
danger to the authority of the specialist than they had done previously, particularly in 
areas such as addiction where the nature of that specialism was tenuous and already 
under threat from other bodies and authorities.  Moreover, biographical medicine 
encouraged GPs and other community-based doctors to ‘see’ the ‘disease’ of 
addiction in a different way to their hospital-based, specialist colleagues.  This 
resulted in further conflict between these groups, this time over treatment methods, a 
conflict that will be explored in greater detail throughout the rest of this thesis.            
 
 
1.  The changing nature of heroin addiction in the 1980s  
1.1 The changing pattern of heroin use  
Heroin addiction in the 1980s appeared to be a very different problem to the one 
encountered in previous decades.  Gone was the confidence of the mid-1970s when 
addiction seemed to have ‘fizzled out, like Hong Kong ‘flu.’5  The first indication that 
the pattern of heroin use was altering came in the form of an increase in the numbers 
of notified addicts.  Brian Turner, of the voluntary organisation Standing Conference 
on Drug Abuse (SCODA), told the Daily Telegraph in 1979 that Britain was on the 
                                                 
5 Sunday Times, (4 May 1975), p. 14. 
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brink of a heroin epidemic.6  This assertion was repeated by SCODA’s chairman, the 
Earl of Denbigh, in the House of Lords and echoed by Sir Bernard Braine MP 
(Conservative, Essex South-East) in the House of Commons later that year.7  Braine 
and Denbigh found evidence for this ‘heroin epidemic’ in a sudden rise in the number 
of addicts notified to the Home Office.8  The number of known heroin addicts had 
remained relatively static in the early 1970s, increasing by a few hundred between 
1971 and 1973, and even decreasing between 1974 and 1976 [see Figure 2, p. 100].9  
But from 1977 onwards the number of known addicts rose from 2,016 to 2,402 in 
1978 and to 2,666 in 1979.10  This trend continued into the 1980s.  Between 1980 and 
1981 the number of notified addicts increased by almost a thousand.11  This 
represented a 44 per cent increase in the number of new notifications; a rise Bing 
Spear argued, that could not just be attributed to more accurate data collection.12  
Notifications to the Home Office continued to rise throughout the decade so that by 
1987 there were 10,389 known addicts.13  Despite better reporting of addiction, 
official figures were notoriously unreliable, so that the ‘real’ number of drug addicts 
could have been as much as five or even ten times greater than the reported figures.14
 
6 Daily Telegraph, (20 July 1979), p. 8. 
7 The Hansard Journal of Parliamentary Debates: Lords, 30 October 1979, Vol. 402, 1979-1980, 353-
356; The Hansard Journal of Parliamentary Debates: Commons, 21 December 1979, Vol. 976, 1979-
1980, 1066-1072. 
8 The Hansard Journal of Parliamentary Debates: Lords, 30 October 1979, 353; The Hansard Journal 
of Parliamentary Debates: Commons, 21 December 1979, 1066. 
9 Treatment and Rehabilitation, Table 1, p. 115. 
10 Home Office, Statistics of Drug Addicts Notified to the Home Office, United Kingdom, 1988 
(London: HMSO, 1989). 
11 Ibid. 
12 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 272. 
13 Statistics of Drug Addicts Notified to the Home Office, 1988. 
14 Stimson, ‘British drug policies in the 1980s’, p. 480 and J. Mott, ‘Notification and the Home Office’ 
in Strang & Gossop, Heroin Addiction and Drug Policy, 271-291, p. 287.  The ACMD also noted the 
inadequacy of data on drug users and suggested that the number notified to the Home Office only 
represented a fraction of the total, ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 4. 
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Figure 2: Addicts notified to Home Office, 1960-1989
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  Heroin addiction was not just increasing numerically; it also appeared to be 
spreading geographically.  When the second Brain committee reported in 1964, it was 
thought that heroin addiction was largely confined to London.15  By the end of the 
1970s it was clear that this was no longer the case.  Denbigh, in his speech to the 
House of Lords on drug addiction in 1979, stated that over the past seven years there 
had been a 127 per cent increase in the number of addicts notified who resided outside 
the London area.16  Manchester, Merseyside and Glasgow were particularly affected, 
but opiate use was increasingly to be found in urban areas throughout the UK.17  
Although drug use researchers Geoffrey Pearson and Mark Gilman argue that the 
‘heroin epidemic’ of the 1980s was not truly a ‘national’ problem, pointing to 
considerable regional differences in heroin use, the broader implications of heroin 
addiction were being felt on a national scale for the first time.18  This was recognised 
by the ACMD in their report Treatment and Rehabilitation when they noted that by 
1982 notifications of addiction were received from most parts of the country, 
reinforcing the view that this was no longer a problem experienced by Greater London 
alone.19  
The growing numbers of heroin addicts in 1980s Britain were not necessarily 
confined to a particular social grouping.  Gerry Stimson argues that as drug use 
became less associated with Bohemian or counter-cultural groups it became more 
‘common’ and not associated with any particular view on life.20  Whilst some 
commentators pointed to a link between rising drug use and increased urban 
                                                 
15 Drug Addiction: Report of the Second Interdepartmental Committee, p. 8. 
16 The Hansard Journal of Parliamentary Debates: Lords, 30 October 1979, 355. 
17 G. Pearson, ‘Social deprivation, unemployment and patterns of heroin use’ in Dorn & South, A Land 
Fit for Heroin?  62-94, pp. 65-67; Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 273. 
18 G. Pearson & M. Gilman, ‘Local and regional variations in drug misuse: the British heroin epidemic 
of the 1980s’, in Strang and Gossop, Heroin Addiction and Drug Policy, 102-120, p. 102. 
19 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 25. 
20 G.V. Stimson, ‘The war on heroin: British policy and the international trade in illicit drugs’ in N. 
Dorn & N. South, (eds.) A Land Fit for Heroin?, 35-61, p. 39. 
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deprivation and unemployment, others were keen to stress that drugs were an evil to 
be found at all social levels.21  The nature of the relationship between deprivation and 
drug use was complex, and according to Susanne MacGregor, rapidly politicised.  
Those on the ‘Right’ tended to stress ‘the corruption of young people by outside 
elements – pushers and dealers.’  Subsequently, ‘criminal subversive elements were 
the root of the problem, together with the moral weakness of some young people who 
had not been brought up to say no.’22  Individuals who supported this argument 
asserted that drug use was to be found at all levels of society; it was not deprivation 
that caused drug addiction, but moral corruption.23  This view was often reinforced by 
the media.  Marek Kohn explored tabloid stories of upper class and working-class 
drug use and concluded that heroin was seen as a problem of the estates; the country 
ones and the council ones.24  An alternative view was frequently put forward by those 
on the ‘Left.’  Labour MPs, often in deprived, Northern, urban constituencies were 
quick to suggest there was a strong link between unemployment and addiction.  Allan 
Roberts, Labour MP for Bootle told the Yorkshire Post in 1984 that ‘The Thatcher 
years are “the hard-drug years”…A whole generation is being sacrificed.  The 
Government are directly responsible…unemployed youngsters and teenagers with no 
hope or stake in their future are easy prey to the drug pusher.’25  Attributing escalating 
drug addiction to deprivation allowed the ‘Left’ blame the Conservative government 
and attack its poor record on unemployment and public spending.  Any potential link 
between drug use and unemployment, crime, or social deprivation remained 
politically sensitive despite widely reported clusters of addiction in areas with high 
                                                 
21 Pearson, ‘Social deprivation, unemployment and patterns of heroin use’, pp. 62-63.  
22 S. MacGregor, ‘The public debate in the 1980s’ in MacGregor, Drugs in British Society, p. 3. 
23 Ibid, p. 4. 
24 Kohn, Narcomania, p. 114.  
25 Quoted in MacGreogor, ‘The public debate in the 1980s’, pp. 4-5. 
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rates of unemployment, such as Glasgow and Liverpool.26   Indeed, linking drug use 
with deprivation has only recently become uncontroversial: Griffith Edwards, chair of 
the working group that produced the ACMD’s 1998 report Drug Misuse and the 
Environment, noted that this was ‘the first occasion on which the ACMD had told the 
government that deprivation is a strongly relevant item on the drug policy agenda.’27
Heroin use in the 1980s expanded in scale at the same time as the black market 
in illegally produced and distributed drugs grew.  Illicit ‘Chinese’ heroin could be 
bought in London during the late 1960s and early 1970s, but it was thought that most 
of the illegally produced drugs that reached Britain’s shores at this time were in transit 
for distribution elsewhere.28  However, in 1979 the domestic market for illicit drugs 
expanded dramatically.  This was partly due to changes in supply.  Heroin from Iran 
flooded the market, as exiles from the revolution sought ways to move capital out of 
the country.29  The amount of heroin seized by police and customs, likely to represent 
just a fraction of the total smuggled into the UK, rose considerably.  The authorities 
seized just 3.3 kilograms of heroin in 1973, compared to 93.4 kilograms seized in 
1981.30  At the same time, demand increased, as DDUs cut down on the amount of 
heroin prescribed to addicts, replacing it with methadone instead.  Buying drugs on 
the black market was an attractive proposition for addicts who disliked methadone, as 
illicitly produced heroin at this time was both relatively pure and relatively cheap.  In 
real terms, the price of black market heroin fell by as much as 25 per cent between 
                                                 
26 Pearson & Gilman, ‘Local and regional variations in drug misuse’, p. 103, pp. 106-111; Pearson, 
‘Social deprivation, unemployment and patterns of heroin use’, pp. 62-63. 
27 G. Edwards, Matters of Substance: Drugs – And Why Everyone’s a User (London: Allen Lane, 
2004), p. 269. 
28 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 228, p. 271; ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 
25.  
29 Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion, p. 364; R. Power, ‘Drug trends since 1968’ in Strang and 
Gossop, Heroin Addiction and Drug Policy, 27-41, pp. 34-35. 
30 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 130. 
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1980 and 1983.31  By the mid-1980s it was clear that a large, organised black market 
in illegally produced and distributed heroin existed, in contrast to the ‘grey’ market in 
traded pharmaceutical opioids of previous decades.32    
The influx of heroin from Iran, and later Afghanistan and Pakistan, had an 
important impact on the character of the British heroin problem and may have led to 
an increase in addiction quite apart from the usual issues of supply and demand.  
Heroin imported from these countries was particularly well suited to smoking rather 
than injecting.33  Subsequently, there was an increase in ‘chasing the dragon’ 
(smoking heroin) in Britain during the 1980s.  In 1979 most heroin users first took the 
drug intravenously, but by the end of the 1980s Strang and his colleagues found that 
the majority of new users began taking the drug by inhalation.34  This was significant; 
smoking heroin did not carry the dangers and stigma of injection, and may have 
resulted in some individuals taking the drug who were repelled (initially at least) by 
intravenous use.35   
Quantifying how important this change in the mode of administration was to 
the rise in heroin addiction overall is of course difficult, but the increase in the 
smoking of heroin needs to be seen in the context of an increasingly ‘polydrug’ 
problem.36  Heroin users were not just injecting heroin, they were often taking a range 
of other drugs by a variety of routes.  As the prescription of heroin to addicts became 
more strictly controlled many users turned to other opioid drugs that could be 
obtained from doctors without a license to prescribe heroin.  The synthetic opioid 
                                                 
31 P. Griffiths, M. Gossop & J. Strang, ‘Chasing the dragon: the development of heroin smoking in the 
United Kingdom’, in Strang and Gossop, Heroin Addiction and Drug Policy, 121-133, p. 124. 
32 Stimson, ‘The war on heroin’, pp. 39-41; R. Lewis, ‘Flexible hierarchies and dynamic disorder – the 
trading and distribution of illicit heroin in Britain and Europe, 1970-1990’ in Strang & Gossop, Heroin 
Addiction and Drug Policy, 42-65; Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, pp. 255-274. 
33 Griffiths, Gossop & Strang, ‘Chasing the dragon’, p. 125. 
34 Strang et al quoted in, Ibid. p. 121. 
35 Griffiths, Gossop & Strang, ‘Chasing the dragon’, p. 121; Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion, 
p. 365. 
36 Griffiths, Gossop & Strang, ‘Chasing the dragon’, pp. 128-129. 
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Diconal was particularly popular during the 1970s and early 1980s.37  Prescribed in 
tablet form, which was then crushed and injected, Diconal use grew until 1984 when 
it was added to the list of drugs for which a doctor required a license to supply to 
addicts.38  Heroin addicts were also increasingly using non-opiate drugs in addition to, 
or as a temporary substitute for, heroin.  Barbiturates, amphetamines and 
benzodiazepines could be acquired from doctors or bought on the ‘grey’ market of 
legally produced but illegally distributed pharmaceutical drugs.39  The use of these 
drugs by heroin addicts led the Lancet in 1979 to note that ‘Polydrug abuse, rather 
than dependence on a single drug, is now the entrenched pattern of drug abuse’ and 
that it was ‘misleading to speak of opiate addicts and polydrug abusers as two 
separate populations requiring different treatment approaches.’40  This holistic 
approach to the treatment of drug addiction was apparently not one adopted by the 
DDUs.  Street agencies and casualty departments were increasingly encountering 
polydrug users who were not catered for by the treatment centres.41  There was, 
according to another editorial in the Lancet in 1982, ‘a near total preoccupation with 
opiate dependence’ at DDUs.42  Treatment facilities established in the late 1960s were 
not designed to cope with the changing nature of the drug problem in the 1980s. 
This did not escape the notice of those outside the medical community.  
Political interest in the drugs issue heightened over the period, spurred on by an 
apparent ‘panic’ over heroin use.  As MacGregor has shown, increased drug use was 
described as a problem, a crisis, an epidemic and a plague by the media and 
                                                 
37 Power, ‘Drug trends since 1968’, p. 31; Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, pp. 259-266. 
38 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 265. 
39 Ibid. pp. 255-259; Power, ‘Drug trends since 1968’, pp. 32-34, pp. 38-39. 
40 ‘Drug addiction: time for reappraisal’, Lancet,  (11 August 1979) 289-290, p. 289. 
41 A.H. Ghodse, ‘Casualty departments and the monitoring of drug dependence’, British Medical 
Journal, (1977) 1381-1382; D. Turner, ‘The development of the voluntary sector: no further need for 
pioneers?’ in Strang & Gossop, Heroin Addiction and Drug Policy, 222-230, p. 225; Mitcheson, ‘Drug 
clinics in the 1970s’, p. 184. 
42 ‘Drug addiction: British System failing’, Lancet, (9 January 1982) 83-84, p. 83. 
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politicians.43  According to Kohn articles in the popular press ‘loaded with 
sensationalism, titillation and moral indignation…convinced the public that the 
nation’s youth was threatened by a plague of heroin.’44  The broadsheets did not 
escape the sense of hysteria.  In 1985 there were 61 separate stories in The Times 
specifically concerning heroin (more than one a week) and many more on related 
issues such as the traffic of drugs and the prevention and treatment of addiction.45  
Compared to the 25 heroin stories in the same newspaper two years before, it would 
seem that 1984-1985 were the peak years of the heroin panic.46  Kohn found an 
explanation for the timing of this in the contemporary socio-political context.  Heroin 
became the focus of attention during the miners’ strike.47  Kohn argued that as the 
strike deepened social divisions and began to turn people against the Thatcher 
government, it became important to find an issue that could re-unite the country.  He 
asserted ‘Heroin is the consensus issue par excellence [his italics].  Everybody is 
against it.  Even most junkies are against it.’48   It was hoped that a war on heroin, like 
the recent war in the Falklands, would bring people together against a common 
enemy.  Kohn found evidence for this in the different ways in which drugs were 
represented in the 1980s.  Drug stories of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s often stressed 
the deviance of the user.  In contrast, stories about heroin use in the 1980s emphasised 
its universality; that drug use did not just occur within a limited group of people.49
Kohn’s line of analysis suggests there was a ‘moral panic’ over the use of 
heroin similar to those described by Stanley Cohen in Folk Devils and Moral 
                                                 
43 MacGregor, ‘The public debate in the 1980s’, pp. 1-3. 
44 Kohn, Narcomania, p. 119. 
45 The Times Index, January-December 1985, pp. 255-256. 
46 The Times Index, January-December 1983, p. 301. 
47 Kohn, Narcomania, p. 107.  Stimson also notes that 1984 was the year that heroin became a major 
media issue.  See Stimson, ‘British drug policies in the 1980s’, p. 481.   
48 Kohn, Narcomania, p. 109. 
49 Ibid. p. 109. 
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Panics.50  MacGregor analysed some key contemporary newspaper reports and found 
the emphasis on the decay, corruption and hopelessness of heroin addiction betrayed a 
distinctly moral tone.51  Nicholas Dorn and Nigel South assessed the validity of 
applying the term ‘moral panic’ to the furore surrounding heroin in the 1980s.  They 
argued that the significant increase in drug use in Britain during this period coupled 
with long held fears about the abuse of the body and the use of drugs for ‘selfish 
pleasure’ suggested deeper forces were at play than could be explained by the notion 
of a ‘moral panic.’52  Yet, the sense of fear and impending danger engendered by 
media reports refused to disappear and was even directly reflected in a controversial 
government initiative aimed at reducing drug use amongst young people.  In 1985-
1986 the Central Office of Information launched an anti-drug campaign targeting 
heroin users.  Designed by top advertising agency Yellowhammer and costing £2 
million the campaign consisted of advertisements in teenage magazines, bill-board 
posters and even a 30 second television commercial.53  Based around the tag line 
‘Heroin Screws You Up’ the advertisements depicted the consequences of heroin use 
in graphic detail.  One image, entitled ‘Your Mind Isn’t The Only Thing Heroin 
Damages,’ depicted a pale, sick-looking, young man in a sweat-soaked shirt, sitting 
hunched over on the floor.  Surrounding him were some of the physical complications 
of intravenous heroin use, including skin infections and blood diseases as well as the 
symptoms of withdrawal, such as aching limbs and wasted muscles. [See Plate 1, p. 
108].   
                                                 
50 S. Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics, (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1972). 
51 MacGregor, ‘The public debate in the 1980s’, pp. 1-5, pp. 8-9.  
52 See ‘Introduction’, in Dorn & South, A Land Fit For Heroin, 1-10, pp. 2-3. 
53 R. Ashton, This Is Heroin, (London: Sanctuary House, 2002) p. 136. 
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Plate 1: ‘Heroin Screws You Up’, 1985-1986 
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The images were clearly designed to shock, drawing heavily on contemporary fears 
about the consequences of heroin use.  However, some advisors to the government 
(including members of the DHSS) warned that it was doubtful whether the campaign 
would make a significant impact on those already using heroin and would dissuade 
only those unlikely to take the drug in any case from doing so.54  Indeed, the 
campaign appears to have backfired.  Some young people read the staunchly anti-drug 
message as an example of government hypocrisy and displayed the posters on their 
bedroom walls as signs of their anti-establishment rebellion.55
The ‘Heroin Screws You Up’ campaign was part of a much more sustained 
interest in drugs issues on the part of central government than had been seen in 
previous years.  In July 1984 a Ministerial Group on the Misuse of Drugs was set up 
under the chairmanship of Junior Home Office Minister, David Mellor.  The groups’ 
report, Tackling Drug Misuse, stated that ‘the misuse of drugs is one of the most 
worrying problems facing our society today’ and suggested ‘a coherent strategy which 
attacks drug misuse by simultaneous action on five main fronts.’  These were: firstly, 
‘reducing supplies from abroad,’ secondly, ‘tightening controls on drugs produced 
and prescribed in the UK,’ thirdly, ‘making policing more effective,’ fourthly, 
‘strengthening deterrence’ and finally ‘improving prevention, treatment and 
rehabilitation.’56  Tackling Drug Misuse concentrated predominately on controlling 
the production and supply of drugs, a move Stimson saw as representative of a decline 
of the ‘medico-centric’ view of drug policy and the emergence of a new emphasis on 
control, in what he termed the ‘criminal-economic model.’57  This enhanced emphasis 
                                                 
54 Ibid. p. 137; Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion, p. 375. 
55 Ashton, This Is Heroin, p. 137.  This suggests an almost sub-cultural inversion of the dominant 
message.  See D. Hebdige, Subculture: The Meaning of Style, (London: Routledge, 1979, 1991). 
56 Home Office, Tackling Drug Misuse: A Summary of the Government’s Strategy, (London: HMSO, 
1985), Foreword. 
57 Stimson, ‘The war on heroin’, p. 43. 
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on law enforcement reflected international developments, particularly in the USA.  
Although Richard Nixon was the first American President to declare ‘war’ on drugs it 
was Ronald Reagan’s televised address to the nation in 1986 that placed drugs on the 
global agenda as never before.58  Reagan promised an extra $600 million to fight an 
all-out ‘war’ on drugs directed at pushers ‘who are killing America and terrorising 
it.’59  The American ‘war on drugs’ undoubtedly influenced British drug policy.  
British law enforcement agencies assisted by the armed forces adopted many of the 
tactics of the American Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and began to target drug 
traffickers and their assets, as well as substituting and eradicating drug crops in other 
countries.60  Furthermore, penalties for drug offences were stiffened; the maximum 
sentence for trafficking in Class A drugs (such as heroin) was increased to life 
imprisonment.61
Party-political and parliamentary involvement in drug issues also grew in the 
mid 1980s.  Drugs were on the agenda of the Conservative Party Conference in 1984, 
the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) David Owen discussed drugs in 
conjunction with unemployment in a speech in 1985, and the Labour party included 
drugs in their statement on health produced in 1986.62  According to MacGregor, 
drugs were often described as a particularly Conservative issue, allowing the 
government to demonstrate concern about a social issue that they could not be blamed 
for causing.63 Cross-party committees also began to inquire into the ‘misuse’ of drugs 
in 1985.  The House of Commons Home Affairs Committee examined the production 
                                                 
58 Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion, p. 338, p. 340, p. 351; MacGregor, ‘The public debate in 
the 1980s’, p. 7. 
59 Quoted in MacGregor, ‘The public debate in the 1980s’, p. 7. 
60 Davenport-Hines, The Pursuit of Oblivion, p. 346; Stimson, ‘The war on heroin’, p. 43 
61 R. Hartnoll, ‘The international context’ in S. MacGregor, (ed.) Drugs in British Society, 36-51.  
62 Stimson, ‘The war on heroin’, pp. 41-42.  David Owen also gave a speech to the Society of Clinical 
Psychiatrists Research Fund on the need for a scientific strategy to curb the epidemic of drug ‘abuse’ in 
October 1985.  See Owen, ‘Need for a scientific strategy’. 
63 MacGregor, ‘The public debate in the 1980s’, p. 13. 
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and traffic of illegal drugs and the Social Services Committee concentrated on the 
treatment and rehabilitation of drug ‘misusers.’64  The Social Services Committee 
found that: 
The misuse of drugs, and particularly misuse of heroin and cocaine, is a 
serious and growing problem.  It demands an immediate, determined response 
from Government and society as a whole.  Existing services are woefully 
inadequate to cope with the increasing pressure.  Treatment facilities are few, 
underfunded, often inaccessible and always have long-waiting lists.65
 
Interest in drug issues was clearly not limited to law enforcement and trafficking; 
treatment remained an issue of paramount importance. 
 
1.2  The changing treatment response 
Treatment, though, was in turmoil.  DDUs, which had formed the cornerstone of 
heroin addiction treatment policy since 1968, were increasingly unable or unwilling to 
respond to the needs of some patients.  An editorial in the Lancet in 1982 branded the 
‘British System’ as ‘failing,’ arguing that ‘the “clinic system” which is the focal point 
of the response to drug dependence in the UK, is now completely inadequate.’66  The 
DDUs faced two main difficulties in dealing with heroin addiction in the 1980s.  
Firstly, they were under-resourced and under-staffed.  Tight controls on public 
expenditure exercised by the Conservative government meant that spending on the 
NHS grew very slowly in the 1980s.67  Over the decade, spending on hospital and 
community health services rose by just ten per cent in real terms.68  Drug addiction 
treatment facilities were not in a good position to compete for scarce resources within 
                                                 
64 House of Commons Social Services Committee, Misuse of Drugs With Special Reference to the 
Treatment and Rehabilitation of Misusers of Hard Drugs, Session 1984-1985 (London: HMSO, 1984-
1986); House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, First Report From the Home Affairs Committee, 
Session 1985-1986: Misuse of Hard Drugs, (London: HMSO, 1985-86).  
65 House of Commons Social Services Committee, Misuse of Drugs, p. liii. 
66 Lancet, (9 January 1982) 83-84, p. 83.  The Sunday Times echoed these sentiments in 1983.  See 
Sunday Times, (27 February 1983) p. 18. 
67 Ham, Health Policy in Britain, p. 41; Klein, The Politics of the NHS, pp. 201-204, pp. 229-235 and 
Baggott, Health Care in Britain, pp. 178-179.  
68 Klein, The Politics of the NHS, p. 229. 
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the health service, as they were traditionally accorded a low priority.69  Despite DHSS 
guidance to local health authorities asserting that the improvement of services for 
drug addicts was to be accorded the ‘highest priority’ (along with improvements to 
other ‘Cinderella’ services such as provision for the mentally ill and the elderly) 
money did not always get through.70  As MacGregor and Ettore remarked, ‘Health 
Authorities find it difficult to put services for drug misusers ahead of those for, say, 
kidney transplants or old people.’71  DDUs subsequently lacked the resources to deal 
with an influx of new patients.  Waiting lists for treatment at clinics lengthened: many 
addicts had to wait more than six weeks for a first assessment appointment at a 
DDU.72  Long waiting periods, as the Social Services Committee noted, could prove a 
disincentive to those seeking treatment.73   
Those that did manage to be seen at a DDU often found the treatment on offer 
did not suit them.  This was the second major problem encountered by the DDUs: 
they had failed to adapt to changing patterns of drug use in the 1980s.  As seen in 
Chapter One, DDUs had changed their prescription policies over the previous decade.  
Clinics stopped prescribing injectable heroin to new addict patients, giving addicts 
(first injectable and later oral) methadone.  Prescriptions were usually over a short 
period and directed towards total abstinence from drugs rather than indefinite 
maintenance.  All the London DDUs were the same, ‘the resultant uniformity of 
treatment’ according to the Lancet, had ‘stultified research into different treatment 
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options.’74  Indeed, the form of treatment on offer at the DDUs did not meet the needs 
of all addicts.  Psychiatrist John Strang argued that the restrictions placed on those 
seeking treatment at a DDU for the first time meant that ‘it is virtually impossible for 
some new patients to obtain service of any valuable nature from the drug clinics.’75  
DDUs were inflexible and homogenous and simply unable to cope with the influx of 
addicts in the 1980s.    
Addicts subsequently began to seek treatment elsewhere.  In 1982 the Lancet 
observed that ‘many drug abusers now prefer to stay outside the system and approach 
non-clinic doctors’ a move the journal attributed to a greater willingness on the part of 
doctors outside the DDUs to prescribe injectable opioids.76  Yet, more generous 
prescriptions were not the only reason for addicts’ abandonment of DDUs.  One 
addict who had left his local clinic in favour of a private practitioner asserted that he 
would have been ‘quite happy to attend [NHS clinics] if they were any good.’77  He 
complained that not only was he prescribed an inadequate dose of methadone at the 
DDU he was being forced to reduce this to nothing over a period of six months, was 
required to pick up his prescription on a daily basis which made working difficult and 
had to attend counselling sessions which he found to be ‘arrogant and patronising.’  In 
contrast, he asserted that the treatment provided by the private doctor enabled him to 
‘hold down my job and live a reasonable life’ in addition to ‘reduc[ing] my intake of 
injectable and oral methadone at a rate which I can cope with.’78  Undoubtedly, non-
clinic doctors were increasingly encountering addicts.  The number of notifications of 
addiction to the Home Office from GPs steadily rose as notifications from DDUs 
declined.  In 1970 just 6 per cent of notifications of addiction came from GPs, 46 per 
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cent from DDUs and 48 per cent from prison medical officers.  In 1981 48 per cent of 
notifications came from GPs, 36 per cent from DDUs and 16 per cent from prison 
medical officers (see Figure One, p. 94).79  This trend continued over the decade with 
over half of all new notifications coming from GPs throughout the period (Figure 
3).80   
 
Figure 3: Percentage of all new notifications of addiction to the Home Office by 
notifying authority, 1982-1987 
 
 
 1982 1983 1984 1985 198681 1987 
GPs 
 
53 53 55 51 49 52 
DDUs 
 
35 34 30 31 31 33 
Prison medical 
officers 
12 11 15 18 21 15 
 
 
Source: Home Office, Statistics of Drug Addicts Notified to the Home Office, United 
Kingdom, 1988 (London: HMSO, 1989) 
 
 
In a national survey of GPs conducted in 1985 Alan Glanz and Colin Taylor of the 
ARU found that one in five GPs saw a patient addicted to opiate drugs over a four-
week period, amounting to between 30,000 and 44,000 new cases of opiate use 
presenting to General Practitioners a year.  These figures were far higher than the 
Home Office notification statistics and were inflated by some duplication of addict 
names, but in other ways may actually have been more accurate, as they accounted for 
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under-notification of addicts by GPs.82  Whatever the precise numbers involved, the 
trend towards increasing involvement of the GP in the treatment of addiction was 
obvious.  This led Glanz and Taylor to conclude that the role of the GP should be 
‘given serious consideration in the development of a national strategy for responding 
to the current drugs problem.’83  Yet, the increasing involvement of non-clinic doctors 
in the treatment of addiction was, according to the ACMD, an ‘unplanned 
development’ which they viewed with ‘some concern.’84  How the GP came to play a 
greater role in the treatment of addiction and the reasons why this was regarded with 
‘concern’ by the ACMD and others requires further consideration.  
 
2.  Treatment and Rehabilitation: a specialist or a generalist approach? 
The ACMD’s 1982 report Treatment and Rehabilitation played an important role in 
setting the parameters of the debate over the treatment of heroin addiction in the 
1980s.  It has been viewed in two slightly different ways.  Stimson argued that the 
transition from the ‘addict’ of the 1960s Brain reports to the ‘problem drug taker’ 
described by Treatment and Rehabilitation indicated the emergence of a more ‘diffuse 
understanding [of drug taking]…with medicine taking a much less central position in 
the response.’85  For MacGregor too the report marked the acceptance of a ‘reformist’ 
rather than ‘medical’ model for drug policy.86  Other commentators, however, pointed 
to the retention of a strong medical influence, particularly over the report’s 
recommendations on the treatment of addiction.  Moreover, the view on treatment 
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presented was that of a particular section of the medical community, the DDU 
psychiatrist.  These doctors felt threatened by the intervention of other agencies and 
individuals, especially general and private practitioners.  Treatment and 
Rehabilitation represented a defence of the specialist’s role in the treatment of 
addiction.  Spear suggested that it was not ‘over-fanciful’ that ‘the more politically 
motivated and forceful members’ of a group of consultants at the London DDUs ‘saw 
in the Advisory Council’s review of treatment services an opportunity to regain the 
influence they feared they were in danger of loosing.’  He asserts that these 
psychiatrists made ‘The elimination of both the independent doctor and the NHS 
general practitioner from the field’ their ‘primary objective’ and to do this they 
persuaded the working group to listen to their views and include them in the final 
report.87  Spear’s view was endorsed by some contemporary analysis of the report.  
Rowdy Yates, a project coordinator at the street agency the Lifeline Project, asserted 
that the ACMD’s recommendations effectively extended the power of DDUs over 
non-specialist services, so that GPs would be allowed to treat addicts only in 
conjunction with advice from clinic doctors.88  This proposal led Mike Ashton, of the 
Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence (ISDD) to argue that ‘It took little 
imagination to see the Advisory Council’s recommendations as an attempt to legislate 
the non-hospital doctor out of addiction treatment.’89
 Such a view would seem to contradict the diffuse model of treatment policy 
found in Treatment and Rehabilitation by Stimson and MacGregor.  However, these 
two approaches are not necessarily contradictory.  Indeed, the one explains the other: 
the very diffusion of the general response to drug use put forward by the ACMD 
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encouraged the purveyors of the main medical response (the DDU psychiatrists) to 
defend their specialism from the encroachments of the GP and the private practitioner.  
The DDU psychiatrist faced two kinds of threat to their position as the authority on 
drug problems: from external non-medical agencies, such as voluntary organisations, 
politicians and local authorities, who threatened the powerful position of medicine in 
defining and shaping the response to drug use, and from internal alternative medical 
agencies such as general and private practitioners who threatened the existence of the 
treatment of addiction as a psychiatric speciality.  To retain a role in the ‘policy 
community’ the DDU psychiatrist needed to present a unified, cohesive ‘medical’ 
approach.  In order to do this, the GP, and the private practitioner (the issues 
surrounding private practice will be dealt with separately in Chapter Three) needed to 
be removed from the treatment of addiction, or at least marginalized, so that 
psychiatrists could present a powerful claim to authority within the increasingly 
diverse ‘policy community’ based on their specialist status. 
 A close analysis of Treatment and Rehabilitation supports such a notion by 
revealing the presence of both currents; the move away from a purely medical 
approach to drugs towards a more diffuse response, and within the specialist medical 
approach a reaction to this diffusion in the form of an attempt to reduce the role of the 
generalist.  The Treatment and Rehabilitation Working Group of the ACMD was set 
up in 1975 to ‘undertake a comprehensive review of the treatment and rehabilitation 
services for drug misusers and to make recommendations for dealing with both 
immediate problems and the situation generally.’90  The composition of the working 
group reveals the increase in the range of bodies and individuals interested in drug 
addiction and at the same time pointed to the continued importance of the clinical 
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psychiatrist.  There were social workers, probation officers and representatives from 
voluntary agencies suggesting a broad view of drug problems and their consequences.  
However, the persistence of a strong medical view was indicated by the continued 
dominance of doctors.  There were six doctors on the committee and of these four 
were psychiatrists involved in the treatment of addiction, the largest single group.91  
They were Parr, a Brighton consultant psychiatrist, Thorley, a consultant psychiatrist 
at Newcastle Hospital and director of the Parkwood House Alcohol and Drug 
Dependence Unit, and most crucially of all, Bewley, consultant psychiatrist at St 
Thomas’ Hospital and Connell, director of the DDU at the Maudsley, the leading 
experts on the treatment of addiction.  It is highly likely that Connell and Bewley 
were the ‘medical politicians’ darkly referred to by Spear.92  The presence of these 
men on the ACMD working group points not only to the continued importance of 
psychiatry in responding to drug use but also hints at a potentially powerful political 
incentive for Connell and Bewley, who in order to preserve their expert status needed 
to diminish the importance of the generalist in the treatment of addiction.  
In order to gather evidence for their report the working group visited a number 
of treatment centres and took evidence from groups and individuals ‘concerned with 
the problems of drug misuse.’93  In 1977 they produced an interim report 
recommending some immediate action, but also suggested that a more wide-ranging 
study of drug ‘misuse’ was necessary.94  The group examined the available data on 
drug use and sent questionnaires to 34 treatment centres in England and Wales.  In 
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addition, they spoke to voluntary workers about rehabilitation facilities for recovering 
addicts.  They published their findings in Treatment and Rehabilitation in 1982.  The 
report considered the shortcomings of the current services in the light of the changing 
pattern of drug use and proposed ‘a new approach to the problems of the drug misuser 
and a framework under which services could be developed.’95  They examined the 
implications of the increased involvement of the private and general practitioner and 
made recommendations on safeguards for prescribing controlled drugs.  The report 
also looked at the need for training and research, and the difficulties of funding 
services for drug misusers. 
 Treatment and Rehabilitation noted changes in drug use and the response to 
this already apparent to many of those working in the field.  The report discussed the 
increasingly polydrug problem, the overall rise in number of people using drugs, the 
geographical spread of this use, the increased availability of illicit drugs, the growing 
proportion of those first notified who claimed to be addicted to heroin rather than any 
other drug and the increased proportion of addicts being notified by doctors in private 
and general practice.96  The ACMD also noted that treatment and rehabilitation 
facilities were largely inadequate in many areas.97  To address these problems and 
improve services Treatment and Rehabilitation presented a new way of looking at 
drug users.  They also appeared to be questioning elements of the disease-based 
notion of addiction or dependence by stating that:  
Most authorities from a range of disciplines would agree that not all 
individuals suffer from a disease of drug dependence.  Whilst many drug 
misusers do incur medical problems through their use of drugs, some do not. 
The majority are relatively stable individuals who have more in common with 
the general population than with any essentially pathological sub-group.98   
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The working group thus shifted emphasis away from a purely medical, or treatment 
based approach to the problem of addiction.  They found that there was no evidence 
for the existence of a ‘typical’ addict or person with drug problems.  There should, 
therefore, be a range of treatment and rehabilitation services available to suit each 
individual.  To this end, the report suggested that services should not be orientated 
towards specific client groups, heroin addicts, amphetamine users and so on.  
According to the working group, the needs of different types of drug user were 
similar, so ‘Services in the future need to be geared to solve common problems rather 
than be merely substance or diagnosis centred.’  The approach should be ‘problem 
orientated.’99  Here the ACMD were drawing on the findings of the Advisory 
Committee on Alcoholism (the Kessel Committee) who published a report in 1978 
detailing The Pattern and Range of Services for Problem Drinkers.100  This report 
marked a shift from dealing with ‘alcoholics’ to providing for a wider group of 
‘problem drinkers.’101  Similarly, Treatment and Rehabilitation represented a 
transition from the ‘addict’ to the ‘problem drug taker.’  The problem drug taker was 
defined as: 
a person who experiences social, psychological, physical or legal problems 
related to intoxication and/or regular excessive consumption and/or 
dependence as a consequence of his own use of drugs or other chemical 
substances (excluding alcohol and tobacco).102    
 
Problem drug takers were, therefore, not just ‘addicts,’ but any individual who 
experienced problems with drug use.  According to Stimson, the adoption of this 
definition indicated ‘a major shift away from the disease model and the opiate 
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addict.’103  Lart concurred, noting that the use of the term ‘problem drug taker’ 
resulted in a move ‘away from the narrow conception of addiction’ which ‘open[ed] 
up the range of aspects of a drug user’s life of legitimate concern to services.’104  
Subsequently, services were to be developed with the ‘problem drug taker’ in mind.  
The ACMD stated that these should recognise the medical, legal and social problems 
for an individual and the community as a result of drug taking.105  Responses to the 
‘problem drug taker’ could come from hospital-based treatment services, 
detoxification services, street agencies and various other voluntary and non-statutory 
agencies.106  Official sanction was therefore given to the involvement of a range of 
bodies and authorities.  Stimson saw the report as indicating that service provision 
would be less dominated by doctors and instead involve ‘workers with many different 
skills.’107   
 Despite stressing a multi-disciplinary view of the problems of those using 
drugs Treatment and Rehabilitation paid particular attention to the role of the doctor, 
suggesting the persistence of medical approaches to drug use.  The report stated that 
‘for the majority of problem drug takers, treatment by doctors will be an important 
component of the help they receive.’  This was because ‘only doctors may prescribe 
drugs and they will be expected to treat the physical and psychological consequences 
of problem drug taking.’ 108  The emphasis on treatment led Tony Slater of the 
therapeutic community Phoenix House to comment in the British Journal of Addiction 
that the report seemed to be ‘very heavily slanted towards supporting the medical 
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model of treatment’ and did not ‘understand all of the needs facing the “problem drug 
taker” and his or her subsequent rehabilitation.’109  This paralleled criticism of the 
Kessel Committee’s report on problem drinkers.  Thom notes that although the 
committee believed they had rejected medical understandings of alcoholism in favour 
of a community-based notion of the problem drinker, some critics found evidence for 
the continued existence of the medical model through the emphasis placed on 
treatment.110  By placing a strong emphasis on treatment offered by doctors rather 
than rehabilitation offered by other agencies Treatment and Rehabilitation appeared 
to be prioritising the medical approach over the more ‘social’ alternatives.   
 The nature of this medical approach is revealed by the recommendations of the 
ACMD on prescribing safeguards, which betrayed a less than inclusive view of who 
should be offering treatment to ‘problem drug takers.’  The report highlighted the 
trend towards drug users seeking medical help from doctors not based at hospitals and 
noted that according to the Home Office, doctors working at the DHSS, and the views 
expressed in a number of medical journals this gave rise to ‘a number of causes for 
concern.’111  These fell into four categories.  Firstly, they were worried that doctors 
working with problem drug takers lacked sufficient training and expertise to treat 
addicts adequately in isolation from specialist advice.  Secondly, they feared that 
drugs supplied to problem drug takers might be diverted to the black market, noting 
that only DDUs tended to prescribe to addicts on a daily basis as they had special 
forms that allowed drugs to be dispensed in this way.  Thirdly, concerns were 
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expressed about the pressure that doctors who prescribed to addicts might become 
subject; aggressive and persuasive addicts could exploit elderly doctors or those 
working alone.  Finally, it was noted that few doctors had access to the kind of 
support staff and facilities available at the DDUs.112  The consequence of this was that 
controlled drugs were being prescribed ‘injudiciously’ giving rise to two major 
problems.  The first was that liberal prescribing encouraged some patients to leave 
DDUs and obtain larger doses of drugs from non-clinic doctors.  The second was that 
the amount of legally manufactured drugs on the black market had risen 
considerably.113  This last assertion does not appear to have been backed up with any 
figures, but it led the ACMD to contend that there had been a recurrence of the same 
problems that caused concern to the second Brain Committee, where doctors were 
providing addicts with drugs in too liberal a manner, therefore feeding the black 
market.  The ACMD therefore recommended that a role could be afforded doctors 
outside DDUs in the treatment of addiction only with ‘strict safeguards.’114  These 
included close liaison with hospital based services, links with other agencies such as 
social services and opportunities for further training.  The working group were not 
convinced that these measures alone would be sufficient.  They subsequently 
recommended that guidelines be established on good practice, the possibility of 
extending licensing for the prescription of all controlled drugs to addicts be examined 
and wider use be made of the tribunal system for irresponsible prescription.115
Some of those who read Treatment and Rehabilitation felt that these 
recommendations would do little to encourage GPs and private practitioners to 
become involved in the treatment of addiction and actually dissuade many.  Yates 
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argued in the British Journal of Addiction that the report ignored ‘any discussion of 
enhancing the positive [his italics] role of General Practitioners in the treatment of 
addiction.’  He went on to note that it did not deal with the fact that the majority of 
GPs were reluctant to see drug users and its recommendations were ‘tantamount to a 
green light to GPs to continue to avoid any responsibility for this group.’116  This, it 
could be argued, was exactly what some members of the ACMD working group (the 
DDU psychiatrists like Connell and Bewley) wanted.  Treatment and Rehabilitation 
recognised that GPs and private practitioners were increasingly involved in the 
treatment of addiction, and whilst it purported to represent a ‘community-based’ 
response and advocated the participation of a range of bodies in dealing with the 
‘problems’ of drug users, its recommendations on treatment were a good deal less 
inclusive.  By raising the problems associated with the treatment of addiction in 
private and general practice and not considering the possible benefits, the report was 
making a covert attack on this mode of treatment.  What is more, it drew lines for 
battle by recommending a number of measures which became key issues in the 
dispute over who should treat the addict (generalist, specialist or private practitioner) 
and also how they should be treated (short-term withdrawal or long-term 
maintenance) such as the need for guidelines on good practice.  Treatment and 
Rehabilitation thus had a vital role to play in setting the parameters of the debate 
between specialists and generalists in the treatment of addiction.  
 
3.  The revitalisation of general practice and the treatment of heroin addiction 
3.1  Generalists and specialists: an old divide renewed?  
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A divide between community based General Practitioners and hospital based 
consultants or specialists existed in Britain as early as the mid-nineteenth century.  
According to Anne Digby, this divide was not, however, necessarily a clear one as the 
respective roles of the specialist and the generalist were ill defined throughout the 
Victorian period leading to ‘intra-professional disputes.’117  It was not until the 1930s 
that formalised definitions of specialist and generalist emerged.  A consultant or 
specialist was defined as a doctor who ‘confines himself [sic.] entirely to 
“consultation” work’ in relation to a particular part of the body and was usually on the 
staff of the local hospital.118  Significantly, Digby found that ‘within the profession 
the status of the GP was lower than that of the consultant.’119  The creation of the 
National Health Service (NHS) in 1948 perpetuated this divide.120  Consultants were 
given privileged status and allowed to continue private work and the ‘difference 
between general practitioners and consultants’ was underlined by the ‘increasing 
difficulty of crossing the divide between them.’121  GPs were not controlled by the 
Regional Hospital Boards but by their own executive councils and employed by the 
local authorities, not the NHS directly.  A considerable gulf developed between 
specialists and generalists as medical and technical developments led to the creation 
of specialist knowledge about particular diseases and conditions.  The status of the GP 
declined as more and more of their original functions were transferred to hospital-
based specialists.122  According to Jefferys and Sachs, by the late 1950s and early 
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1960s this had the effect of ‘giving the public, as well as both branches of the medical 
profession the impression that general practitioners, when compared to hospital based 
consultants, were second-class doctors.’123  Furthermore, it was not just the general 
public that viewed general practice with some disdain; a survey of final year medical 
students between 1961 and 1966 found that only a quarter gave this as their first 
choice of career.124  General practice reached something of a nadir during the 1960s 
and there was ‘tension and mutual suspicion, if not hostility’ between the two 
branches of medicine.125   
 However, by the end of the decade, and into the next one, there were signs that 
general practice was beginning to fight back.  In 1967 GP’s pay was increased to 
roughly that of some hospital-based specialists, helping to improve status.126  
Elimination from the hospital made GPs increasingly aware of their collective identity 
and practices.  Through the Royal College of General Practitioners (founded in 1953) 
a new approach to general practice and a different way of seeing medicine and disease 
emerged.127  This placed the patient and their symptoms rather than the disease itself 
at the centre of the medical gaze.  Although the notion of seeing the ‘patient as a 
person’ rather than as a disease had existed since the early twentieth century, this 
approach was most fully realised in Dr Michael Balint’s The Doctor, His Patient and 
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The Illness in 1957.128  Balint was a Hungarian psychoanalyst who began working 
with GPs in 1950.  By applying psychotherapeutic techniques to the general practice 
setting a shift of focus from the diagnosis of disease to the meaning of illness, from 
the illness to the patient, and from the patient to the doctor-patient relationship 
occurred.129  Armstrong argues that for Balint ‘the medical gaze was no longer to be 
directed to the silent interior of the body but to the patient’s biography and 
environment.’  This approach, which Armstrong describes as ‘biographical medicine,’ 
did not deny the existence of organic pathology, but reduced its significance, paying 
more attention to the symptoms of disease as experienced by the individual patient.  
The patient was no longer the ‘passive receptacle of organic pathology’ but 
transformed into the ‘centre of the medical problematic.’130   Balint’s work influenced 
GPs who attended the seminars he hosted and his ideas were communicated to the 
wider field of general practice when these doctors became leaders of the RCGP.131  
These same GPs were also key figures in the publication of the College’s iconic 
teaching manual The Future General Practitioner in 1972.132  According to Professor 
of General Practice, Marshall Marinker, this marked ‘a massive breaking-away from 
intellectual and emotional chains of a predominately instrumental and reductionist 
hospital-orientated medicine.’133  The Future General Practitioner adopted the ideas 
of Balint and placed the patient and their social environment at the centre of 
therapeutic endeavour.  Balint’s work thus provided a new epistemological basis for 
general practice, one that was gradually internalised through the use of The Future 
                                                 
128 For the early history of the patient-as-a-person movement see R. Porter, The Greatest Benefit to 
Mankind: A Medical History of Humanity From Antiquity to the Present, (London: Harper Collins, 
1997), pp. 682-683; Armstrong, The Political Anatomy of the Body, pp. 105-108. 
129 M. Marinker, ‘ “What is wrong” and “how we know it”: changing concepts of illness in General 
Practice’ in Loudon, Horder & Webster, General Practice Under the NHS, 65-91, p. 74. 
130 Armstrong, ‘The emancipation of biographical medicine’, p. 5.   
131 Marinker ‘ “What is wrong”’ p. 73; Tudor-Hart, A New Kind of Doctor, p. 88. 
132 Marinker ‘ “What is wrong”’ p. 73, p. 78. 
133 Ibid. p. 71. 
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General Practitioner in the training of new GPs throughout the 1970s and 1980s and 
crucial to the foundation of an ideology of general practice independent of hospital 
specialism.134  The divide between specialist and generalist was thus reinforced as 
GPs became more confident in their own worth and the services they could offer as 
distinct from the hospital-based consultant.  
 
 
 
3.2  General Practitioners and the treatment of addiction 
Alan Glanz has argued that the re-intervention of the GP into addiction treatment in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s can be seen in this context of an improving position for 
general practice within medicine. Through biographical medicine ‘the whole position 
of general practice had been strengthened and the GP could meaningfully be called 
upon to play a significant role in the treatment of drug misuse.’135  The specific 
consequences of biographical medicine for the methods used in the treatment of 
addiction in general practice will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter Four, it is 
sufficient to note here that the confidence of GPs in their own abilities and outlook 
allowed them to take on, and even challenge, a previously specialist domain.  In 
addition, there were a number of more practical reasons why the GP became more 
involved in the treatment of addiction during the 1980s.  The growing scale of the 
drug problem meant that specialist facilities were overloaded and, failing an 
expansion in these, addict-patients would have to been seen elsewhere by other 
doctors.  The GP was a natural and obvious choice.  General Practitioners were to be 
found all over the country and were often the first source of medical help turned to by 
                                                 
134 Ibid. p. 78; Tudor-Hart, A New Kind of Doctor, p. 89. 
135 Glanz, ‘The fall and rise of the general practitioner’, pp. 158-159. 
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addicts.  John Strang also suggested that as the numbers of drug takers increased and 
they became more ‘normal’ it was logical that treatment services become more 
‘normal’ in response.136  Involving the GP was thus, at least in part, a pragmatic 
reaction to the changing nature of drug use in this period.   
 Attempting to assess why addicts approached GPs for treatment highlights the 
politicised divide between those who supported the growing involvement of the GP in 
the treatment of addiction, and those who opposed it.  Those specialists who opposed 
the treatment of addiction in general practice argued that addicts went to GPs because 
they more readily prescribed opioid drugs than DDUs.  It was a commonly held 
concern amongst DDU psychiatrists that GPs working alone with limited knowledge 
of the wiles of the addict and no access to diagnostic testing facilities could be put 
under pressure to over-prescribe.137 Connell and Mitcheson expressed an oft-repeated 
fear when they asserted that unlike most treatment centres, where a team approach 
was practiced, the single-handed doctor ‘who has little or no experience of addicts is a 
vulnerable target for the drug seeker.’138  GPs, it was strongly implied, were more 
easily duped than DDU staff into prescribing inappropriately large doses of opioids.  
DDUs, therefore, were the best place for the addict to receive treatment as they were 
less likely to over-prescribe drugs which would feed the ‘grey’ market. 
In contrast, those who were critical of the DDUs, such as Ann Dally, argued 
that it was the practices of these that were driving addicts into general practice.  She 
argued that forcing addicts on to reducing doses of oral methadone and refusing to 
                                                 
136 J. Strang, ‘A model service: turning the generalist on to drugs’ in MacGregor (ed.) Drugs in British 
Society, 143-169, p. 147. 
137 P.H. Connell & M. Mitcheson, ‘Necessary safeguards when prescribing opioid drugs to addicts: 
experience of drug dependence clinics in London’, 288, (10 March 1984) 767-769; T.H. Bewley, 
‘Prescribing psychoactive drugs to addicts’, British Medical Journal, (16 August 1980) 497-498 and 
T.H. Bewley, A.H. Ghodse, ‘Unacceptable face of private practice’, British Medical Journal, 286, (11 
June 1983) 1876-1877; Ghodse, ‘Treatment of drug addiction in London’, Lancet, pp. 636-638. 
138 Connell and Mitcheson, ‘Necessary safeguards’, p. 769.   
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treat them as individuals encouraged them to seek treatment elsewhere, with GPs or 
sympathetic private practitioners like herself.139  Some reports published in the 
medical press also suggested that psychiatric services were inappropriate for the 
treatment of addiction.  Aidan Bucknall, a researcher on the Edinburgh Drug 
Addiction Study, Roy Robertson, a GP and James Strachan, a consultant psychiatrist, 
surveyed referrals to psychiatric services (there were no DDUs in Scotland) for the 
treatment of addiction from a general practice in Edinburgh.  Bucknall and his 
colleagues found there was no evidence to ‘indicate that patients receiving treatment 
from the psychiatric drug treatment service have a higher rate of abstinence than those 
not starting treatment, casting doubt on the value of this kind of service.’140  
Furthermore, the study’s authors took the high rates of non-attendance amongst the 
patients referred to these services to mean that ‘patients find the service both 
uncomfortable and inappropriate.’141  This was, at least in part, because few of the 
patients encountered by Bucknall, Robertson and Strachan considered themselves to 
be suffering from a psychiatric illness.  This led the researchers to argue that ‘The 
relevance of referral for every drug abuser is debatable, particularly if treatment is 
largely limited to withdrawal.’  Instead, they contended that ‘General Practitioners 
may be in the best position to cope with the extended management of drug users, and 
certainly community based treatment seems more likely to maintain contacts [with the 
drug user].’142  Similar conclusions were reached in another report produced by some 
of the same researchers.  A study of the medical facilities used by a group of addicts 
found that general practice was ‘the main interface between the drug users and the 
                                                 
139 A. Dally, A Doctor’s Story, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) pp. 62-69, pp. 79-80, p. 83.  The 
treatment policies of Dally are discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, pp. 140-146. 
140 A.B.V. Bucknall, J.R. Robertson & J.G. Strachan, ‘The use of psychiatric treatment services by 
heroin users from general practice’, British Medical Journal, 292, (12 April 1986) 997-999, p. 999. 
141 Ibid. p. 999. 
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medical establishment (even accounting for selecting the study group through general 
practice).’  The authors felt that this had not been sufficiently taken into account in the 
response to drug addiction, leading them to argue that ‘the historical emphasis placed 
on intervention based in hospital (normally psychiatric) for the education and general 
management of drug users appears to be inappropriate.’143  Taken together, these 
studies could be construed as a counter-attack on the specialist nature of treatment of 
addiction.  If psychiatric services were of little use in treating addiction then the 
generalists’ position was automatically enhanced at the cost of the ‘expertise’ of the 
psychiatrist. 
However, examining the actual role played by the GP in the treatment of 
addiction at first seems to indicate that this was insignificant in the mid-1980s, posing 
little real threat to the authority of psychiatry in this area.  A national survey of a 
random sample of GPs conducted by Glanz in 1985 found that two thirds of GPs 
referred addict-patients on to either a DDU or general psychiatric services.144  
Furthermore, they noted that many GPs were not keen about taking addicts on as 
patients; less than a third of the GPs surveyed said they would take on opiate users as 
willingly as other patients, and two thirds thought the treatment required by addicts 
was beyond the competence of the general practitioner.145  Yet, the flip side of this 
research would indicate that there was a sizeable minority of GPs who were interested 
in addicts and their problems, GPs that did not simply refer opiate users on to the 
specialist services.  Going by Glanz and Taylor’s more conservative estimate of 
30,000 ‘new’ cases of opiate misuse presenting to GPs a year at least 10,000 addicts 
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were not being seen by specialists.146  This would suggest that there was not a total 
monopoly of the treatment of addiction by clinical psychiatrists.  Indeed, not all GPs 
were totally averse to addict patients: 55 per cent of those surveyed said they thought 
they could play a positive role in the treatment of addicts even if they were not 
prepared to come off drugs.147  Moreover, positive attitudes towards the treatment of 
addict patients were more often found in those GPs most recently qualified.  Around 
40 per cent of GPs surveyed who qualified in the 1970s and the 1980s said they were 
prepared to treat addict patients as willingly as any other patient, compared to just 25 
per cent of those who qualified before this period.148  This would suggest that the new 
generation of GPs trained in the principles of biographical medicine were more 
amenable to treating addicts.  This needs further investigation, as does what happened 
to the third of addicts who remained under the care of the General Practitioner.  
Glanz’s study was not designed to answer this question and his figures do not really 
allow for direct comparison, but he found that those GPs who did prescribe to addicts 
were just as likely to prescribe opiate drugs on a long-term basis (over two weeks) as 
on a short-term basis.149  The involvement of the GP with maintenance and the impact 
of biographical medicine on the treatment offered in community-based practice will 
be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, but it is clear that the GP could and did 
play a significant role in the treatment of addiction, which in turn posed a threat to the 
expert status of the psychiatrist in this field.   
 
Specialist versus generalist: an ongoing battle? 
                                                 
146 Glanz & Taylor, ‘Extent of contact with opiate users’, p. 427. 
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148 Ibid. p. 544. 
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This threat was particularly potent when placed in the overall context of a burgeoning 
‘policy community’ around drugs.  As the number of bodies and individuals interested 
in drug problems increased, psychiatrists had to defend their claim to a powerful 
position in this community by pointing to their expertise in treatment.  Yet, their claim 
here was also being challenged.  A new generation of self-confident GPs revitalised 
by biographical medicine were less willing to accept that addiction was inherently an 
area of specialist knowledge.  When combined with existing problems in catering for 
a growing number of increasingly diverse drug users it was unsurprising that more 
GPs were becoming involved in the treatment of addiction.  This brought them into 
conflict with hospital-based psychiatrists, particularly those in DDUs, who felt their 
position was being threatened.  In response, a group of psychiatrists attempted to 
reduce the role played by the generalist in the treatment of addiction by trying to bring 
the GP under the control of the DDU, a recommendation made in Treatment and 
Rehabilitation.  In addition, clinic psychiatrists tried to discourage GPs from 
becoming involved in this area by outlining some of the ‘difficulties’ involved with 
the treatment of addiction in the pages of medical journals and elsewhere, thus 
reinforcing the notion that this was a specialist area of medical knowledge.   
There were, therefore, particular reasons as to why there was a conflict 
between the specialist and the generalist in the treatment of addiction, but this can also 
be read as a manifestation of the old divide between specialist and generalist redrawn.  
General practice, revitalised through its encounter with biographical medicine, was 
reinventing itself and taking an interest in areas that had previously been considered 
solely the domain of the specialist, such as addiction.  Indeed, biographical medicine 
was to bring GPs involved in the treatment of addiction into further conflict with the 
specialist.  The community-based physician came to view disease and its treatment in 
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a different way.  Subsequently, many GPs and private practitioners who treated 
addicts offered a different form of treatment to that found in the DDUs, one that drew 
on the principles of biographical medicine and placed the patient at the centre of the 
endeavour.  This led to further conflict between the specialists and the generalists over 
the treatment of addiction, a conflict that will be discussed in Chapter Four and 
Chapter Five.  Before moving on to discuss this conflict it is first necessary to 
consider another conflict involving the DDU psychiatrist, this time with the private 
practitioner.  As will be seen in Chapter Three, this was inter-twined with the conflict 
between specialists and generalists and between those who supported the short-term 
withdrawal of drugs from addiction and those who supported long-term prescription, 
adding another dimension to the debate over the treatment of addiction in this period.   
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Chapter Three 
 
Public versus Private: the Contested Role of the Private Doctor –  
the GMC versus Dr Ann Dally, 1983 
 
Introduction 
The GP was not the only doctor treating addicts away from the DDUs.  Some addicts 
abandoned publicly funded treatment on the NHS altogether, preferring instead to 
seek treatment from private doctors, many of whom were also psychiatrists.  Though 
there were no accurate figures charting this development and doctors and officials had 
little idea how many addicts were actually being treated privately, it was a trend that 
provoked particular ire.  The ACMD noted in Treatment and Rehabilitation that 
‘although doctors in private practice are legally entitled to prescribe controlled drugs 
to problem drug takers, this is undesirable.’  There were, they asserted, ‘moral and 
ethical aspects’ that gave ‘grave cause for concern.’1  As with the concern voiced over 
the increasing role being played in the treatment of addiction by the GP, this was 
motivated in part by the existence of genuine problems with the treatment of addiction 
in private practice, but also because this posed a threat to the power and authority of 
the DDU psychiatrist.  The nature of this threat was different to that posed by the GP, 
as many of the doctors treating addicts privately were psychiatrists, or psychiatrically 
trained.  Instead of challenging the treatment of addiction as an area of psychiatric 
expertise these doctors were presenting an assault on the actual practices of the DDU 
and those who developed them.  The existence of the private practitioner suggested 
there was an alternative locus of expertise within psychiatry, but away from the DDU 
and NHS provided care.  This was construed, therefore, as a more personal assault on 
the knowledge, methods and expertise of a group of individuals (the DDU 
                                                 
1 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 54. 
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psychiatrists) who, until recently, had been unchallenged in their position as the 
leading authority on drug users and their problems, but were now facing threats to 
their status and position from all sides.   
 This chapter will analyse the contested role of the private practitioner in the 
treatment of addiction by examining this from both the public and private 
perspectives.  Though private medicine expanded considerably in this period the 
increase in private treatment for addiction was not necessarily part of this broader 
expansion, but was motivated more by perceived failings within NHS treatment 
provision.  Addicts began to turn to private practitioners for the same reasons others 
approached GPs or resorted to the black market; they were dissatisfied with the 
treatment on offer at the DDUs.  Examining the work of private practitioner Dr Ann 
Dally shows that private doctors often responded to these criticisms of clinic practices 
when developing their own treatment policies.  Dally argued that she provided 
treatment for the long-term stable addict who found the DDUs unsuitable.  In her 
view, long-term addicts required long-term prescription.  Each patient was to be 
treated as an individual: there should be no forced reductions in dose or limitations to 
the duration of prescription.  Dally was a particularly important figure in the 
public/private debate within the treatment of addiction; as an active practitioner, a 
vocal critic of NHS DDUs and founder of the Association of Independent Doctors in 
Addiction (AIDA) which supported and promoted the role of the ‘independent’ doctor 
(private and general practitioners) in the treatment of addiction.   
 AIDA was created in a climate where opinion was increasingly turning against 
the involvement of the private doctor in the treatment of addiction.  DDU psychiatrists 
raised a number of problems with private treatment in this field.  These centred 
mainly on the payment of a fee for treatment that involved the prescription of an 
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opioid drug.  Many DDU doctors felt that addicts would be unable to afford this 
treatment without resorting to selling some of the drugs prescribed.  It was argued that 
addicts would over-state the amount of drug they needed in order to have a surplus to 
sell on to other addicts.  Clinic-based psychiatrists also pointed out that there was a 
financial incentive for the private doctor to prescribe to the addict patient regardless 
of their need; the addict would attend as long as they were getting a supply of drugs 
and the doctor would continue to collect their fee.  The private doctor, the NHS DDU 
psychiatrist argued, had a vested interest in maintaining addiction, not curing it. 
 This attack on private practice formed the backdrop to the GMC’s case against 
Dally for serious professional misconduct as a result of irresponsible prescription to 
an addict patient in 1983.  Dally was accused of prescribing irresponsibly to an addict 
patient who could only afford her fees by selling his part of prescription.  Dally 
argued that she had not prescribed excessively to the patient and to the best of her 
knowledge he had been able to pay her without selling drugs, but the GMC remained 
unconvinced.  She was found guilty of serious professional misconduct and 
admonished for her behaviour.  Although there were undoubtedly some flaws in 
Dally’s handling of the patient in question it is impossible not to see this judgement in 
the light of the wider political debate about the desirability or otherwise of the 
treatment of addiction in private practice.  Contemporaries recognised that the case 
was about publicly disciplining a leading private practitioner involved in the treatment 
of addiction and was motivated more by a desire to prevent the proliferation of a 
private alternative to the treatment on offer at the DDUs than censuring an individual 
doctor.  Indeed, it was this alternative that was a problem for DDU psychiatrists as 
much as the fact that it existed outside the NHS, as it posed a further threat to their 
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position and authority which had already been weakened by the increasing 
involvement of the generalist and other non-medical agencies.    
 
1.  Private: the role of the private practitioner in the treatment of addiction 
1.1  The expansion of private practice 
The increase in private treatment for addiction paralleled a more general growth in 
private medicine in this period, but there were a number of anomalies between the 
overall pattern of private healthcare provision and the treatment of addiction in private 
practice that suggested there were different reasons for expansion in this area.   
Private healthcare services have co-existed with state provision since the foundation 
of the NHS, but expanded considerably during the 1980s, spurred on by the Thatcher 
government who believed that ‘the private sector was more efficient, better managed 
and more responsive to the consumer than the public sector.’2  A review of spending 
in 1983 resulted in policies designed to achieve greater efficiency within the NHS 
also encouraged the development of health insurance and private care to exist 
alongside collective provision.3  This led to a rapid growth in the private sector, so 
that by 1988 there were around 200 private or voluntary hospitals in Britain, treating 
eight per cent of all inpatients.4  Private medical services were most commonly used 
for elective repair surgery for non-life threatening conditions where there were long 
waiting lists for NHS operations.5  Much of this care was provided through health 
care insurance policies.  Subscriptions to medical insurance policies rose steadily over 
the decade: in 1979 2.7 million Britons (just under 5 per cent of the population) were 
insured by such schemes, compared to 6.2 million Britons (around 10 per cent of the 
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3 Ham, Health Policy in Britain, pp. 46-47. 
4 Ibid. p. 47. 
5 Klein, The Politics of the NHS, p. 215. 
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population) in 1989.6  Treatment for addiction, however, was rarely, if ever, provided 
for under such schemes.  Addicts generally paid for treatment at the point of service, 
paying fees directly to the doctor concerned.  So, whilst the increase in private 
treatment for addiction was concomitant with an upsurge in private medicine, it was 
not necessarily part of the more general pattern in terms of the way services were 
provided.   
However, the relationship between public and private provision of healthcare 
does provide some clues as to why the private treatment of addiction expanded in the 
1980s.  Despite the ideological fury sometimes aroused by the issue of private 
practice Rudolf Klein saw the relationship between the NHS and the private sector as 
essentially a symbiotic one.  He argued that for the NHS the private sector was a 
‘safety valve,’ catering for some demands not met by state provision, and for the 
private sector, the NHS offered services that could not be provided in private 
medicine, or at least not at a profit.7  In this way, the private market in healthcare 
could be used to gauge where the NHS was lacking, or perceived to be lacking, by 
those who could afford to opt out of the state system.8  The existence of private 
treatment for addiction in this period might, therefore, suggest that the NHS was 
‘failing’ some of its addict patients.  This was the view of Lyn Perry, Assistant 
Director of drugs advice charity Release, who said in a statement supporting Dally in 
1986 that ‘In many areas, only private practitioners are prepared to offer flexible 
treatment options, and are stepping into the breach where state services are patchy or 
inadequate.’9  This argument requires further exploration.  Addicts, like any other 
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9 Contemporary Medical Archives Centre at the Wellcome Library for the History and Understanding 
of Medicine, London (hereafter CMAC), private papers of Dr Ann Dally, (hereafter PP/DAL) CMAC 
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patients, must have had good reasons for leaving free public services to pay for 
private treatment.  The services offered by private practitioners therefore need 
investigation.    
 
1.2  The private practitioner and the treatment of addiction – Dr Ann Dally 
The role of the private doctor will be considered by examining the work of private 
psychiatrist Dr Ann Dally.  Dally practiced privately in rooms off Harley Street from 
1963 onwards.10  Although she had no formal qualifications in the field, she regarded 
herself as a psychiatrist and not a general practitioner, maintaining that she had gained 
training and experience wherever possible.11  In her work as a general psychiatrist 
Dally had encountered heroin addicts, but stated that after 1979 she was referred 
increasing numbers of this type of patient by GPs.12  This was the result, she argued, 
of serious deficiencies in the treatment offered by the DDUs.13  Dally asserted that 
‘all clinics are geared to the addict who is young, recently addicted, unemployed, 
single and male.’14  She believed that DDUs concentrated on young, ‘new’ addicts as 
they felt that there was a greater likelihood of ‘success’ in getting them off drugs.15  
This meant that clinics favoured a prescription policy concentrating on withdrawing 
drugs from the addict with abstinence as a clear, immediate goal.  The addict would 
be prescribed a rapidly reducing dose of orally administered methadone with the aim 
of being ‘drug free’ in a short, fixed period of time.  Dally thought this was unrealistic 
                                                                                                                                            
PP/DAL/E/4/12, Statement from Lyn Perry, Assistant Director of Release, with respect to Ann Dally, 
27 January 1986. 
10 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 44, p. 57. 
11 CMAC PP/DAL/E/17, Transcripts of the General Medical Council Professional Conduct Committee 
Hearing, 1986-1987, (hereafter PCC Hearing, 1986-7), 27 January 1987, pp. 15-16. 
12 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, pp. 57-58.  
13 Ibid. p. 62.  See also A. Dally, ‘Personal view’, British Medical Journal, 283 (26 September 1981) p. 
857. 
14 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Analysis of my addict practice’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, January 
1987. 
15 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Maintenance’, by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, January 1987. 
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for addicts who had been addicted to heroin for a long time.  She stated in a document 
prepared for her defence at a GMC professional misconduct hearing in 1986/7 that 
she found some truth in the notion that ‘it takes as long to wean an addict off drugs as 
the time he has been taking those drugs.’16  Long-term addiction, in her opinion, 
required long-term treatment. 
 The duration of treatment was not the only criticism Dally, and the addicts that 
came to her, had of the DDUs.  Many clinics introduced a ‘contract system,’ whereby 
addicts would agree to reduce their intake of opiate drugs by a certain amount over a 
fixed period, and also set a limit on the overall duration of prescription.17  Dally 
argued that these contracts were usually the same for all patients regardless of how 
long they had been addicted and that these were ineffective for many addicts.18  Those 
who came to Dally told her that they were not treated as individuals by clinics and 
disliked the attitudes of the staff that worked there.  One addict commented that ‘the 
treatment provided by the NHS is at best dogged by an excess of very generalised and 
rigid rules and regulations, which take little or no account of an individual’s needs 
and expectations.’19  Another felt they were ‘treated like a criminal rather than a 
patient.’20  Many addicts told Dally that the way clinics operated made it impossible 
to continue in paid employment.  One addict remarked that clinics were ‘more 
concerned with keeping strict adherence to appointment dates/times, than they are 
with patient’s keeping their jobs.’21  Most clinics insisted that addicts collect their 
                                                 
16 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/22, Draft statement of Dr Ann Dally, 20 October 1986. 
17 Connell & Mitcheson, ‘Necessary safeguards’, p. 768; Stimson and Oppenheimer, Heroin Addiction, 
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18 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 79. 
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20 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/11, Reply from ‘Mark’ to Dally’s letter of December 1985.  
21 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/11, Reply from ‘James’ to Dally’s letter of December 1985. 
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prescriptions on a daily basis.22  This was supposed to prevent the addict from over-
dosing or selling their drugs, but it also made holding down a job difficult as the 
addict had to visit the chemist every day, often at a specific time, to collect their 
drugs.23  Clinics also required patients to attend regular treatment sessions usually 
held during office hours, again something that made continuing to work 
problematic.24
Dally used these criticisms of DDU treatment policy to develop her own 
treatment philosophy and methods.  She maintained that the treatment she offered was 
directed at a series of clear, mutually dependent goals: ‘to improve their [the addicts] 
general health and social situation and to help them reduce their drug need, with the 
hope that they would eventually become drug free.’25  Her aim was to get addicts to 
‘stabilise their lives’ and then ‘help them towards a drug-free life.’26  To achieve this, 
Dally prescribed sufficient opiate substitutes (usually methadone) to prevent 
withdrawal and had regular sessions with the patient directed towards helping the 
patient acquire greater self confidence and a more ‘stable’ life, at which point work 
could be undertaken to reduce the dosage of drugs.27  Prescription could be over a 
prolonged period.  Dally thought that long-term addicts required long-term 
prescription.  She did not, however, regard this treatment as ‘maintenance.’  Dally 
disliked the term, and thought ‘that the idea of simply giving an addict a regular dose 
of a drug forever and not doing any more to help him is quite wrong, or at least not 
the function of a doctor.’28  Instead, she preferred to think of this as a ‘stabilisation 
                                                 
22 Connell & Mitcheson, ‘Necessary safeguards’, p. 768. 
23 Stimson & Oppenheimer, Heroin Addiction, p. 106. 
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dosage’ and her treatment as ‘long-term detoxification.’29  Dally summarised her 
prescription policy as being ‘to prescribe as little as possible and to reduce the dose as 
fast as possible, but only within the capacity of the individual patient.’30
In order to determine that the patient she was treating was indeed addicted to 
opiate drugs Dally relied chiefly upon an examination of the patient.  She 
concentrated on looking for the physical signs of repeated injection, scars over veins 
in the arms, legs and groin area called ‘track marks.’  Dally argued that these were 
difficult to fake, but an addict patient who appeared as a witness at her professional 
conduct hearing in 1986/7 claimed that she had marked her arms deliberately in order 
to convince Dally she was an addict.31  The more ‘scientific’ way of determining 
whether or not someone was an addict, and the method used by the DDUs, was to 
conduct urine analysis for the presence of opiate drugs.32  Dally argued that addicts 
could easily fake the results of these tests.33  What is more, she did not have the 
facilities to conduct this kind of testing at her surgery and would have had to send 
samples for analysis elsewhere.  As a private doctor she would have been required to 
pay for this service, and pass the cost onto her patient.34  Her dislike of urine testing 
as a method for determining whether or not a patient was taking opiate drugs set her 
apart from her clinic-based peers.  Even if urine analysis was a dubious diagnostic 
tool, not using it opened Dally up to criticism in a climate where testing was the 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 82 
31 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing 1986-7, 11 December 1986, pp. 16-25; CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/6 
Statement of ‘Miss B.’, 4 September 1986. 
32 Smart found that 80 per cent of the DDUs in England and Wales that she surveyed in 1982 had urine 
testing facilities. See, Smart, ‘Drug dependence units in England and Wales’, p. 137.  See also: Chapter 
One, p. 81; Ghodse, ‘Treatment of drug addiction in London’, p. 637; Connell & Mitcheson, 
‘Necessary safeguards’, p. 768; Gardner & Connell, ‘One year’s experience in a drug-dependence 
clinic’, p. 455; Stimson & Oppenheimer, Heroin Addiction, pp. 98-99. 
33 A. Dally, ‘Drug users and urine testing’ letter to the Lancet, (3 September 1983) p. 575; Dally, A 
Doctor’s Story, pp. 202-203, p. 293; CMAC PP/DAL/E/2/4, PCC Hearing 1983, 6 July 1983, p. 21. 
34 Annette Lingham, Dally’s secretary and receptionist, in a statement taken for Dally’s defence in 
1986 said that urine tests, when carried out, cost £15-£18.  See CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/12, Statement of 
Annette Lingham, 20 November 1986.  
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orthodoxy.  Urine analysis could indicate the presence of opioid drugs but it was of 
little use in determining what dose to prescribe.  Dally, like other doctors treating 
addicts tended to use a ‘rule of thumb’ in absence of any other accurate method.35  
When she first began to treat addicts Dally stated that she read all the scientific 
literature available on the subject and decided not to prescribe more than 180 
milligrams of methadone per day to any patient, although she contended that in 
practice she rarely prescribed more than 80 milligrams a day and never actually 
reached her upper limit.36
Dally argued that she built her treatment philosophy and methods around a 
different kind of patient to the ones seen in DDUs.  Dally’s patients were older than 
those usually seen by clinics.  In an analysis of her practice produced in 1987, Dally 
found that the average age of her patients was 35 years for men, 33 years for 
women.37  This was higher than those attending clinics, where the majority of addicts 
were in their twenties.38  According to Dally, her addict patients almost universally 
had been addicted to opiates for a long period of time.  She estimated that 90 per cent 
of her addict patients had been addicted for at least three years.39  Most of the addicts 
she treated had jobs; indeed, Dally stated that she made it a condition of treatment to 
provide some form of documentation to prove employment or sufficient funds.40  This 
was vital, as she needed to ensure that patients could afford to pay her fees.  Dally 
                                                 
35 See Chapter One, p. 81. 
36 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 84. 
37 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Analysis of my addict practice’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, January 
1987. 
38 Ibid.  See also Hicks, ‘The management of heroin addiction at a General Hospital Drug Addiction 
Treatment Centre’, pp. 235-243, where the average age of patients attending was stated as 22.8 years, 
Love & Gossop, ‘The process of referral and disposal within a London Drug Dependence Clinic’, 
where 68% of patients were 25-29 years old and M. Sheenan, E. Oppenheimer & C. Taylor, ‘Why drug 
users sought help from one London Drug Clinic’, British Journal of Addiction, 81, (1986) 765-775, 
where the mean age of the sample was 24.6 years.  
39 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Analysis of my addict practice’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, January 
1987. 
40 Dally asserted the need to check employment records of her addict patients when she gave evidence 
at the 1986/7 hearing.  See CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing 1986-7, 26 January 1987, p. 58.  
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charged £50 for an initial visit and £30 a session after this.41  This was less than her 
‘non-addict’ rate, and her fees remained the same from 1979 until 1987 when she 
stopped seeing addicts.42  In addition to the consultation fee, addicts had to pay for 
their prescriptions privately.  This was more expensive than getting prescriptions 
through the NHS, as the NHS charged a flat rate for the drugs prescribed and paid the 
pharmacists’ dispensing fee.  Drugs dispensed on a private prescription were paid for 
at market value; this was around £20 to £30 for the average methadone or other opiate 
substitute script.43  In addition, pharmacists charged a dispensing fee for private 
prescriptions, and this ranged from £2 to £12.44  The payment of fees for treatment of 
heroin addiction was a key issue in the debate over the involvement of the private 
practitioner in this field, and this will be dealt with in more detail below, but it is 
important to note that Dally had to check that her addict-patients had sufficient funds 
not only so that she could ensure that the patient could pay her fees, but also to guard 
against the likelihood of a patient selling drugs prescribed to him or her to a third 
person.  Patients initially saw Dally once a week, but when they were ‘stable,’ or she 
felt they could be trusted, they came once every few weeks, or even once a month.45  
She argued that this meant that the addict had to take less time off from work to attend 
treatment sessions.  Crucially, too, Dally allowed addicts to collect their prescriptions 
once a week, in contrast to many clinics, which required addicts to obtain their drugs 
one day at a time.  Dally stated that she had four reasons for weekly prescription.  
Firstly, those that worked found getting to the pharmacy each day almost impossible.  
Secondly, she found that many of her patients had difficulty finding a pharmacy that 
                                                 
41 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/12, Statement of Annette Lingham, 20 November 1986. 
42 Dally charged non-addict patients £65 for an initial visit, and £35 to £50 per consultation after this.  
See Ibid.   
43 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/9, Miscellaneous statements from patients, 1986. 
44 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Frequency of my prescription’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, 28 
January 1987.  
45 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 75, p. 78. 
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would make up a private prescription, except in the Harley Street area.  Thirdly, Dally 
wanted to limit prescription costs to a minimum and as private patients had to pay a 
dispensing fee each time a script was cashed, weekly prescription was clearly 
considerably cheaper.  Finally, Dally felt that her patients were more mature and 
stable than many of those who attended clinics, so they could be trusted with weekly, 
rather than daily, prescriptions.46
The kind of treatment offered by Dally clearly differed from that found in the 
DDUs.  Dally was prepared to prescribe to addict-patients over a longer period of 
time than clinic psychiatrists.  She was less insistent that addicts abide by common 
DDU practices such as collecting prescriptions daily or submitting regular urine 
samples for analysis.  It was for these reasons that addict patients consulted her, but it 
was these same aspects of her treatment philosophy and methodology that brought her 
into direct conflict with DDU psychiatrists.  This conflict was based partly on the 
problems as they saw it with her methods, but also because she presented a critique of 
their methods, and therefore, an attack on their status and position.    
 
1.3  AIDA – a critique of the NHS DDUs? 
This assault on the DDUs and their methods was consolidated by Dally’s outspoken 
criticism of clinics’ practices and her strong advocacy for the increased involvement 
of what she termed the ‘independent’ practitioner in addiction.  Dally argued that 
doctors independent of the DDUs, be they GPs or general psychiatrists, in private 
practice or working for the NHS, had a role to play in the treatment of heroin 
addiction.47  To strengthen this claim, and to campaign for the wider involvement of 
                                                 
46 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Frequency of prescription’, by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, 28 January 
1987. 
47 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 85. 
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the independent doctor, Dally established the Association of Independent Doctors in 
Addiction (AIDA) in 1981.  Its purpose was to: 
promote high standards of practice among doctors (both National Health 
Service and private) who are interested in treating drug addicts outside clinics 
and to encourage and teach National Health Service general practitioners to 
look after their own addicts.48  
 
Dally canvassed support for her organisation by persuading medical journals to insert 
notices about AIDA.49  She claimed that she received several hundred replies from 
doctors all over the world, but AIDA’s membership was actually quite limited.50  In a 
document prepared for her lawyers prior to the 1986/7 professional conduct hearing 
Dally stated that AIDA had ten ‘active’ members, and a further 30 members ‘world-
wide.’51  Elsewhere Dally conceded that many of the practising doctors rarely 
attended meetings, and ‘some of [the] membership [is] really a mailing list.’52  Those 
who joined AIDA, according to Dally, were ‘doctors like myself who were trying to 
help addicts and to treat them in a humane and effective way and who wished to meet 
and discuss with others of like mind.’53  Despite Dally’s protestations, AIDA was 
frequently seen as an organisation consisting purely of private doctors.  A researcher 
who had observed the work of the DDUs noted in a letter to the Lancet that ‘most’ 
members of AIDA were private doctors.54  Dally was quick to reply that ‘Private 
practitioners form a substantial minority [of AIDA’s members], but it is a minority.’55  
The veracity of this is unclear.  Of the ten ‘active’ members, including Dally herself, 
                                                 
48 A. Dally, ‘Drug addicts in Piccadilly’, letter to the British Medical Journal, 287, (22 October 1983) 
p. 1219. 
49 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 85; Notices, Lancet, (12 December 1981) p. 1358. 
50 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 85. 
51 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Expansion on my skeleton document about the unpaid work I do and have 
done in relation to drug addiction’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, 5 December 1986. 
52 See CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘List of witnesses, definite and possible’ by Dally, prepared for her 
lawyers, 1986.  
53 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p 85 
54 L. Hewitt, ‘Drug Clinics Today’ letter to the Lancet (30 April 1983) p. 990. 
55 A. Dally, ‘Drug Clinics Today’ letter to the Lancet (28 May 1983) p. 1223 
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listed in 1986 six practised privately (some in addition to NHS work) and only one 
practised exclusively within the NHS.56
 AIDA’s reputation was not enhanced by being associated with a number of 
doctors who had their names deleted from the GMC’s register of licensed medical 
practitioners.  A former AIDA member, Dr Ali Khan, was struck off in 1982 for 
irresponsible prescription to addicts.57  Dally stated that this happened before the 
organisation had really got going and that they had persuaded Khan to change his 
prescription practices, but by then it was too late.58  Dally maintained that he was the 
only member of AIDA to be struck off by the GMC, but this was not necessarily 
widely understood.  At a meeting of the DHSS Working Party on Drug Misuse 
constituted to create guidelines on good clinical treatment of addiction in 1984, 
Bewley confidently asserted that members of AIDA had been struck off.59  Dally 
admitted that there were other doctors of dubious clinical reputation who became 
associated with AIDA.  Dr Peter Tansey, Dr Rai and Dr Rahman had all been found 
guilty of irresponsible prescription by the GMC and were all ‘cited by our critics as 
being members,’ although Rai and Rahman attended only one meeting.60   
AIDA did, however, have a number of more positive associations.  According 
to Dally, Bing Spear was ‘enthusiastic’ and he felt that an organisation like AIDA had 
                                                 
56 The members of AIDA in 1986 listed by Dally were: Dr Charles Cohen, status unknown; Dr 
Leighton Charles, private psychiatrist, stopped treating addicts in June 1986; Dr Patrick O’Connor, 
status unknown; Dr A.W. Beard, former NHS Consultant Psychiatrist at Middlesex Hospital, but then 
treating addicts privately; Dr Margaret McNair, private General Practitioner; Dr John Poncia, NHS 
consultant psychiatrist at various hospitals including Broadmoor, but also treated addicts privately; Dr 
Tessa Hare, NHS GP and Dr Badrawy, private practitioner, Harley Street  See CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, 
List of AIDA members, 24 January 1987.  Not included on this list, but a prominent member, was Dr 
Dale Beckett, a retired NHS consultant psychiatrist who also treated addicts privately.  See CMAC 
PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘List of witnesses, definite and possible’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, 1986.   
57 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 112. 
58 CMAC PP/DAL/B/5/1/2, Letter from Ann Dally to Dr Dorothy Black, Senior Medical Officer at the 
DHSS, and representative of the DHSS to the Working Party on Drug Misuse, 26 March 1984.  
59 Ibid.;  Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 130. 
60 See CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘List of witnesses, definite and possible’ by Dally, prepared for her 
lawyers, 1986. 
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‘long been needed and offered help.’61  Spear initially allowed AIDA to meet at the 
Home Office, giving Dally the impression of support, allowing her to boast in a letter 
to the Lancet in 1982 that ‘We are meeting regularly together with observers from the 
Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Security.’62  They were later 
forced to reconvene at Dally’s home after protests about AIDA meeting at the Home 
Office from what she describes as the ‘drug dependency Mafia’ led, Dally alleged, by 
Bewley.63  Dally believed that ‘meeting there [at the Home Office] had given us a 
respectability that was unacceptable in some quarters.’64  This may have been more 
than paranoia: Spear noted that ‘the London consultants did not take too kindly to the 
contact the Drugs Inspectorate had with AIDA and individual private practitioners.’65  
However, Spear viewed AIDA more equivocally than perhaps Dally realised.  He 
noted that his contact with the organisation was 
perfectly consistent with our [the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate’s] long-
established policy of keeping in contact with anyone working in the drug 
dependence field.  It did not imply approval, or disapproval, of the clinical 
judgements of those concerned.66
 
Spear’s interest in AIDA, therefore, did not necessarily equate with support for its 
members or their goals.67
 The work of AIDA was primarily advisory.  There was an attempt to provide a 
practical solution to some of the problems in the treatment of drug addiction identified 
by AIDA when the organisation tried to establish its own non-profit making clinic.  
This clinic would ‘try to help the large numbers of addicts who do not benefit from 
                                                 
61 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 85. 
62 A. Dally, ‘Drug addiction and the independent practitioner’ letter to the Lancet, (23 January 1982) p. 
228. 
63 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Expansion on my skeleton document about the unpaid work I do and have 
done in relation to drug addiction’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, 5 December 1986; Dally, A 
Doctor’s Story, pp. 85-86. 
64 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 100. 
65 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 287. 
66 Ibid. p. 287. 
67 CMAC PP/DAL/E/2/4, PCC Hearing 1983, 6 July 1983, p. 53. 
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the NHS but cannot afford private treatment.’68  Patients would be seen on referral 
from their GPs and the addict would pay a small fee ‘in accordance with their means’ 
for treatment.69  AIDA applied to the DHSS for a grant to pay staff working at the 
clinic on a per session basis.  Dally maintained that they did not hear anything about 
the success or otherwise of their application, and AIDA’s attempt to set up a clinic 
never came to fruition.70  The greatest potential for AIDA to influence the 
development of drug addiction treatment came in 1984 when they were asked to send 
a representative to sit on the working party of drug addiction experts tasked with 
drawing up guidelines on the good clinical treatment of addiction by the DHSS.  
AIDA elected Dally as their representative, and another AIDA member, Dr Dale 
Beckett, also sat on the working party.71  A more extensive discussion of the working 
party and the guidelines produced will take place in Chapter Four, but it is clear that 
Dally and Beckett were very much minority voices on the committee.  They were 
unable to have a significant influence on the content, wording or style of the final 
guidelines, to the extent that AIDA felt moved to produce their own comments on the 
document.72  
AIDA were also asked to give evidence to the House of Commons Social 
Services Committee in 1985.73  AIDA submitted a memorandum and gave verbal 
evidence raising a number of issues with current drug treatment policies.  They stated 
that the ‘proper person to treat most addicts is the general practitioner’ and suggested 
that some kind of additional payment could be made to GPs willing to take on addict 
                                                 
68 A. Dally, letter to the Lancet, ‘Drug clinics today’, (28 May 1983) 1223-1224. 
69 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘Expansion on my skeleton document about the unpaid work I do and have 
done in relation to drug addiction’ by Dally, prepared for her lawyers, 5 December 1986. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 127 
72 CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/8, Association of Independent Doctors in Addiction comments on 
Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment of Drug Misuse, July 1985.  
73 Social Services Committee, Misuse of Drugs, Evidence of AIDA, 27 February 1985, pp. 108-124. 
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patients.74  There is some evidence to indicate that the committee took on board this 
suggestion, as they recommended the DHSS examine the feasibility of such a 
scheme.75  Indeed, the committee commended the role of the GP in the treatment of 
addiction more generally, and suggested that there was no reason why GPs should not 
treat addicts with gradually diminishing doses of oral methadone on a short-term 
basis, provided they were properly trained and had access to specialist support and 
advice.76  It is unlikely, however, that AIDA were solely responsible in shaping this 
recommendation, as the committee heard evidence from a number of bodies and 
individuals who stressed the role of the GP in the treatment of addiction, including the 
Royal College of General Practitioners.77  
AIDA was very much Dally’s organisation.  She was its founder and 
president, and believed that she did most of its work, complaining she was the only 
doctor in the organisation who spoke out or criticised the DDUs.78  Most of the 
documents produced in AIDA’s name were drafted entirely by Dally and it is almost 
impossible to differentiate between AIDA’s collective views and Dally’s personal 
opinions.  It is revealing, for instance, to compare the written comments Dally sent to 
Dr Dorothy Black at the DHSS on the Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the 
Treatment of Drug Misuse (the Guidelines) and those sent out under the auspices of 
AIDA.79  The two documents make almost identical points, and though similarities 
might be expected, nothing separated the supposed ‘consensus views’ of AIDA from 
                                                 
74 Ibid. p. 109, p. 110, pp. 120-121. 
75 Ibid. p. xxix, p. lvi. 
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77 Ibid. Minutes of evidence 6 February 1985, memorandum submitted by the Royal College of General 
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the Treatment of Drug Misuse sent to Dr Dorothy Black, DHSS, September 1984, and CMAC 
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Dally’s own beliefs.80  Dally was without doubt AIDA’s most vocal representative 
but the other members did play a role in the organisation’s work.  Dr Tessa Hare was 
an AIDA member and NHS GP who treated addicts in a similar fashion to Dally, 
emphasising the need for helping addicts to develop a stable life.  In an interview with 
General Practitioner in 1983 she mentioned her membership of AIDA, and she and 
Dally gave evidence jointly on behalf of the organisation to the Social Services 
Committee on the Misuse of Drugs in 1985.81  AIDA members were called upon to 
support Dally when she faced the GMC on charges of irresponsible prescription to 
addicts in 1983 and again in 1986/7, but there was no broad-scale campaign to 
publicise her case or her position.  Dr Beard, an AIDA member, submitted written 
character evidence in support of Dally at her 1983 hearing and Beckett appeared as a 
witness for the ‘defence’ at in 1986/7.82  Beckett was one of Dally’s greatest 
supporters, but whether this was as a friend, or as a fellow AIDA member is unclear. 
Questions can therefore be raised about the extent to which AIDA had any 
significant impact on heroin addiction treatment policy in this period.  Though they 
gave advice to both the DHSS committee on the production of the Guidelines and the 
Social Services Committee their views were largely ignored.  Most of the 
membership, apart from Dally, Hare and Beckett showed little sign of becoming 
actively involved in the organisation’s work or the broader debate over the treatment 
of addiction.  Yet, AIDA was important for two reasons.  Firstly, AIDA’s true 
significance lay in the fact that it existed at all.  The presence of an organisation 
founded to support and defend the role of NHS GPs and private practitioners 
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81 ‘Rebellious GP who takes on rejected addicts’, General Practitioner, (12 August 1983) p. 21; Social 
Services Committee, Misuse of Drugs, 112-124. 
82 CMAC PP/DAL/E/2/4, PCC Hearing 1983, written evidence of Dr A.W. Beard, 6 July 1983; CMAC 
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interested in the treatment of addiction indicated that these doctors were playing an 
increasing role in this area and this was provoking conflict with the DDUs.  AIDA 
was created because a broader debate was taking place over who could most 
effectively treat the addict: the DDU psychiatrist, the GP, or the private doctor.  
Secondly, Dally, as AIDA’s founder, president and prime activist dramatically raised 
her own profile in the field through the organisation.  This enhanced her claim to be 
an ‘expert,’ something she was later to rely on in her GMC disciplinary hearings, but 
her high profile also made her a target for those keen to eliminate the ‘independent’ 
doctor from the treatment of addiction.  AIDA was thus significant for Dally 
personally and the private practitioner more generally.   
 
2.  Public: the attack on the private treatment of addiction 
2.1  Drugs and money: the problems of private treatment of addiction  
An organisation such as AIDA had much to contend with when it came to improving 
the position of the private practitioner in the treatment of addiction.  The image of 
private treatment for heroin addiction had been somewhat tarnished by the activities 
of some notorious ‘prescribers,’ doctors who prescribed controlled drugs to addicts 
freely, seemingly without limitation.  Of the six doctors identified by the Brain 
Committee as being responsible for the over-prescription of drugs the most notorious 
was Lady Frankau, who worked in private practice.83  In 1962 Frankau prescribed a 
total of six kilograms (600,000 tablets) of heroin.84  On one occasion she prescribed 
nine grams (900 tablets) of heroin to an addict and gave the same patient a further six 
                                                 
83 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 145. 
84 According to Spear, Frankau was the doctor responsible for the over prescribing excesses listed in 
the Brain report, see Ibid. p. 144.  Figures taken from Drug Addiction: Report of the Second 
Interdepartmental Committee, p. 6. 
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grams (600 tablets) three days later to ‘replace pills lost in an accident.’85  When 
Frankau died in 1967 Dr John Petro took over many of her patients.  Petro easily 
equalled his predecessor in terms of notoriety amongst addicts and also the wider 
newspaper reading public, as his sad and sordid story of decline from practising in a 
consulting room in Wimpole Street, to writing scripts for addicts in a series of cheap 
hotels, and then the buffet at Baker Street tube station and finally from the back of a 
Vauxhall Viva, hit the headlines.86  Petro had his name struck off the Medical 
Register in 1968, but other ‘prescribers’ like Dr Christopher Michael Swan continued 
to over-prescribe controlled drugs to addicts, until he too was struck off and sentenced 
to fifteen years imprisonment in 1970.87  Strong connections were thus made between 
private practice and dubious prescribing practices. 
Tales of ludicrous over-prescription by private doctors fed into attacks 
directed at the private treatment of heroin addiction in the 1980s.  Critics argued that 
this was unethical.  The ACMD, in Treatment and Rehabilitation, noted that the 
charging of a fee for consultation and prescription raised the question of how those 
patients with no regular income were to pay for this.  Furthermore, it was suggested 
that ‘Payment of fees may also inhibit the establishment of an effective therapeutic 
relationship between doctor and patient.’88  John Strang offered the opinion in the 
British Medical Journal in 1982 that ‘most addicts view the payment of the fee as 
being direct payment for the prescription of drugs and not for any medical, 
psychiatric, or psychotherapeutic service.’89  An editorial in the Lancet, also in 1982, 
suggested that the private treatment of addicts could be banned because ‘the 
prescription of a dependence-producing drug in return for a fee smacks so strongly of 
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87 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 214. 
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legalised drug-dealing with potentially enormous financial rewards.’90  These 
financial rewards were the subject of some debate.  Bewley estimated that if an addict 
being treated privately paid £25 a consultation, once a week, a doctor would need to 
see 20 such patients to earn £500 a week, or £25,000 a year.91  In a later paper, co-
written with Hamid Ghodse, a consultant psychiatrist at St George’s and Tooting Bec 
Hospitals, working on the same figures, but by upping the number of addicts seen to 
20 a day, it was argued that a private doctor ‘could receive over £100,000 a year 
solely by prescribing controlled drugs to addicts.’92  This statement suggested that 
doctors involved in private practice were not interested in treating addicts but only in 
giving them drugs and receiving their fee, but it is unclear if this practice was ever 
widespread.  There was no suggestion, for example, that Dally had been financially 
motivated in offering treatment to addicts; even the Home Office agreed on this 
point.93   
Bewley’s later paper clearly represented a more sustained assault on the 
position of the private practitioner.  A number of individuals took issue with Bewley’s 
claims.  A.B. Robertson, an addict receiving private treatment wrote to the British 
Medical Journal arguing that he did not ‘consider that I am being sold a batch of 
drugs at every visit.  Doctors must charge fees, or how else are they to live?’94  
Beckett also wrote to the British Medical Journal protesting about Bewley and 
Ghodse’s article, stating that their assertion about being able to earn £100,000 made 
him ‘angry’ as in his practice ‘a session with an addict lasts an hour, and usually I 
                                                 
90 ‘Editorial: Drug addiction: British System failing’, Lancet, (9 January 1982) p. 83. 
91 Bewley, ‘Prescribing psychoactive drugs to addicts’, p. 497. 
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93 See Chapter Five, p. 241-242. 
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spend a long time afterwards writing out prescriptions.’95  Dally argued in her book A 
Doctor’s Story that those who viewed private medicine as a ‘money-making racket’ 
were unaware of the expenses of private practice.96  At the time of writing (the book 
was published in 1990) Dally noted that annual rents on rooms from which a doctor 
could practice in the Harley Street area were £14,000-£15,000.  Other expenses, 
including a secretary, doubled this amount, leading Dally to argue that a doctor who 
gave up two NHS sessions had to earn at least £1,000 a week to cover costs and 
compensate for loss of earnings.97
 The precise amount that a private doctor could earn by prescribing to addicts 
was less of an issue than how addict patients were to find the money to pay for this.  
Bewley stated that if the patient was unemployed they might sell some of the drugs 
prescribed to support themselves and to pay the doctor’s fee, as did an editorial in the 
Lancet.98  This suspicion was seemingly confirmed by social anthropologist Angela 
Burr, who spent some time observing the operation of the black market in legally 
prescribed but illegally sold drugs in the Piccadilly area.99  She found that ‘most’ drug 
users prescribed drugs on a private basis sold some of their supply to pay doctors’ and 
chemists’ fees.  This led her to assert that private practitioners were clearly 
prescribing addicts larger amounts of controlled drugs than was necessary for the 
alleviation of withdrawal symptoms if addicts had a surplus left over to sell to fund 
treatment. 100  This was supported by a survey of addict patients conducted by Bewley 
and Ghodse.  They asked 69 addict patients why addicts went to see private doctors 
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and came up with a list of reasons.  It was suggested that private practitioners 
prescribed injectable drugs, they prescribed more than one drug, they prescribed 
weekly, they prescribed in larger doses and they were easier to con.101  Bewley 
argued elsewhere that such doctors acquired a reputation as being an “easy writer,” a 
label Spear claimed he had never heard addicts use.102  What appeared to concern the 
DDU doctors most about the actions of private practitioners was their supposed 
readiness to prescribe large doses of opiates.  Strang argued that private doctors 
prescribed higher doses of drugs than the DDUs, often in injectable form.103  
According to the Lancet private practitioners and those working outside the clinics 
‘may be casual in the quantities that they prescribe and what they overprescribe [sic.] 
can readily find its way to the black market.’104  This led the journal to conclude that 
whilst these doctors might be well intentioned ‘many people well placed to judge the 
consequences of their actions argue that they [non-clinic doctors] are aggravating an 
already grim scene.’105  Bewley and Ghodse suggested that there were only two ways 
to remedy the situation; Home Office tribunals or the GMC should act to stop private 
doctors deliberately over-prescribing to addicts and failing that, the licensing system 
for the prescription of heroin to addicts should be extended to include all controlled 
drugs.106  This would result in the effective exclusion of the non-clinic doctor, as 
licenses for the prescription of heroin were generally limited to DDU psychiatrists. 
 The studies conducted and editorials penned certainly painted a bleak picture 
of the work of the private practitioner in the treatment of addiction.  The impression 
given was that private doctors over-prescribed opioid drugs to their addict patients 
                                                 
101 Bewley & Ghodse, ‘Unacceptable face of private practice’, p. 1877. 
102 Bewley, ‘Prescribing psychoactive drugs to addicts’, p. 497; Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and 
Control, p. 284. 
103 Strang, ‘Personal view’, (1982) p. 972. 
104 ‘Editorial: Drug dependence in Britain: a critical time’, Lancet, (27 August 1983) 493-494, p. 493.  
105 Ibid. p. 493. 
106 Bewley & Ghodse, ‘Unacceptable face of private practice’, p. 1877. 
 158
either unwittingly, due to a lack of experience, or deliberately in order to make money 
for themselves.  Regardless of motive this had the consequence that more drugs found 
their way onto the black market as addicts sold their surplus, sometimes to help fund 
private treatment.  However, over-spill of legitimate drugs onto the illegitimate 
market came from NHS doctors as well as private practitioners.  Burr found that drugs 
bought and sold on the Piccadilly black market came from DDUs as well as from 
private doctors.107  Furthermore, the significance of this ‘grey’ market in 
pharmaceutical drugs may well have been exaggerated: illicitly produced, imported 
and traded drugs were freely available by the early 1980s and this ‘black’ market 
easily exceeded the ‘grey’ market in terms of size.108  Other studies, such as Bewley 
and Ghodse’s, were based on somewhat questionable evidence that revealed more 
about the study’s author’s views on the private treatment of addiction than an accurate 
picture of the consequences of this.  Bewley and Ghodse’s study was based on a 
survey of addict patients attending DDUs.  They asked them a series of rather leading 
questions such as if they considered private doctors were more easily ‘conned’ than 
clinic doctors, or if private practitioners prescribed larger doses than could be 
obtained from DDUs.109  However, as only half of the 69 respondents had actually 
consulted a private doctor half of the responses were not based on personal 
experience, but rather on rumour and supposition.  The article subsequently came in 
for a good deal of criticism.110  G. Milner of the Worcester Royal Infirmary argued 
that ‘it would be wrong to blame only private practitioners for the spread of 
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addiction.’111  Beckett asserted that ‘the BMJ has published propaganda disguised as a 
scientific paper.’112  Spear later contended that ‘between them the critics laid bare the 
true purpose of the paper,’ which was an ‘establishment attack on the private 
sector.’113         
 
2.2  Motivations 
It is clear that the motivation for this attack on the private treatment of addiction came 
not just from the particular problems facing private practice in this field.  Though it 
may be tempting to suggest that this could be read as a more generalised attack on 
private medicine, examining the actions of some of the key protagonists indicates this 
was unlikely.  Dally believed that Bewley was totally opposed to private medicine.  
She asserted that ‘Bewley had a strong dislike of private practice and made no attempt 
to hide it.’114  Yet, in response to a direct question about his views on the private 
treatment of addiction in an interview with the British Journal of Addiction, Bewley 
replied: 
I don’t see any objection in principle to the private practice treatment of addicts.  
It can be difficult for a single-handed practitioner.  They can get themselves into 
difficulties because they are isolated and have not got an NHS team to support 
them, and they may not have colleagues.  There are fewer difficulties for those 
working in a private hospital.  It is the single-handed practitioners in Harley Street 
who have run into difficulties. In that sense there can be difficulties for private 
practitioners.115
 
This response would suggest that Bewley was not necessarily wholly against the 
treatment of addiction in private practice or private practice in general.  Indeed, other 
key figures such as Connell practised privately, and even treated addict patients in this 
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capacity.116  Connell told the Social Services Committee that he did ‘a very small 
amount of private practice’ though he stated that ‘I personally would not prescribe 
drugs to a patient in private practice unless it was very clearly on a withdrawal 
scheme that was stuck to whatever happened.’117  Philip Fleming, consultant 
psychiatrist and director of Wessex Regional Drug Dependence Services, who gave 
evidence against Dally at the 1986/7 GMC hearing also did private work, though he 
did not treat addicts in his private practice.118  This indicates that leading DDU 
consultants, and even those most closely involved in the assault on the private 
treatment of addiction, were not opposed to private medicine in principle.  
Surprisingly, nor where they necessarily against the treatment of addiction in private 
practice, as long as this was under their control and conducted in a manner they 
approved of. 
 It is this response that provides a clue to the motivation behind the attack on 
the private treatment of addiction in the 1980s.  This appeared to be the result not of 
an ideological opposition to private practice or even necessarily a dislike of addiction 
treatment conducted in this manner, but because it posed a potential threat to the 
authority of a group of DDU doctors.  Spear asserted that: 
The intrusion of the independent practitioner into the drug addiction treatment 
field was seen as a direct challenge to the pre-eminence and prestige of a few 
influential clinicians, whose personal views and prejudices dominated 
treatment policy in London.119
 
Though Spear’s contention may be correct in spirit it does not explain how or why 
these doctors were influential, beyond hinting at the existence of conspiracy on the 
part of a group of psychiatrists to impose ‘their own ethical and judgemental values 
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on treatment policy.’120  Instead of looking to a ‘conspiracy’ to explain the influence 
of the DDU psychiatrists (particularly those in London) it is necessary to consider the 
nature of expertise and the way in which it was employed by these doctors.  DDU 
psychiatrists established themselves as ‘experts’ in the field through their claim that 
psychiatry was best able to treat the addict (see Chapter One) and also because they 
were well connected to the medical and drug dependency ‘establishment.’  Connell 
was the consultant in charge of the DDU at the Maudsley and Bethlem hospitals, the 
foremost psychiatric facility in Britain.  He was a member of the ACDD and later the 
ACMD, chairing this body between 1982 and 1988.  He was Chairman of the DHSS 
Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence that produced the Guidelines and 
Chairman of the ISDD.  He was a consultant advisor to the DHSS on addiction from 
1971 until 1986, and a member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists Special 
Committee on Drugs and Drug Dependence.  Connell also became involved in a 
number of other bodies not directly connected to drug addiction.  He was Vice-
President of the Royal College of Psychiatrists from 1979 until 1981, and a member 
of the GMC from 1979 until 1990, where he acted as the Preliminary Screener for the 
Health Committee.  Bewley’s list of distinctions and committee memberships was 
almost as long.  He was a member of the ACDD from 1966 until 1971, a member of 
the ACMD between 1972 and 1984, and a member and joint co-founder of the ISDD.  
He acted as consultant advisor on drug addiction to the DHSS from 1972 until 1981 
and for the WHO between 1969 and 1978.  In addition, Bewley was President of the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists from 1984 until 1987.  Although not a member of the 
GMC himself, Bewley’s wife, Beulah, sat on the council.   
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These connections allowed men like Bewley and Connell to exert considerable 
influence in the drug dependency field.  And, as much of the criticism of private 
practitioners came from DDU doctors, including Connell and Bewley specifically, 
Spear found it difficult to avoid the conclusion that they orchestrated the campaign 
against private practice.121  Spear was in a good position to observe the drive to 
exclude the private doctor as he frequently attended meetings of the London DDU 
consultants.  He noted that in September 1981 the consultants considered making a 
formal complaint to the GMC about the private treatment of addiction, but were 
persuaded by one of their number that an ‘informal’ approach might be better.  
Nonetheless, Spear argued that as a result the GMC Professional Standards 
Committee took up the issue for examination.122  The GMC were thus aware of the 
arguments against the involvement of the private doctor in heroin addiction and the 
potential problems with this kind of treatment.  It is also clear that the campaign 
against the private practitioner was not being won on the pages of the medical press as 
these doctors continued to treat addicts.  Action was required.  It was in this 
environment that a case was brought against Ann Dally for serious professional 
misconduct in respect to irresponsible prescription to an addict patient in 1983.  
Though there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the DDU doctors set up the case 
their influence was crucial in the construction of a climate of opinion that was 
strongly against the treatment of addiction in private practice.  The Dally case 
therefore warrants close attention.  
 
3.  Public versus private: the GMC vs. Dr Ann Dally, 1983 
3.1  The GMC: discipline and the drug doctor 
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The General Medical Council is a statutory body granted powers by Parliament to 
regulate the medical profession.  It was created as a result of the Medical Act in 1858 
to administer a single register of all medical men designed to differentiate between the 
qualified practitioner and a range of unqualified healers.123  In essence, the function of 
the GMC has remained the same since its establishment.  The GMC controls who may 
enter the register of licensed medical practitioners by deciding what qualifications are 
necessary to practice medicine and can remove those deemed unfit to continue.  To 
this end, it approves medical schools and investigates complaints or convictions 
against licensed medical practitioners.124  It has no inspectorate, and relies upon 
complaints or convictions reported to the GMC to learn of suspected instances of 
serious professional misconduct.  The GMC is responsible to the Privy Council, and 
appeals against the GMC’s findings are heard there.  The GMC is a self-regulating 
professional body, but has included ‘lay,’ non-medical members as a statutory 
requirement since 1950.125  In 1983 the GMC had 83 medical members and seven lay 
members.126  It is independent of the NHS and the Government, and is funded directly 
by its members.  But, according to medical sociologist and one time lay member of 
the GMC, Margaret Stacey, it is part of the state because of its statutory position.127
 A re-examination of the GMC’s role came in 1975 with the Merrison Enquiry. 
Merrison found that the GMC was not a complaints machine for patients but existed 
to protect the public from unqualified practitioners.  Its purpose, therefore, was not to 
punish doctors, but to maintain the standards of the profession.128  Merrison endorsed 
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the position that doctors could only be removed from the register if they had been 
convicted of a criminal offence which suggested they were unfit to practice, or if they 
were found guilty of serious professional misconduct.129  Serious professional 
misconduct was defined by the Medical Act in 1969 as being ‘serious misconduct 
judged according to the rules, written or unwritten, governing the profession.’130  In 
order to clarify what kinds of behaviour could be constituted as serious professional 
misconduct Merrison suggested that the GMC’s guidance to doctors, Professional 
Conduct and Discipline: Fitness to Prescribe, known as the ‘Blue Book,’ should be 
expanded.131  According to the ‘Blue Book’ professional misconduct fell into four 
categories.  The first was neglect by doctors of their professional responsibilities to 
patients for their care and treatment.  The second was the abuse of professional 
privileges or skills.  The third concerned the personal behaviour of the doctor and 
encompassed conduct seen to be derogatory to the reputation of the medical 
profession.  The last prohibited the advertising of professional services by doctors.132  
Determining whether a doctor’s actions constituted professional misconduct was the 
responsibility of the Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) of the GMC.133  This 
was the last stage in the disciplinary process that began with the initial complaint 
being passed to a Preliminary Screener.134  The screener decided whether or not 
action should be taken, and if this was in the affirmative, passed the complaint to the 
Preliminary Proceedings Committee (PPC).  If the PPC found there was a case to 
answer, they referred the case to the PCC to investigate.  Very few cases actually 
reached the PCC in the 1980s.  Stacey found that in 1983 57 per cent of cases were 
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dealt with by the Preliminary Screener alone, 15 per cent reached the PPC and just 4 
per cent got as far as the PCC.135   
The PCC were elected annually by the Council, and had 20 members.  A 
maximum of 10 of these were allowed to sit on a case alongside two lay members.136  
The committee were advised by a Legal Assessor, present at hearings to prevent the 
committee from making any legal mistakes and to rule on disputed questions (often 
the admissibility of evidence).137  The PCC usually sat in public and its procedure was 
similar to that of a court of law.  Doctors were allowed legal representation and the 
same standards of proof were required as in a court; the charge of serious professional 
misconduct had to be proven beyond reasonable doubt.138  If the charge was proved, 
the committee had four basic options open to them.  They could simply conclude the 
case if they felt the doctor had already suffered enough, they could admonish the 
doctor and then conclude the case, they could suspend the doctor for a fixed period of 
time up to a year and finally they could have the doctor’s name erased from the 
register, meaning that he or she would no longer be able to practice medicine.139  The 
PCC were also able to make continued registration conditional on whatever they 
deemed appropriate for a maximum period of three years.140
The GMC had traditionally been reluctant to play a role in disciplining doctors 
believed to be over-prescribing opiate drugs to addicts.  The Rolleston Committee 
recommended that tribunals be established to deal with doctor addicts and those who 
dispensed drugs to addicts too freely.141  The Dangerous Drugs Regulations of 1926 
provided the statutory basis for tribunals, permitting the Home Secretary to remove 
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the doctor’s right to prescribe controlled drugs if found guilty, but these were never 
used.142  When the first Brain Committee examined the issue in 1961 they were not 
convinced that tribunals were either practical or necessary given ‘the infrequency of 
these irregularities.’143  The over-prescription of drugs to addicts by a handful of 
doctors prompted the second Brain Committee to reconsider.  However, they decided 
that should disciplinary proceedings be necessary, the appropriate tribunal would be 
the Disciplinary Committee (later the Professional Conduct Committee) of the 
GMC.144  If the charge was proved, the GMC should have the authority to remove the 
doctor’s right to prescribe controlled drugs.145  According to Smart, the GMC refused 
to take on this responsibility.146  The then President of the GMC, Lord Cohen, did not 
believe that the Council should act as ‘a police authority for the medical 
profession.’147   
To deal with doctors who prescribed drugs to addicts in an irresponsible 
manner, Home Office tribunals were to be revived under the Misuse of Drugs Act, 
1971.148  It was not until 1974 that these came into being, by which time the GMC 
had changed its stance on the issue and were increasingly prepared to consider ‘the 
prescription of drugs other than in the course of bona fide treatment’ as being serious 
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professional misconduct.149  Why the GMC changed its position is unclear, but they 
heard 39 cases of improper prescribing between 1972 and 1984, resulting in 18 
doctors having their names erased from the medical register.150  Home Office 
tribunals were not widely used to pursue cases of irresponsible prescription until the 
early 1980s; between 1974 and 1982 just nine tribunals were held.151  The ACMD 
were critical of this, noting that a narrow and legalistic approach had been adopted, 
resulting in only those cases where there was clear evidence of gross irresponsible 
prescription being heard.152  Stung into action, the Home Office tribunal prohibited 
three doctors from prescribing controlled drugs in 1983, another three in 1984, and a 
further three were prevented from doing so on a temporary basis.153  This meant that 
there were two separate bodies pursuing the discipline of doctors prescribing 
irresponsibly to addicts, the Home Office tribunals and also the GMC.  The two 
differed in the charge they could levy and the punishment they could exact, but were 
effectively trying the same offence.  Tribunals tried doctors for irresponsible 
prescription and if found guilty could remove the doctor’s right to prescribe controlled 
drugs.  The GMC assessed whether or not a doctor’s prescription of drugs to an addict 
was part of bona fide treatment, and if they decided it was not, could charge the 
doctor with serious professional misconduct and censure him or her in whatever way 
they saw fit.   
To confuse matters still further, the two systems were not in contact with one 
another and there did not seem to be a clear reason why a doctor should face a 
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tribunal and not the GMC, or vice-versa.  Being found guilty of irresponsible 
prescription by the Home Office did not automatically lead to a GMC hearing on 
charges of suspected serious professional misconduct.154  The two systems existed 
because of the GMC’s initial reticence to become involved in disciplining doctors 
thought to be prescribing in an inappropriate manner, so the Home Office instigated 
their own methods.  By the time these had been put into place, the GMC were more 
amenable to the idea of considering over-prescription to addicts as serious 
professional misconduct, so there were two pieces of machinery to deal with the same 
problem.  Deciding which body a doctor should face was probably down to the 
peculiarities of the individual case.  Unravelling the reasons behind this is less 
revealing than the overall upward trend in the use of both tribunals and GMC PCC 
hearings.  By 1983 there was a more general willingness to use these bodies to pursue 
doctors believed to be prescribing to addicts irresponsibly.155  According to Ashton, 
the disciplinary mechanisms were being ‘oiled-up and put to use.’156  This suggests 
that either more doctors were prescribing irresponsibly, and/or there was more interest 
in these cases, resulting in a greater number coming before the Home Office and the 
GMC.  Dally’s case was thus part of an increase in the use of the available machinery 
to discipline doctors thought to be prescribing to addicts irresponsibly. 
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3.2  The GMC vs. Dr Ann Dally, 1983 
The case which brought Dally before the PCC in July 1983 centred on her treatment 
of one addict patient, Brian Sigsworth.157  Dally first saw Sigsworth in 1981.  He had 
been addicted to heroin for 17 years and was then taking Diconal as a substitute on 
prescription from his GP.158  He had a long criminal record and had spent time in 
prison, always, it seemed, for offences committed to obtain money for drugs.159  Dally 
found his case interesting.  He told her that he had not learnt to read and write until he 
was 16, but since then, during spells in prison, had passed A-Levels and read for a 
degree with the Open University.160  When he first went to see Dally Sigsworth was 
studying at Coventry Polytechnic.  Dally thought that he ‘was the sort of addict who 
most needed my help.  Unable to benefit from the clinic system, he was forced to lead 
a criminal life.’161   Dally spoke to Ian Heaton, a Drugs Inspector at the Home Office 
about Sigsworth’s criminal record.  Heaton told her that Sigsworth had a bad police 
record, but there was nothing to suggest that he had ever tried to deceive doctors or 
forge prescriptions for controlled drugs.162  Dally stated that she was concerned that 
Sigsworth was living in Coventry, as she tried to accept only patients that lived in 
London, but as there were no facilities for treating him there, and the city was less 
than a two hour journey away, she agreed to take him on.163
 Treating Sigsworth, however, rapidly became problematic.  Dally instructed 
him to come to weekly consultations, at least initially.164  Yet, over the 18-month 
period that she was treating Sigsworth Dally saw him just half a dozen or so times, 
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and he missed more appointments than he kept.165  When he failed to attend, Dally 
sent his prescription directly to the pharmacist and on one occasion allowed a friend 
of Sigsworth’s to pick up his script.166  Sigsworth told Dally that he was unable to 
come to consultations because he was in bed with a bad back.  It appears that 
Sigsworth genuinely did have chronic back problems, as he had previously needed 
surgery, so Dally was prepared to give him a little leeway.167  A year and a half after 
Dally started treating Sigsworth she received a telephone call from Spear, informing 
her that Sigsworth had been arrested and charged with supplying drugs to another 
person, and was in jail on remand.168  It later emerged that Sigsworth had also been 
found guilty of breaking into a doctor’s surgery in Coventry, so it could never be 
proved that the drugs he supplied had come from Dally.169  Although no official 
complaint was made to the GMC about Dally’s prescription to Sigsworth, the case 
came to their notice and she received a letter laying out the allegation of serious 
professional misconduct by issuing prescriptions to Sigsworth other than in the course 
of bona-fide treatment.170
 Dally’s case came before the PCC on 5 July 1983.  The committee was 
presided over by Sir John Walton, the President of the GMC.  Dally was represented 
by Adrian Whitfield QC and Timothy Preston QC appeared on behalf of the GMC.  
The charge laid against Dally was that between June and November of 1981 she 
abused her position as a medical practitioner by issuing prescriptions for controlled 
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drugs (Ritalin and Diconal) other than in the course of bona-fide treatment.171  
Preston’s main contention was that 
Even if it be right in rare cases to prescribe large quantities of controlled drugs 
to acknowledged addicts so as to forestall their obtaining those drugs on the 
black market and with a view to ultimately reducing the dosage and therefore 
weaning them from their addiction, that course of treatment should be done 
only in the strictest of conditions.172
 
Dally, he argued, had not observed these conditions.  He suggested that precautions 
should include not issuing prescriptions to a third person, that a clinical examination 
of the patient be carried out to check that he was not injecting the drugs prescribed, 
and also to see if these drugs were being taken at all.  Preston also drew the 
committee’s attention to the fact that Dally was treating Sigsworth privately, and the 
special responsibilities that this placed on the practitioner.  He noted that the fee 
charged should not be so great as to tempt the patient to sell drugs on in order to 
finance treatment.  This, he argued was particularly pertinent in the case of a patient 
like Sigsworth who had a criminal record.173  Preston’s concern was that Sigsworth, 
as an unemployed student living on a grant, travelling from Coventry to London to 
see a private doctor who charged £30 a consultation, paying an average of £7 to have 
his prescription filled, would find the temptation to sell some of his script to raise 
money was too great.174  The question, therefore, was whether it ought to have 
occurred to Dally that Sigsworth might sell some of the Diconal she prescribed 
him.175   
 Preston called a number of witnesses to provide evidence to help him prove 
his case.  The first was Brian Sigsworth himself.  His appearance on the stand did 
little to help Dally, despite the fact that he initially refused to give evidence ‘to the 
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detriment of Dr Dally.’176  He admitted that he had lied to Dally about his income, 
saying he had around £2,500 a year rather than £1,600.177  He also stated that Dally 
had sometimes examined his arms for ‘track marks,’ but on other occasions she did 
not.  Preston’s next witness was Dr Finlayson, Sigsworth’s GP in Coventry.178  When 
asked to comment on Dally’s prescription of 105 tablets a week (15 a day) to 
Sigsworth Finalyson said that he would prescribe six tablets a day at the most, and he 
was ‘concerned at a dose of 105 a week.’179  He also remarked that he would have felt 
‘uncomfortable’ about prescribing Diconal to Sigsworth, as he thought it possible that 
he might sell it on.180  The question of dosage arose again during the evidence of Bing 
Spear.181  He could not recall a case where such a large amount of Diconal was being 
prescribed to a patient, although he knew of other cases where as large or larger doses 
of equivalent opioids were prescribed.182  The implication was that Dally prescribed 
more Diconal to Sigsworth than was necessary for treatment of his addiction.  Preston 
then used the evidence of further witnesses to suggest that Dally should have known 
that Sigsworth was a ‘dodgy’ patient and likely to re-sell some of his prescription.  
Heaton, the Home Office Drugs Inspector Dally had first spoken to about Sigsworth, 
stated that Sigsworth’s criminal offences were relatively minor, but was forced to 
concede that this was a ‘slight misnomer’ when Preston pointed out that during the 
past seven years Sigsworth had spent two and a half years in jail and had just received 
another sentence of five years imprisonment for offences which included burglary of a 
chemists’ shop and possession of controlled drugs.183  Preston concluded his case by 
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arguing that a doctor prescribing drugs to an addict had a duty not just to their patient, 
but also to the public at large to ensure that only the person for whom they were 
intended used the drugs supplied.  If Dally had ‘closed her eyes to that possibility’ or 
‘given the circumstances of this case probability,’ that the patient might sell drugs to a 
third party that would be treatment in bad faith, and would, therefore, constitute 
serious professional misconduct.184  Preston contended that elementary enquiries 
would have shown Dally that Sigsworth could not afford the fees charged, the 
transport to London, and the cost of having the prescription filled without selling 
some of his tablets.185   
 Dally defended her treatment of Sigsworth by arguing that her prescription to 
him had not been excessive and she believed that he could afford her fees by taking 
on extra work if necessary.  She maintained that she only prescribed Diconal to 
patients who could manage on nothing else, and only to those who would not inject 
the drug.186  As Sigsworth had initially asked for 20 tablets of Diconal a day, 15 was 
actually something of a reduction.187  Furthermore, Dally asserted that if one thought 
of opioids as being interchangeable 15 tablets a day was the equivalent of 150mg of 
opioid a day.188  The British National Formulary (the official guide to dosage 
prescription) of 1981 stated that up to 18 tablets a day could be prescribed for chronic 
pain, so on this basis her prescription was not excessive.189  Dally maintained that 
Sigsworth was able to finance her treatment of him through legitimate means by ‘day 
labour.’190  When asked by a member of the committee how she thought Sigsworth 
could labour with a bad back Dally countered that she did not know if he meant work 
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in the physical sense, but he could always get ‘brain work’ if he wanted it.191  She 
could not accept that Sigsworth would sell some of his prescription in order to pay her 
fees, as he, in her opinion, needed the drugs prescribed.  If he wanted money, Dally 
asserted that Sigsworth was more likely to commit a burglary, and in any case her fees 
were considerably less than buying drugs on the black market, where he was paying 
£40 a day, not £40 a week.192  Dally’s barrister, Whitfield, argued that there was no 
suggestion of bad faith in Dally’s prescription of Diconal to Sigsworth, and even if 
guilty of prescribing too liberally this did not constitute serious professional 
misconduct.193  He noted that there were not many cases where allegations of 
irresponsible prescription were made and members of the Drugs Inspectorate could be 
called upon to defend the practitioner concerned.194  Whitfield also pointed out that 
the Home Office were not interested in calling Dally to a tribunal.195  He concluded 
that on examining the facts of the case ‘this lady appears as one who was doing her 
best.’196  
 Before the committee retired to consider their verdict the Legal Assessor was 
asked to provide more evidence on how irresponsible prescription could be 
considered male-fide treatment and, therefore, serious professional misconduct.  He 
determined that a doctor could be found to be acting not in the course of bona-fide 
treatment if they knew, or did not care if, controlled drugs prescribed by them were 
being sold by a patient.197  Dally believed that the wording of the charge was being 
changed so as to find her guilty, an assertion supported to some extent by reports of 
journalists overhearing a person ‘associated’ with the GMC or its lawyers remarking 
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that the ‘prosecution’ were unlikely to win their case because of the wording of the 
charge, and subsequently the charge was altered.198  After consideration, the 
committee decided that Dally had been prescribing Diconal to Sigsworth not in the 
course of bona-fide treatment, and was, therefore, guilty of serious professional 
misconduct.  The President told Dally that as the medical profession had been given 
special responsibilities in relation to the prescription of controlled drugs to addicts the 
GMC were ‘bound to take a serious view of a case such as yours where it has been 
proved to their satisfaction that you have disregarded those special responsibilities.’199  
The Committee found that Dally had prescribed large amounts of drugs to a patient 
and the circumstances in which the prescriptions were issued did not amount to a 
sufficient level of supervision.  They believed that she had not taken satisfactory steps 
to establish adequate therapeutic reasons for prescribing Diconal to Sigsworth, and 
she did not monitor his progress well enough.200  The committee took into account 
‘the many references and representations made’ on Dally’s behalf, and decided to 
admonish her, and conclude the case.201
 Examining the evidence presented and the verdict reached in Dally’s case 
raises some key points about the treatment of addiction and the role of the private 
practitioner.  Dally’s handling of Sigsworth was flawed given the climate of opinion 
about the treatment of addicts.  She prescribed large doses of an opiate substitute on a 
weekly basis, did not carry out extensive clinical examinations or urine tests and 
rarely even saw her patient.  Yet, it was the peculiar problems of the treatment of 
addiction in private practice that raised the biggest questions over Dally’s treatment of 
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Sigsworth.  As a private doctor Dally charged Sigsworth a fee for consultations.  In 
order to fund this treatment, as an addict patient on a low income, who had committed 
criminal acts in the past to get money for drugs, it was perfectly possible that 
Sigsworth could or would sell some of the pills prescribed by Dally.  Of course, 
Sigsworth could just as easily have sold drugs prescribed to him by an NHS doctor, 
but he would not have had to pay for treatment, or as much for his prescription.  There 
was less of an inducement, as there was less of an incentive.  Viewing the case on its 
merits alone, however, would suggest that to find that Dally had acted in bad faith 
when prescribing to Sigsworth was something of a curious verdict.  She was certainly 
naïve and imprudent in her handling of a ‘dodgy’ patient, but that her motives were 
entirely honourable was indisputable; even Preston in his opening statement to the 
committee concurred.  To explain this verdict, the context in which it was delivered 
needs to be considered.  Views on the private treatment of addiction were increasingly 
polarised and a powerful, well-supported group of DDU psychiatrists wanted to 
eliminate the private practitioner from the treatment of addiction.  Dally was a 
figurehead for the private doctor treating addicts and, therefore, an obvious target in 
the war over drug addiction treatment.   
 
3.3  A political trial?  Reactions to the Dally case  
Evidence for this view can be found in the reaction to the GMC’s verdict in the 
medical press and elsewhere.  Dally’s case had a number of significant implications 
not just for those treating addicts, but also for the methods used.  The GMC, it 
appeared, was not above using the PCC to conduct ‘political’ trials.  Jean Robinson, a 
former chairperson of the Patients’ Association sat on the GMC PCC during the 
1980s.  In a wide-ranging critique of the Council she argued that although the 
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members of the PCC tried to do an honest job in the end they ‘merely become 
instruments for the occasional ritual sacrifice.’202  Michael O’Donnell, doctor, 
medical commentator and member of the GMC (he was one of the ‘rebels’ appointed 
in 1970) made it clear that this was what had happened to Dally when he opened his 
attack on the case by referring to the medical establishment as having offered up a 
‘sacrificial lamb.’203  O’Donnell recognised that the debate about the treatment of 
addiction and the view that the clinics were ‘failing’ was the backdrop to the GMC’s 
case against Dally.  He wondered if without the ‘background political noise’ Dally 
would have faced the ‘full ritual of a “public trial.”’  O’Donnell could well understand 
the view of journalists watching proceedings that ‘this was a political trial in which 
the “establishment” was out to “get” Dr Dally because of her heretical views.’  
Because Dally had dared to ‘question the party line on the management of drug 
addiction’ she was subjected to a ‘trial’ by the GMC.204         
O’Donnell and Dally both referred to the dismay of journalists in the public 
gallery at the PCC’s verdict, yet none of this outrage spilled out into articles in the 
broadsheet press.205  Most newspapers just confined themselves to the details of the 
case, only The Guardian hinted at wider political reasons for the hearing.206  The 
article stated that Dally had ‘publicly set herself up in opposition to the government-
run clinics for drug addicts’ suggesting that the case might be about adjudicating a 
debate over treatment.207  The medical press covered the case in more detail.  An 
editorial in the Lancet noted that there was ‘speculation’ about ‘the motives behind 
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the charge.’208  Furthermore, the evidence against Dally was not ‘compelling.’209  
This was a theme continued by the Lancet’s legal correspondent, barrister Diana 
Brahams.  Brahams argued that the case was ‘disquieting’ for two reasons.  Firstly, 
the way in which the charge was interpreted by the legal assessor and the committee, 
and secondly, the unjustness of a system that did not allow the right to appeal when a 
doctor had been found guilty of serious professional misconduct but not suspended or 
struck off.210  Brahams also mentioned the ‘background of concern about the role of 
private doctors in the treatment of drug dependence,’ again hinting at the broader 
implications of the case.  Brahams too found that the evidence submitted during the 
hearing fell ‘well short of proof of a lack of good faith.’  She suggested that the 
outcome of the case indicated that guidelines were required on the treatment of drug 
addiction in private practice, and also that there should always be a right to appeal if a 
doctor was found guilty of serious professional misconduct.211
There was some attempt on the part of the GMC to fight back against the 
criticism directed at the PCC’s findings in Dally’s case.  Sir John Walton wrote to the 
British Medical Journal defending his committee’s verdict and challenging some of 
the allegations made by O’Donnell.212  He argued that the PCC did not take decisions 
lightly and ‘least of all vindictively.’213  The case, he maintained, was not about the 
benefits or drawbacks of a particular method of treating addicts, but about 
determining whether or not Dally had abused her position as a medical practitioner by 
issuing prescriptions to a patient other than in the course of bona fide treatment.  
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According to Walton, that alone was the issue on which the PCC adjudicated and 
found the charge to be proved to their satisfaction.214  The climate in which the case 
was brought, however, must have shaped its outcome.  Ashton, in his piece on 
‘doctors at war’ pointed out that debate about the involvement of the private doctor in 
the treatment of addiction had reached its height just a few months before Dally 
appeared before the GMC.215  He argued that what mattered was not so much whether 
the judgement against Dally was ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ but the significance this verdict 
held in terms of the controls placed on the prescription of drugs to addicts.  For 
Ashton the decision represented ‘a tougher line on addiction treatment.’216
 
Implications 
Taken as a whole, these articles indicate that Dally’s case was about more than Dally.  
And, when in seen in context of the debate about the role of the private practitioner in 
the treatment of addiction that took place immediately prior to the hearing, it is 
difficult not to conclude that Dally was the ‘sacrificial lamb’ referred to by 
O’Donnell.  Her treatment of Sigsworth was not without mistakes, but prescribing 
drugs to addicts was a risky business.  Whether in private practice or working at an 
NHS DDU, drugs prescribed legitimately by doctors did find their way onto the black 
market.  The risks were, of course, greater with private prescription as the costs 
involved increased the likelihood that drugs could be sold to finance treatment, but 
these drugs constituted just a small proportion of those available to addicts wishing to 
buy drugs illegally; most drugs by the 1980s came from illicit sources.  This, 
however, was not widely acknowledged by those who wished to halt the intervention 
of the private doctor in the treatment of addiction.  Flagging up the problems of 
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private practice in Treatment and Rehabilitation and in countless letters and articles in 
medical journals had not stopped the involvement of private doctors and GPs in this 
field.  But, by finding a key private practitioner treating addicts guilty of serious 
professional misconduct the Dally case could also serve as a warning to other private 
doctors and prevent them from becoming involved.  The GMC were, therefore, 
assuming a position in the conflict over the role of the private practitioner in the 
treatment of addiction through this verdict.  It was no coincidence that this position 
was broadly that of the DDU psychiatrists, the respected ‘experts’ in the field who 
had strong links to the medical establishment and even the GMC itself.  That is not to 
say there was necessarily a ‘campaign’ to ‘get’ Dally, rather that the position and 
authority of the leading DDU doctors allowed them to indirectly influence the PPC’s 
decision.217      
Yet, to some extent the GMC PCC hearing can be said to have ‘failed.’  It did 
not stop Dally practising and treating addicts, nor did it completely halt the 
intervention of the private doctor.  Moreover, astute commentators recognised the 
political significance of the PCC’s findings.  As well as raising the well-aired 
concerns about who should treat the addict Dally’s case pointed to a number of other 
issues around which the treatment debate continued to revolve.  The hearing 
demonstrated that there was a great need for guidelines on the treatment of addiction, 
both to help practitioners determine the correct course to follow, and also as a 
standard against which doctors thought be prescribing to addicts irresponsibly could 
be held.  Running through the case was an undercurrent concerning not just private 
practice treatment of addiction, but all treatment of addiction.  Some of the criticisms 
directed at Dally’s treatment methods were not just attributable to her status as a 
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private doctor, but raised issues with her underlying treatment philosophy.  Indeed the 
debate within the treatment of addiction moved away from issues of whether or not 
private or general practitioners should be involved in the treatment of addiction and 
instead began to focus on the type of treatment offered.  It is to the consideration of 
this issue that the remainder of this thesis will be directed.    
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Chapter Four 
 
Withdrawal versus Maintenance: the Growing Dominance of Short-term 
Withdrawal Treatment, 1984-1986 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the mid 1980s tension existed not only between DDU psychiatrists and private and 
general practitioners involved in the treatment of addiction, but also between those 
doctors who offered short-term, abstinence orientated withdrawal treatment and those 
who prescribed for addicts on a long-term, or maintenance basis.  Director of the 
Liverpool DDU, John Marks, asserted that ‘The debate about controlled drug 
prescribing has split the profession down the middle.’1  Those who supported the 
rapid withdrawal of drugs from addicts prescribed diminishing doses of an opiate 
substitute (usually orally administered methadone) over a short period of time at the 
end of which the addict would be ‘abstinent’ or ‘drug free.’  It could then be said that 
the addict was ‘cured,’ as he or she was, officially, no longer taking their drug of 
addiction.  Doctors who supported maintenance prescribed drugs to addicts over a 
much longer period and were less inclined to reduce the dose.  This treatment was 
aimed not so much at getting the addict off drugs, but was instead targeted at 
enhancing the social functioning of the patient; improving relationships, employment 
and general health.  The treatment offered by the respective groups thus differed in 
the duration of prescription but also over the expected outcome. 
Furthermore, the position and the type of medicine practised frequently 
separated advocates of short-term withdrawal and those who offered maintenance.  
Supporters of short-term abstinence orientated treatment were largely to be found in 
NHS DDUs, whereas those who called for long-term maintenance were often found in 
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private or general practice.   This chapter will argue that this division was no 
coincidence; indeed it can be used to explain why disputes over the treatment of 
addiction were so bitterly fought.  The relative position of these groups, the 
environment in which they existed and the types of medicine they practised 
fundamentally affected their understanding of addiction and its treatment.  Doctors 
working in hospital-based DDUs practised clinical medicine.  This aimed to ‘identify, 
record and analyse the symptoms presented in sickness; determine deviations from the 
norms demonstrated by physiological research; and on those bases develop valuable 
therapeutic interventions.’2  Disease was abstracted from the ‘sick man,’ who became 
a pathological body studied with lesions.3  Further subjugated by the disciplinary 
mechanisms of the hospital the ‘patient,’ was reduced ‘to the status of walking 
stomachs, blood sugars, heart valves or whatever [was] the seat of their disease.’4  
The treatment offered to addicts in DDUs conformed to these principles.  Psychiatrists 
saw only the disease to be treated and paid less attention to the social situation of the 
individual addict patient.  Addicts were examined and if the diagnosis of addiction 
was made, treatment offered.  Doses of opioids were reduced as rapidly as possible, as 
this was ‘treatment’ more likely to result in ‘cure’ – the patient being drug-free.   
In contrast, private and general practitioners operating outside hospitals 
frequently practiced biographical medicine.5  Here, emphasis was placed more on the 
patient rather than the disease.  The patient was not an inert vessel in which disease 
resided, but an individual.6  Through biographical medicine, according to Armstrong, 
the ‘sick man’ re-emerged; attention was paid to the experience of the sick individual 
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and not just to ridding them of disease.7  This explains why private and general 
practitioners treating addicts developed treatment programmes concentrating on the 
needs of each patient and were less concerned with the rapid removal of the drug from 
the body of the addict.  These doctors were more aware of the context in which the 
addict and their illness resided and therefore were more interested in improving social 
functioning rather than withdrawing the drug.  It is, therefore, argued that conflict 
over the treatment of addiction during the 1980s was caused as much by a clash 
between different approaches to sickness and disease as by specific concerns about 
who should treat the addict (specialist or generalist, NHS doctor or private 
practitioner) or how they should be treated. 
Caution, however, should be exercised.  The distinction between the different 
groups and their positions can be too tightly drawn.  There were exceptions to the 
rule.  As a hospital-based clinician running a DDU in Liverpool it would be expected 
that Marks supported abstinence orientated rapid withdrawal of opioid drugs from 
addicts.  Yet Marks offered the majority of his patients long-term maintenance 
prescriptions and developed a treatment philosophy concerned primarily with 
‘improving the physical health of the patient and improving the quality of their 
lives.’8  Marks offered a more biographical medicine type approach despite his 
clinical position.  Furthermore, short-term withdrawal and long-term maintenance had 
existed as suggested forms of treatment since at least the nineteenth century.9  Those 
who worked with drug addicts were divided over which method was to be preferred 
during the 1920s: supporters of the rapid withdrawal of drugs from addicts were to be 
found on the Rolleston Committee despite their eventual endorsement of 
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maintenance.10  As seen in Chapter One, this same split in expert opinion existed in 
the 1960s, leading to confusion about the treatment offered in the new clinics within 
the Ministry of Health and those hospitals asked to establish them.  Although the 
DDUs initially offered maintenance treatment to addicts by the late 1970s most had 
switched to the rapid withdrawal of opioid drugs from addict patients, believing it to 
be a more therapeutic response.  During this period the numbers of addicts seeking 
treatment increased and at the same time many grew disillusioned with the short-term 
withdrawal treatment available from clinics.  Some addict patients turned to private 
and general practitioners operating outside DDUs for treatment.  These doctors were 
often more inclined to offer maintenance prescription, arguing that it improved the 
social functioning of the patient.  Thus, the clash between withdrawal and 
maintenance occurred anew, and with added vehemence, in the 1980s. 
This chapter will consider this conflict by examining the case put for 
withdrawal and the case put for maintenance in more detail, taking into account the 
position and outlook of key protagonists.  Despite the increasing confidence of 
community-based practitioners in dealing with conditions they had previously left to 
specialists, in addiction the specialists appeared to remain dominant.  Short-term 
withdrawal, therefore, became the ‘orthodox’ method of treatment.  This can be 
observed in the production of the Guidelines of Good Practice in the Treatment of 
Drug Misuse (hereafter the Guidelines) in 1983-4.  The Guidelines strongly suggested 
that the most appropriate form of treatment for addiction was short-term abstinence 
orientated withdrawal, and implied that though the non-DDU doctor could have a role 
to play in the treatment of this condition this was fairly limited.  Yet, the supposed 
‘consensus’ presented in the Guidelines belied the diversity of opinions amongst the 
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working group members that produced this document and the wider drug addiction 
treatment community.11  Though short-term withdrawal was the dominant method of 
treatment it was not the only one.  Maintenance treatment continued to be offered by 
some doctors.  The ‘battle’ between these two methods and philosophies was clearly 
not over.   
 
1.  The treatment debate: short-term withdrawal versus long-term maintenance 
1.1  Short-term withdrawal 
It is almost impossible to distinguish short-term withdrawal from the practice of the 
DDUs.  DDU doctors were its strongest advocates and it was at clinics that the 
method was most widely practised.  A survey of the treatment offered at DDUs 
conducted in 1982 found that clinics ranked ‘help with withdrawal’ as their most 
important treatment policy.  In contrast, they did not believe that maintenance played 
a significant role in the treatment they offered.  An overwhelming majority of the 
DDUs surveyed (97 per cent) believed that heroin maintenance was either not 
important or not their policy, 84 per cent thought the same about maintenance with 
injectable methadone and 29 per cent found that maintenance on oral methadone was 
not acceptable either.12  By the mid-1980s, few clinics were prepared to prescribe new 
addict patients opioid drugs over a long period of time.  In 1984 Strang stated that all 
of the last 100 patients treated at his DDU in Manchester had been placed on a 
withdrawal regime to be completed in a fixed period between three and twenty weeks.  
In every case the drug prescribed was to be administered orally.13  Short-term 
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prescription of oral drugs (usually methadone) aimed at abstinence was the method of 
treatment offered by most DDUs and championed by many drug addiction experts.   
Explaining why this was adopted and how it became the orthodox method of 
treatment is as much about the perceived disadvantages of maintenance as the 
advantages of short-term withdrawal.  There were six main arguments put forward 
against maintenance and in support of rapid withdrawal.  The first was that 
prescription of a drug to an addict maintained the addiction.  Psychiatrists at a DDU in 
Sheffield felt that ‘prescribing drugs of addiction [to an addict] comes close to 
colluding with and maintaining the habit.’14  The choice of words in this statement is 
particularly interesting.  ‘Collusion’ suggests that by prescribing drugs to an addict a 
doctor was complicit in perpetuating a ‘habit,’ not providing treatment for a medical 
condition.  Maintenance was, therefore, unacceptable as it fed a habit and did not treat 
the disease.  This belief was underlain by an essentially moral objection to 
maintenance.  Connell told the Social Services Committee in March 1985 that 
maintenance might be suitable for a small group of ‘chaotic’ individuals, under very 
strict control, but as a whole this method was not appropriate.  By posing the 
rhetorical question ‘Is society required to provide something like a sweet or a drug 
because somebody wants it?’ and countering that ‘Those who are trying to treat this 
seriously are a little worried about adopting this view, which is of course the view that 
the person dependent upon the drug likes to put forward’ Connell implied that giving 
an addict a drug simply because he or she asked for it was unacceptable.15  Moreover, 
he suggested that prescribing addicts drugs of addiction was not treating the condition 
‘seriously.’  This was the second argument made against maintenance; that as it 
perpetuated the disease of addiction it did not constitute treatment and was not, 
                                                 
14 F.A. Jenner & P.V. Gill, ‘Helping heroin addicts kick the habit’, letter to the British Medical 
Journal, 291 (3 August 1985) 344-345, p. 345.  
15 Social Services Committee, Misuse of Drugs, Evidence of Dr Connell, March 1985, p. 126.   
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therefore, the role of the doctor.  This was not a new argument, but it was frequently 
repeated.  Dr Strachan of the Royal Edinburgh Hospital asserted at a meeting of the 
Northern Drug Addiction Psychiatrists in 1985 that ‘NHS facilities should be used for 
those who want treatment not sociomedical [sic.] control nor prevention of crime.’16  
Even if maintenance had advantages in terms of controlling addiction or reducing 
crime, it was not the responsibility of a doctor to prescribe drugs to addicts. 
Similar arguments had been made twenty years earlier when the Ministry of 
Health tried to determine the function of the DDUs and the treatment they should 
offer.  Maintenance was tentatively endorsed because civil servants and doctors alike 
wanted to avoid the development of a black market in drugs and thought this could be 
prevented by providing addicts with a legal supply through the clinics.17  The third 
argument raised by those who opposed maintenance was that this reason for long-term 
prescription was redundant by the 1980s.  According to addiction specialist J. Madden 
maintenance therapy ‘had not forestalled an expansion of the drug market.’18  
Furthermore, addicts prescribed drugs on a maintenance basis frequently sold their 
drugs to other addicts, or bought illegal drugs to supplement their legal supply, the 
fourth and fifth arguments made against long-term prescription.  A study of the 
Piccadilly drug scene in 1983 by anthropologist Angela Burr found a thriving market 
in the illicit trading of drugs prescribed by DDUs and GPs.19  Many drug addiction 
specialists, such as Connell and Bewley, were anxious about over-spill from the 
prescription of drugs to addicts to the black market.  Subsequently, they encouraged 
the development of restrictions as to when an addict could be prescribed drugs and 
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17 See Chapter One, pp. 59-67. 
18 J.S. Madden, ‘Editorial: The decline of long-term prescribing to opioid users in the United 
Kingdom’, British Journal of Addiction, 82 (1987) 457-459, p. 457. 
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under what conditions in an effort to reduce over-prescription.20  Connell also stated 
in an interview with the British Journal of Addiction that even when he had prescribed 
addicts heroin in the 1960s, they continued to buy drugs on the side.21  Other doctors 
involved in the treatment of addiction such as Jenner and Gill argued that they 
adopted a non-prescribing policy when treating addicts because they were ‘frequently 
being mislead and cheated.’22  The simplest way to avoid this was not to prescribe to 
addicts at all, or to do so over a very short period.   
The final argument put forward against maintenance was essentially an 
economic one.  The ACMD noted in Treatment and Rehabilitation that maintenance 
treatment offered to ‘old’ existing patients at DDUs ‘may be a factor in blocking the 
ready access of new patients to the clinics.’23  This view was endorsed by Strang, who 
noted that the ‘constant flow of patients into the clinic system was not matched by any 
equivalent flow of patients out of the system.’  As clinics were faced with static or 
diminishing resources they ‘found it necessary to look at shorter, more cost effective 
(and perhaps more appropriate) types of response.’  Adopting short-term prescription 
instead of maintenance was, therefore, ‘a pragmatically derived approach.’24  Short-
term prescription was cheaper than long-term maintenance as fewer drugs were 
required over a shorter period.  What is more, resources were being applied to those 
most likely to be ‘cured’ of addiction; when asked what happened to the majority of 
addicts who did not want treatment at a meeting of the Northern Drug Addiction 
Psychiatrists Strachan replied that there were enough patients who wanted withdrawal 
                                                 
20 See, for example: Bewley, ‘Prescribing psychoactive drugs to addicts’, Gardner & Connell, 
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21 Connell, ‘Conversation with Philip Connell’, p. 20. 
22 Jenner & Gill, ‘Helping heroin addicts kick the habit’, p. 344 
23 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 28 
24 Strang, ‘Abstinence or abundance – what goal?’, p. 604. 
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to keep DDUs busy.25  And, in the increasingly evaluative context in which the DDUs 
were operating, where ‘results’ were expected, withdrawal offered a tangible outcome 
in the form of ‘cure.’26  The potential benefits of maintenance for the individual and 
for society were much more difficult to assess.  In addition, maintenance was 
expensive, ‘blocked’ clinics from those most likely to benefit from their services and, 
it was argued, was not cost-effective.     
The case against maintenance was, therefore, a powerful one, covering a range 
of arguments and supported by many doctors credited with expertise in the treatment 
of addiction.  Maintenance did not cure addicts of their addiction and could not 
subsequently be considered ‘treatment’ and the responsibility of the doctor.  The 
experiment with maintenance flirted with by DDUs in the 1960s and early 1970s had 
not prevented the development of a black market, nor had it stopped addicts trading in 
the drugs they were prescribed.  And in addition to being ineffective, it was 
expensive.  Arguing against maintenance prescription was easy, but this did not 
necessarily amount to an automatic endorsement for short-term withdrawal.  There 
were far fewer positive assertions portraying the benefits of short-term treatment than 
negative comments about maintenance.  Indeed, those who supported rapid 
withdrawal tended to concentrate on the damaging effects of maintenance rather than 
the plus points of short-term treatment.  This can be attributed, in part, to a lack of 
‘evidence’ to support either short-term prescription or maintenance.  The Hartnoll-
Mitcheson trial comparing injectable heroin with oral methadone published in 1980 
compared the drugs, not the method of treatment, as both drugs were prescribed on a 
maintenance basis.  The study did indicate that prescribing oral methadone to addicts 
                                                 
25 CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/1/5, Minutes of the 1985 meeting of the Northern Drug Addiction Psychiatrists 
(DAPS) held at Liverpool Drug Dependence Clinic, 8 March 1985. 
26 For more on the administrative context of the DDUs and how this affected treatment offered see 
Chapter One, pp. 90-91. 
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was associated with greater change; that those prescribed methadone were more likely 
to be abstinent from drugs than those prescribed injectable heroin.27   These findings 
were used to explain the widespread adoption of oral methadone as opposed to 
injectable opioids in the DDUs, but this change also indicated a shift in the orientation 
of the treatment offered in clinics towards abstinence.  Strang noted in 1984 that the 
service offered to addicts at his DDU was now ‘predominantly geared towards 
helping the drug taker to become and remain drug free.’28  It had long seemed 
counter-intuitive to many doctors to prescribe a drug that perpetuated a medical 
condition and this view was strengthened by disillusionment with maintenance as 
method of treatment for addiction.  A new emphasis was placed on helping the addict 
to become abstinent from drugs by withdrawing the drug in a short a period as 
possible.  
This method fitted with the view of disease and its treatment that arose from 
the clinical context and operational environment of the hospital-based DDU 
psychiatrist.  Through their rejection of maintenance and adoption of short-term 
withdrawal psychiatrists were returning to their expected clinical role: to diagnose 
disease and to treat it.  Anatomo-clinical medicine was ‘born’ at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century.29  Detailed methods of examination (clinical practice) searched 
for the existence of a pathological lesion inside the body as the source of disease.  
Foucault argued that medicine’s ‘gaze’ was thus directed to the body of the patient, 
simultaneously locating and constituting disease within that body.30  Although this 
gaze created the body of the patient it saw only the disease.  The patient was a ‘case’ 
rather than a unique individual; indeed the disease was seen as being contaminated by 
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30 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic. 
 192
the presence of the ‘sick man.’31  To facilitate this way of seeing disease a 
disciplinary mechanism developed which subjugated the patient: the hospital.  Based 
on clinical practices hospital medicine abstracted the disease from the patient and 
located it in pathology.32  This type of medicine dominated nineteenth and twentieth 
century medical practice.  It was further strengthened by a turn towards scientific 
method and the emergence of ‘clinical science’ which gathered pace in the post-war 
period.33  Coupled with technological developments, hospital medicine became 
increasingly specialised.  Specialists focused on a specific disease or the functions of 
a particular part of the body.34  In this way some conditions were rendered visible, but 
others were necessarily ignored.35  Attention became still more focused on the 
specific disease or condition.  Hospital-based specialists could simply not ‘see’ the 
whole patient as their gaze was directed towards a specific condition or disorder.  
Specialisation thus reduced sensitivity to the social context of illness, such that the 
view that the ‘clinical aspects of human illness [were] inextricably linked with their 
social aspects’ was not something that was ‘self-evident to all, or even most 
doctors.’36  In this context the social dimensions to a condition such as addiction were 
not considered relevant.    
Even within psychiatry, the social setting of illness was not paramount.    
Indeed, in the 1970s there was something of a resurgence of biological psychiatry 
which heightened interest in the organic or genetic causes of mental illness rather than 
those relating to the experiences of the individual.  Shorter noted that instead of 
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attributing psychiatric conditions to ‘faulty child rearing or environmental stress, 
curable through in depth psychotherapy’ psychiatrists in this period more readily 
accepted the view that ‘psychiatric illness rested on a substrate of disordered brain 
chemistry and development.’37  Moreover, these could be treated through the use of 
psychotropic drugs: ‘a veritable cornucopia of antipsychotic, antimanic, and 
antidepressant drugs poured forth, changing psychiatry from a branch of social work 
to a field that called for the most precise knowledge of pharmacology.’38   The 
‘wonder drugs’ of the ‘pharmacological revolution’ suggested that mental illness 
could be managed or even cured.39  In this context of therapeutic optimism 
maintaining the condition of addiction instead of trying to rid the addict of their 
disease appeared to be a contradiction for many psychiatrists.  The irony was that the 
treatment of addiction, unlike the treatment of other psychiatric conditions, involved 
the removal of a drug rather than the prescription of one.  Yet, as short-term 
abstinence orientated treatment was directed more readily towards the ‘cure’ of 
addiction it conformed more readily to the principles of clinical psychiatry and thus 
became the ‘orthodox’ method of treatment advocated by the leading specialists in the 
field.       
Indeed, the emergence of short-term withdrawal as the ‘orthodox’ method of 
treatment was facilitated by the perceived ‘expert’ status of those who promoted 
short-term treatment and their connections to the medical and psychiatric 
‘establishment.’  Connell was probably the leading expert on drug addiction in Britain 
during the 1980s, closely followed by Bewley.  Both men were advocates of rapid 
withdrawal, both were considered to be experts in the field and both held powerful 
positions within the medical establishment as well as advising the government on 
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drug addiction related issues (see Chapter Three).  It has been suggested that Connell 
had particular influence in political as well as medico-political circles.  Dally 
contended that Connell had the ‘ear’ of the Home Office Minister in charge of drugs 
issues, David Mellor, and was thus partly responsible for Mellor’s ‘prohibitionist’ 
attitudes.40  Mellor was certainly opposed to maintenance; he described the comments 
made by Dr Henry Marjot in favour of reviewing the prescription of heroin to heroin 
addicts as “grotesque and fatheaded.”41  Connections such as these allowed men like 
Connell and Bewley to influence the direction of drug addiction treatment policy 
within central government which was becoming more involved in drug issues in this 
period.  However, their influence within the within the medical community was just 
as important, if not more so, as this was where most of the crucial changes in drug 
addiction treatment were initiated.  Here, the support Bewley and Connell received 
from other DDU doctors, particularly in London, was vital.  Consultant psychiatrists 
at London clinics all advocated the short-term withdrawal of opioid drugs from 
addicts, at least in public.  As noted in Chapter One, regular meetings of the London 
DDU doctors ensured a high degree of uniformity of practice across clinics in the 
capital.42  Furthermore, these doctors were regarded as ‘experts’ in their own right, 
particularly those who held posts at teaching hospitals which commanded higher 
status than those in non-teaching facilities.43  Thus, there appeared to be a high degree 
of expertise in favour of short-term withdrawal, encompassing the leading figures in 
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drug addiction treatment at a practical and advisory level.  This meant that short-term 
withdrawal was rapidly becoming the dominant treatment method for addiction.    
1.2  Long-term maintenance 
However, a small but vocal group of doctors continued to advocate the long-term 
prescription of drugs to addicts despite the climate of powerful opposition to this 
method within medico-political circles.  Support for maintenance treatment came 
mainly, but not exclusively, from doctors operating outside DDUs.  Some of these 
doctors, like Dally and Beckett, worked in private practice.  Others, such as Banks 
and Hare, were NHS GPs.44  There were also a few consultant psychiatrists working 
in NHS DDUs that advocated the long-term prescription of opioid drugs to addicts.  
The most prominent of these was Dr John Marks, Clinical Director and consultant 
psychiatrist at Liverpool DDU.  A handful of other supporters of long-term 
prescription to addicts could be found in provincial DDUs, particularly in the north of 
England.  In Scotland there were no DDUs, so treatment for addiction was carried out 
either within general psychiatric services, or more often in general practice.45  
Subsequently, there was more criticism of short-term withdrawal and support for 
maintenance in these areas.  Some doctors who attended meetings of the Northern 
Drug Addiction Psychiatrists such as Dr Basson of the Royal Edinburgh and Dr 
Sefari, consultant at Macclesfield DDU attacked short-term withdrawal and expressed 
tacit support for maintenance (see below).  Marks estimated that around 25 per cent of 
regional clinics offered some form of long-term prescription to addicts, with the 
remaining 75 per cent following the London DDUs and advocating rapid reduction.46  
It is significant that support for maintenance treatment by DDU doctors occurred 
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away from the capital.  Regional differences in the heroin ‘problem’ might account 
for the differences in approach, but it is more likely that the relative remoteness of 
Northern DDUs from the power networks of London doctors and drug addiction 
experts allowed them a degree of autonomy not afforded clinic doctors in the 
capital.47  This permitted a few regional clinic doctors to adopt an ‘unorthodox’ line 
and offer maintenance prescription to some addict patients. 
 Those doctors that advocated long-term prescription of opioid drugs whether 
working at a DDU, or in private or general practice, held a common view of addiction 
and the addict.  They felt that addicts usually took drugs as a result of other 
psychiatric problems and could only be taken off drugs when they were able to deal 
with these.  Marks asserted that ‘Addicts give up when they are ready to and special 
detoxification units do little to expedite this.’  Instead, treatment should ‘discover why 
addicts abuse drugs or alcohol and then work with them to seek alternative methods of 
dealing with the problems muffled by drug dependence.’48  There was a feeling that 
withholding drugs from addicts did not result in them becoming abstinent.  Sefari 
stated at a meeting of the Northern Drug Addiction Psychiatrists in 1986 that ‘the 
natural history of drug addiction suggests that people will continue to take drugs one 
way or another, legally or illegally, whether there is prohibition or not.’49  Marks too, 
argued that heroin addicts tended to maintain their addiction themselves if they were 
not prescribed drugs.50  Furthermore, as authors of a study of drug addiction in 
Edinburgh pointed out, withdrawal from heroin or another opioid drug constituted a 
minor part of treatment because ‘heroin abuse, like alcohol abuse, is a remitting and 
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relapsing disorder, with users spontaneously abstaining with little or no medical 
intervention.’  Abstinence, they argued, did not always equate with ‘cure.’51
 Nonetheless, abstinence was the ultimate goal of treatment involving long-
term prescription, just as it was with more rapid withdrawal.  Dally argued that her 
philosophy was to prescribe a minimum dose to her addict patients and to reduce this 
gradually ‘with the aim of eventually achieving a drug-free life.’52  Hare also asserted 
that it was her policy that addict patients ‘come off the drug sometime.’53  At the 
Liverpool DDU the first stated goal was ‘to return the patient to a drug free life 
style.’54  Where those who offered maintenance differed from those who advocated 
rapid withdrawal was over the time period after which abstinence was expected.  At 
Marks’ clinic a drug-free lifestyle might be a ‘short, medium or long-term goal 
according to age, previous drug history and motivation of the patient.’55  Dally also 
stressed the reduction of a patient’s drug intake, but only within their individual 
capacity.56  This differed from the policy of many DDUs, which set a fixed time limit 
to the duration of prescription. 
Getting the addict off drugs might have been the hoped for outcome of 
treatment, but this was not to be achieved at the cost of the social functioning of the 
patient.  The treatment offered by the Liverpool DDU under Marks was aimed at 
improving the health and quality of addicts’ lives.57  The idea was to switch injecting 
heroin addicts to oral methadone and to reduce drug consumption so long as this did 
not compromise the social functioning of the patient.  Treatment was to improve the 
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physical and mental health of the addict, stabilise their lifestyle, improve family 
relationships, decrease the amount of black market drugs being bought, reduce the 
level of criminal activity of the patient and increase the employment prospects of the 
patient.58  In order to achieve these goals, prescription of an opioid drug was 
permitted whilst the problems hidden by addiction were dealt with.  This did not 
result in blanket maintenance prescriptions for all addict patients attending the 
Liverpool DDU.  Between 1985 and 1987 17.5 per cent of patients were prescribed 
oral opioids on a maintenance basis after the first consultation and just 6.2 per cent 
were maintained on injectable drugs.  The majority of patients, 58.9 per cent, were 
placed on some sort of withdrawal regime, but arbitrary limits of the amount 
prescribed and the duration of prescription were not set.59  Reduction was achieved on 
an individual basis.  Dally used a similar justification for maintenance prescription to 
some of her addict patients.  She argued that she prescribed the minimum dose 
necessary for the individual patient to lead a ‘normal’ life; earning a legal living, 
looking after a family and children, and so on.60  Once more, stress was placed on the 
individual patient, rather than on a specific treatment programme designed for all.        
            The emphasis on the individual was indicative of a change in the perceived 
function of maintenance treatment.  During the late 1960s maintenance was described 
as a form of social control; it was seen as a way to prevent the development of a major 
heroin addiction problem by providing addicts with drugs so that they would not need 
to buy these on a black market.  This would reduce the social problems associated 
with addiction and at the same time prevent the spread of the disease of addiction 
within the community by limiting the contact between infected persons (addicts) and 
healthy individuals.  Maintenance was seen as largely being for the good of society, 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. p. 61 
60 Social Services Committee, Misuse of Drugs, Evidence of AIDA, 27 February 1985, p. 114. 
 199
rather than the good of the addict.  In the 1980s, those who supported maintenance 
spoke not of social control of addiction but of the social functioning of the addict.  
The explanation for this shift lies partly in the public health context in which the 
condition was being described.  In the 1960s addiction was located in the relationships 
between people, leading it to be described as a social disease.  Twenty years later 
public health looked not at the relationships between people as a source of disease, 
but to individual behaviours.  The ‘new public health’ was concerned with ‘lifestyles’ 
and the potential ‘risks’ to individual health through voluntary actions such as 
drinking, smoking and taking drugs.61  The discourse about maintenance in the 1980s 
drew on some of these concepts by placing the behaviour of the individual at the 
centre of treatment.  Long-term prescription in order to improve social functioning 
concentrated on enhancing the ‘lifestyle’ of the addict and reducing the risk of drug 
taking to their general health, relationships, employment and so on.  Individual 
behaviour was thus not just a cause of disease, but also its potential cure. 
 Those who practised short-term withdrawal were not immune to the increased 
attention being placed on individual behaviour.  Here too there was talk of social 
functioning.  Strang argued in 1985 that the ‘pure medical component of therapeutic 
intervention’ into heroin addiction had reduced in recent years so that treatment was 
now about ‘practical management of the physical complications that may accompany 
drug withdrawal,’ facilitating ‘family, social, and occupational rehabilitation to take 
place.’62  This was one area of common ground between the two different treatment 
philosophies; as was the hope by those who offered maintenance that their addict 
patients would one day achieve a drug-free life.  What separated short-term 
withdrawal and long-term prescription was the priority accorded social functioning 
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and abstinence.  For advocates of rapid withdrawal it was most important for the 
addict patient to become abstinent from drugs in a short period of time.  For 
supporters of maintenance, social functioning was the primary concern.  Only once 
this had been improved could abstinence be achieved.  Conflict, therefore, was about 
more than the duration of prescription; it was about what treatment should be 
expected to achieve.  This debate went to the very heart of what ‘treatment’ meant 
within the context of addiction, and in medicine more generally. 
 Signs of a different approach to addiction in community-based practice and 
hospital medicine were apparent as early as the late 1960s, a divide that was 
accentuated by the growth of biographical medicine.  In 1967 the British Medical 
Journal published a collection of articles on the proposed centres for the treatment of 
addiction.63  Comparing the outlook of Bewley, who argued that ‘special centres’ 
based in hospitals had ‘advantages’ and Chapple, a GP interested in the treatment of 
addiction who asserted that this was best conducted in the community, is instructive.  
Bewley noted that the establishment of clinics and co-operation between these would 
allow for the development of ‘standard practice’ when dealing with addicts.64  
Chapple, however, asserted that  
Institutional treatment has been an almost complete failure…because it has 
created a situation where the patient finds himself in conflict with his doctors 
– often forced to relinquish drugs against his will – but also because it fails to 
face the real problem, which is that of teaching the addict patient to live in 
society without using drugs.65
 
According to Lart, the gap between these views ‘reflects that between the perceptions 
of “hospital medicine” and “biographical medicine.”’  The GP’s view was that the 
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treatment of the addict could only be successfully undertaken in the community, as 
this would be more accessible to the addict than clinical treatment.66   
These differing perspectives reflect the greater sensitivity to the social context 
of illness found in general practice, a trend that continued into the 1970s and 1980s as 
biographical medicine began to make a more significant impact upon community-
based medicine.  As seen in Chapter Two, biographical medicine revitalised general 
practice, but it also brought GPs into further conflict with specialists by providing 
them with a contrasting view of disease.  For the community-based doctor the disease 
could not be abstracted from the patient, and in turn the patient could not be removed 
from the social context in which they resided.67  In a study based on interviews with, 
and observations of, GPs during the 1970s sociologists Jeffreys and Sachs found that 
these doctors were conceptualising their work in a different way to hospital-based 
consultants.  GPs saw their approach as being ‘“holistic, problem-solving and open 
ended”’ in contrast to the work of specialists which they saw as ‘narrow, specific and 
closed.’  Moreover, 
In addition to diagnoses based either on physical or on psychological 
symptoms, they – more often than hospital doctors – needed to take into 
account as well, social situations.  “Ideally in general practice” one doctor 
reflected, “each patient is recognised as a unique distillation of his physical, 
psychological and social experiences.”  This approach, they suggested, was in 
contrast to the “ready-made” service provided by hospital consultants.  
General practice, they claimed, was tailored to the needs of the individual.68
 
This focus on the individual and their social setting was reflected in the kinds of 
treatment community-based physicians offered addicts.  Maintenance focused on the 
whole addict rather than just on the disease.  Doctors who prescribed opioid drugs to 
addicts over a longer period took into account the situation of the addict and focused 
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on improving their social functioning before ‘curing’ the disease by removing the 
drug. 
The emergence of biographical medicine provided an alternative way of 
seeing and responding to disease, bringing it into conflict with hospital-based clinical 
medicine.  The existence of this clash can be observed in debates about the treatment 
of addiction.  Examining the arguments of leading protagonists suggests that their 
views were shaped by their respective positions and the type of medicine practised.  
Hospital-based DDU consultants saw the disease of addiction and not the addict him 
or herself.  DDU doctors, therefore, largely advocated the rapid withdrawal of drugs 
from addicts, wanting to cure the patient as quickly as possible by making them 
abstinent.  To achieve this, clinical methods were employed; blood tests, urine tests 
and physical examinations resulting in the same programme of treatment being 
prescribed for all.  In contrast, the community-based GP or private practitioner saw 
the patient and their symptoms.  This led the community doctor to focus on the 
experience of addiction; on the social, physical and psychiatric problems that the 
individual addict faced rather than the ‘disease’ itself.  To this end, they advocated the 
long-term prescription of opioid drugs in order to combat these problems and improve 
the social functioning of the addict.  Attention was paid to the condition of the 
individual rather than their disease (addiction).  It would seem, therefore, that short-
term withdrawal represented a hospital based clinical view of disease and its treatment 
and maintenance represented a community based biographical view.  Indeed, 
biographical medicine’s influence was not limited to general practice.  By providing 
an alternative way of seeing and treating disease away from the disciplinary 
mechanisms of the hospital, biographical medicine re-invigorated other types of 
community-based medicine, including those in private practice.  The individual 
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patient had always retained more significance in private practice because, as Porter 
commented, ‘private doctors must, within limits, give patients what they want.’69  
Private practitioners dependent upon fees for their livelihoods were more amenable to 
the needs of the patient and not necessarily so concerned with the disease.  Such an 
approach was sanctioned by biographical medicine which placed the patient at the 
centre of the conceptualisation of disease and its treatment.  A divide thus existed 
between those who treated addicts within the community and those who treated 
addicts in hospital-based specialist facilities. 
As indicated above, caution must be exercised as this divide can be too tightly 
drawn.  There were DDU doctors who maintained addicts, just as there were GPs who 
practised short-term withdrawal.  These positions were not as entrenched as at first 
may appear, with both methods of treatment sharing some common ground.  It is also 
possible that the treatment approaches of the DDU doctors and the community-based 
physicians may have been partially influenced by the type of patient they saw, rather 
than their philosophical outlook.  As noted in Chapter One, maintenance was 
considered an acceptable form of treatment for the middle-aged, middle-class addicts 
of the 1920s, but not for the younger, recreational addicts of the 1960s and 1970s.  If 
the addicts seen by GPs and private practitioners were more like the addicts of the 
Rolleston era it would be understandable if these doctors responded to older, middle-
class addicts in the same way as their predecessors had done sixty years earlier, with 
maintenance.  Dally repeatedly stated that she treated a different kind of patient to 
those seen at DDUs.  She asserted that her patients were older, employed, middle-
class, stable addicts in contrast to the younger, unemployed, chaotic, working-class 
                                                 
69 Porter, The Greatest Benefit to Mankind, p. 671. 
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addict more likely to be seen at a DDU.70  Confirming this assertion is difficult.  
Detailed data of patient profiles is not available for a sufficiently large number of 
private and general practitioners to compare these to the DDUs.71  Even if a 
comparison between patient profiles were feasible, it would not be possible to 
extrapolate how important this was for the individual doctor in making the decision to 
offer short-term withdrawal or long-term maintenance. 
It is also difficult to assess the extent to which community-based physicians 
treating addicts were influenced by biographical medicine.  Though biographical 
medicine was the ‘dominant ideology’ within the RCGP in this period its adoption in 
the field was not necessarily so widespread.72  Tudor-Hart noted that in 1986 the 
RCGP had 13,000 members, which was only just over a third of all GPs.73  Tudor-
Hart was himself a leading proponent of another ideological approach that influenced 
general practice: epidemiology.74  Here the focus was not on the individual patient as 
with biographical medicine, but on the pattern of disease within the patient cohort 
seen in general practice, suggesting a different focus of therapeutic endeavour.  
Indeed, as seen in Chapter Two, despite changing theoretical outlooks many GPs 
continued to show little interest in treating addicts, often preferring to refer them on to 
specialist services.  However, those that did treat addicts were often younger doctors 
who had qualified in the 1970s and 1980s, when biographical medicine was at its 
most influential.75   It is possible, therefore, that these doctors used this approach in 
                                                 
70 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 61. 
71 See Chapter Four, p. 144 for details of age and work record of Dally’s patients.  A few studies of 
patients attending DDUs do exist, such as Sheenan & Oppenheimer’s ‘Why drug users sought help’, 
pp.766-767, but as this was based on only 50 patients attending one clinic it could not be called 
comprehensive.   
72 Armstrong, ‘The emancipation of biographical medicine’, pp. 6-7. 
73 Tudor-Hart, A New Kind of Doctor, p. 89. 
74 Ibid. pp. 99-107; Markiner, “What is wrong” and “how we know it”, pp. 84-87. 
75 Glanz, ‘Views on treatment’, p. 544. 
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their work, enabling them to view the disease of the addict in a different way to their 
specialist, hospital-based colleagues.   
This view accounts for the high degree of conflict over the treatment of 
addiction.  The dispute was rooted not just in intra-professional battles between DDU 
psychiatrists jealously guarding their speciality from private and general practitioners 
who threatened their autonomy and status, but also in a deeper conflict concerning 
opposing philosophies of medicine, disease and its treatment.  That is not, however, to 
deny the significance of addiction in this wider battle.  Indeed, the clash between 
clinical medicine and biographical medicine could only take place in an arena like 
that of addiction where the field was relatively ‘open.’  The socio-medico status of the 
‘problem’ of addiction facilitated the emergence of a range of approaches to providing 
a ‘solution.’  As no one could agree on what that solution should be, there was no 
conclusive evidence to ‘prove’ that any method ‘worked.’  Judgements about what 
was the most appropriate method of treatment for addiction therefore came to be 
based on other elements, such as the position of the doctor and their pre-existing ideas 
about disease and its treatment.   The presence of these alternative views on the 
treatment of addiction presented a challenge to hospital-based clinicians advocating 
short-term withdrawal.  Yet, DDU psychiatrists were able to counter this challenge by 
re-iterating the need for a specialist approach to the problems of addiction and 
confirming rapid withdrawal as the orthodox method of treatment.  This was achieved 
through the production of the Guidelines in 1984. 
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2.  The production of the Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment of 
Drug Misuse, 1983-1984 
2.1  Establishment 
In 1982 the ACMD called for ‘an authoritative statement of good practice’ on the 
treatment of heroin addiction.76  This was not a novel recommendation.  The 
Rolleston Committee suggested in 1926 that a ‘Memorandum affording guidance’ 
would be useful for doctors treating addicts.77  However, specific advice from experts 
on the treatment of addiction was not forthcoming.  Guidance for doctors that went 
beyond what was contained in the committees’ reports did not emerge from Rolleston 
or either of the incarnations of the Brain Committee.78  The call for guidelines 
expressed in Treatment and Rehabilitation met with more success.  This was because 
there was a need for guidelines in the 1980s not felt in previous decades.  The 
involvement of a growing number of doctors in the treatment of addiction with no 
previous experience of this kind of work meant that many were ‘uncertain about the 
treatment they should offer’ and, it was argued, would ‘welcome guidance from their 
colleagues with more experience.’79  Crucially, these doctors were treating addicts 
away from the DDUs.  Guidelines on good practice in the treatment of addiction 
already existed within the clinics.  In 1969 an ‘informal’ guide to good practice was 
drafted by Connell and circulated amongst DDU psychiatrists.80  He and Strang 
asserted that this was ‘not a static code of practice but represented the consensus or 
prevailing view based on practice and experience as it was accrued.’81  By the 1980s, 
                                                 
76 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 57. 
77 Report of the Departmental Committee on Morphine and Heroin Addiction, p. 26. 
78 There was a Home Office memorandum on the Dangerous Drugs Act and Regulations and the first 
Brain Committee report did call for this to be presented in a more readable manner and distributed to 
all doctors, but this did not take place.  See Departmental Committee on Heroin Addiction, p. 13 and 
ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 57. 
79 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 57. 
80 Connell, ‘Treatment of drug-dependent patients’, 1968-1969. 
81 Strang & Connell, ‘The creation of the clinics’, p. 173. 
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however, this guidance was becoming increasingly formalised.  Bewley outlined 
guidelines agreed on by consultants in charge of London DDUs in the British Medical 
Journal in 1980 as a way of highlighting the problems faced by the private 
practitioner who did not necessarily adhere to these.82  Connell and Mitcheson 
expanded upon these four years later in an article that outlined the ‘necessary 
safeguards when prescribing opioid drugs to addicts.’83  This ‘code of practice’ 
effectively ensured uniformity on treatment within the London DDUs.84   Guidelines 
on treatment were subsequently required for those doctors who operated outside this 
system.  They were needed as much to determine what was bad practice as to ensure 
that good practice predominated.  The ACMD noted that  
the lack of widely known guidelines on the forms that medical treatment of 
drug misusers should take has meant that dubious practices have escaped the 
censure they merit.  This uncertainty appears to have hampered the effective 
operation of the disciplinary procedures of both the Misuse of Drugs Act and 
the General Medical Council.85
 
This had been powerfully demonstrated by the GMC’s case against Dally in 1983.  
Defining what irresponsible prescription of controlled drugs to addicts consisted of 
was problematic for both the GMC and Dally, as there was no clear statement of what 
responsible prescription entailed.  Furthermore, this case demonstrated the political as 
well as the practical need for the development of guidelines on good practice.  There 
was a desire not only to provide advice and assistance to those treating addicts but 
also to determine who those doctors should be and what treatment they should offer.  
The creation of a statement of good practice on the treatment of addiction must, 
therefore, be seen in the context of the wider treatment debate. 
                                                 
82 Bewley, ‘Prescribing psychoactive drugs to addicts’, pp. 497-498. 
83 Connell & Mitcheson, ‘Necessary safeguards’, p. 768. 
84 Strang & Connell, ‘The creation of the clinics’, p. 173. 
85 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 57. 
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In January 1983 the DHSS convened a conference of representatives from a 
range of medical bodies and organisations to gauge the response of the profession to 
Treatment and Rehabilitation.  The conference agreed with the ACMD’s 
recommendation that a committee of medical experts be established to draw up 
guidelines on good clinical practice in the treatment of drug dependence.  The Chief 
Medical Officer, Donald Acheson, invited Connell to chair the working group with 
membership drawn from medical bodies including the GMC, the BMA and the Royal 
Colleges as well as individuals with expertise in the area.86  There were five 
consultant psychiatrists on the committee, two private psychiatrists, five GPs, and an 
endocrinologist, Sir Gordon Wolstenholme, a former member of the GMC and 
sponsor of the Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence (ISDD).  The working 
group also included Professor of Psychiatry W. Kessel, a member of the GMC and 
former chair of both the Advisory Committee on Alcoholism and the ACMD.  The 
most significant fact about the membership of the committee was, as Mike Ashton 
noted, that it included individuals from ‘both sides of the growing divide between 
psychiatrists in the drug dependency units and the doctors in private and general 
practice.’87  The DDU doctors were represented by Connell, Bewley and Thorley, the 
GPs interested in addiction by Banks and Cohen, and the private practitioners by 
Beckett and Dally.  Dally’s inclusion might appear surprising given that she had been 
found guilty of serious professional misconduct, and Bewley did object to her 
presence for this very reason, but her membership was perhaps indicative of a 
willingness on the part of the DHSS to hear both sides of the debate.88  
 
                                                 
86 Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the 
Treatment of Drug Misuse, (London: DHSS, 1984) p. 3. 
87 Ashton, ‘Doctors at war, part one’, p. 13. 
88 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 130; CMAC PP/DAL/B/5/1/2, Letter from Dally to Dr Dorothy Black, 
DHSS, 26 March 1984. 
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2.2  Conflict?  Discussions of the Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence  
The Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence met six times between February 
and July 1984.  They were asked to ‘prepare guidelines of good clinical practice in the 
treatment of drug dependence for dissemination to the medical profession’ and to 
‘consider the feasibility of the extension of licensing restrictions to include all opioid 
drugs.’89  There were four central issues: the role of general and private practitioners 
in the treatment of addiction, the desirability of requiring doctors to have a license to 
prescribe any opioid drug to an addict, the nature of the treatment provided to addicts 
and what constituted irresponsible prescription.  On all of these issues there was a 
considerable diversity of views expressed and a high degree of personal conflict 
amongst committee members.   
Unsurprisingly, the issue of private and general practice involvement 
provoked some of the most fury.  Bewley’s dislike of the treatment of addiction in 
private practice was well known and in his submission to the committee he asserted 
that maintenance prescription to addicts in private practice was ‘undesirable,’ citing 
the experiences of AIDA members and Dally in particular before the GMC as 
evidence of the problems encountered by ‘single handed doctors who move into this 
field without training or experience and who can easily be manipulated by addict 
patients.’90  This implied the exclusion of not just private practitioners but general 
practitioners as well, as not all GPs worked in inter-disciplinary teams like those 
found at clinics, or had training in this field.  Other members of the committee, such 
as GP Arthur Banks, argued that the large and increasing numbers of addicts meant a 
                                                 
89 Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, Guidelines, p. 3. 
90 CMAC PP/DAL/B/5/1/7, Submission to Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence by Dr 
Bewley; CMAC PP/DAL/B/5/1/7, ‘Some suggestions for drawing up guidelines on prescribing 
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correspondingly ‘large number of GPs as well as other services must be persuaded to 
take part in addict care.’91
 Inextricably linked to the issue of the involvement of the general and private 
practitioner was the question of licensing.  The ACMD recommended in Treatment 
and Rehabilitation that the requirement to possess a license to prescribe heroin and 
cocaine to an addict-patient be extended to cover all opioid drugs.92  This 
recommendation was clearly based on the advice of DDU consultants like Connell.  In 
1981 he sent a letter to The Times purporting to represent the ‘consensus views’ of 
thirteen DDUs and ten voluntary agencies calling for the extension of licensing 
regulations.93  A similar letter was also sent to the ACMD, a body which Connell sat 
on and was later to chair.94  Spear argued that the London DDU doctors saw the 
introduction of licenses as a means to both control irresponsible prescription and a 
way to limit who could actually prescribe for addicts.95  Licenses to prescribe heroin 
were held almost solely by doctors working at DDUs, so the extension of licensing 
could have led to the complete exclusion of the non-clinic doctor.  Treatment and 
Rehabilitation did suggest that the scale of addiction demanded that some doctors 
outside of DDUs be granted licenses, but recommended that this should only be under 
the supervision of hospital-based experts.96  This, according to Ashton, was a way of 
ensuring that non-DDU doctors ‘toed the line laid down by the clinic psychiatrist.’97  
Spear went even further, and argued that DDU doctors wanted to use the regulations 
as a way of eliminating those doctors in private and general practice who continued to 
                                                 
91 CMAC PP/DAL/B/5/1/7, Submission to Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence by Dr Banks, 
‘Basic guidelines for good practice in the treatment of drug addiction’, 15 March 1984. 
92 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 59. 
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94 Ashton, ‘Doctors at war, part one’, footnote, p. 15. 
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prescribe to addicts in a way they thought was inappropriate.98  Licensing was, 
therefore, a critical issue for the Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence and 
for the treatment of addiction more generally. 
 The working group contained a number of supporters of the extension of 
restrictions on the prescription of drugs to addicts including the Chairman, Connell, as 
well as other psychiatrists such as Maden and Bewley.99  Despite the authority of 
these individuals there were voices raised against licensing.  A paper produced by the 
DHSS and set before the working group outlining potential benefits and drawbacks of 
the extension of licensing did provide an element of balance to discussions.  The 
paper stated that extending control over opioid drugs could limit ‘injudicious’ 
prescription of drugs to addicts, thus reducing the over-spill of prescribed drugs onto 
the black market, protect doctors from ‘importunate’ addicts and encourage the use of 
more substitute drugs in the treatment of addiction.  However, the paper also 
expressed concern at the restrictions being placed on the clinical freedom of doctors 
and the possibility that having to apply for a licence might discourage doctors from 
treating addicts.100  There were members of the working group who agreed with this 
view.  Banks, in a letter to Dally, said that he had telephoned GPs all over the country 
to judge their response to licences and found that even those currently treating addicts 
were reluctant to apply for one, and argued that those that did not want to deal with 
addicts would have the perfect excuse for not doing so.101  Banks maintained that GPs 
who were interested in the treatment of addiction could be put off by the bureaucracy 
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and form filling required to hold a license.102  Support for this view came via a letter 
to the secretary of the working group from Strang, at the Regional Drug Dependence 
Unit in Manchester.  Strang argued that before a scheme was introduced in the North 
West to encourage GPs to treat addicts they were ‘discriminated against on grounds of 
diagnosis and sometimes denied access to general medical care as well as drug 
specialist care’ and he feared this would increase if addicts were only to be treated by 
licensed practitioners.103  Strang also pointed out that restricting prescription of drugs 
to addicts would place greater demands on an already over-stretched service.104  
Banks too could see no reason why a ban on prescription to addicts by unlicensed 
doctors would enhance treatment offered to addicts.105   
Despite extensive discussions the committee remained divided on the question 
of licensing and failed to reach an agreement.  At a meeting in June 1984 the secretary 
and Senior Medical Officer at the DHSS, Dr Dorothy Black, told the group that if 
necessary they could leave this issue and concentrate on production of the guidelines.  
This, she explained, was because the ministers concerned ‘regarded the guidelines as 
the more urgent part of the Group’s terms of reference.’106  The working group agreed 
and the guidelines published in October made no mention of licenses.  The group did 
later recommend that licensing restrictions should be extended to all opioid drugs 
except oral methadone, as did the House of Commons Social Services Committee in 
1985.107  However, civil servants at both the DHSS and the Home Office were 
concerned about the practicality of monitoring and enforcing the restrictions and the 
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government decided not to implement this recommendation, stating that they could 
find no significant advantage to outweigh the risk that some GPs might be deterred 
from treating addicts by the need for a license.108
 The type of treatment offered to addicts and particularly the role played by the 
prescription of opioid drugs was another key issue that provoked disagreement within 
the working group.  Bewley, like many of the DDU doctors, argued that if drugs were 
prescribed to addicts they should be in the form of oral methadone, dispensed on a 
daily basis.109  Dally, on the other hand was more prepared to prescribe injectable 
drugs to her patients and often allowed them to collect their drugs weekly.110  The 
duration of this prescription to addicts was also a critical matter.  Notes of the first 
meeting of the group recorded ‘There was a consensus that protracted maintenance 
was no longer acceptable for new patients but might have a continuing use for 
existing chronic users.’  In addition it was stated that ‘Heroin should not be prescribed 
to new patients, injectables rarely, the aim should be to use oral liquid preparations if 
a prescription was deemed necessary.’111  Not all members agreed with this; on her 
copy of the typed notes Dally had placed a question mark by both statements 
suggesting that she at least did not support the supposed consensus view.112  Though 
such a mark could be ambiguous and read as a query about a specific point rather than 
dissent, this is rendered unlikely by Dally’s own comments to the working group on 
this issue and the highly critical account she presents of their meetings in A Doctor’s 
Story.113  She argued in her submission to the working group that ‘Addicts vary as 
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much as any other group both in personality and in the kind of help they require.’114  
This apparently was not the view of other members of the committee who 
emphasised, according to Dally, that “treatment must be the same for everyone.”115
 The production of guidelines on good practice in the treatment of heroin 
addiction was intended to help determine what bad practice and particularly 
irresponsible prescription of drugs to addicts comprised.  Even here the working 
group could not agree.  Bewley asserted that one way of assessing whether or not a 
doctor was prescribing irresponsibly was to establish if he or she had ‘special 
expertise in the treatment of drug dependence’ and if they had the ‘proper’ facilities 
for treating the patient and for carrying out diagnostic tests.116  This could be taken to 
mean that doctors treating addicts outside clinics, who did not always have access to 
these facilities, were acting irresponsibly.  Bewley went on to state that responsible 
treatment would involve more than just prescribing drugs and was swift to condemn 
‘liberal’ prescription, a fault he believed was common in private practice.117  
Comments such as these led to a high degree of personal conflict between individual 
members.  Dally felt moved to complain to the secretary about Bewley’s attacks on 
her specifically and private practice more generally.  She asserted that the situation 
was in danger of becoming ‘ugly’ and wanted to prevent the committee from further 
‘polarisation.’118  Meetings were undoubtedly heated; the Chairman himself reputedly 
described them as including ‘near-vituperative exchanges.’119  Infighting and division 
within the committee worsened when a small number of the working group decided to 
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write a minority report.120  This group of ‘dissidents’ supported, but not, she claims 
initiated, by Dally agreed not to sign the final report and to create their own instead.  
According to Dally this was because they felt that the committee were ignoring long-
term users and not questioning why the proportion of addicts attending clinics was 
declining.121  However, the ‘dissidents’ did not get an opportunity to produce their 
report as the procedure of the committee was altered (Dally claims by Connell) so that 
no one would be required to sign the final Guidelines making a minority report ‘out of 
order.’122  Thus the working group failed even to agree to disagree. 
 
2.3  Consensus?  The report of the Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence 
Despite the complete lack of agreement amongst the members of the working group 
their final report, which constituted the Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the 
Treatment of Drug Misuse, asserted that there was an ‘emerging consensus’ amongst 
doctors involved in the treatment of addicts.123  In a sense this was correct, as a 
consensus did exist amongst DDU doctors (particularly those who practised in 
London) about how heroin addiction should be treated, and it was their views that the 
Guidelines largely expressed.  The document ignored many of the opinions voiced by 
the ‘dissident’ faction on the working group.  If there was a consensus, it was 
enforced.  A close reading of the Guidelines indicates that though they purported to be 
‘a flexible framework within which doctors can continue to develop a constructive 
response to the problem of drug misuse’ they actually put forward a fairly rigid 
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regimen that constituted just one side of the debate about the treatment of 
addiction.124
 The Guidelines stated that ‘All doctors have a responsibility to provide for 
both the general health needs of drug misusers and their drug related problems’ and it 
was here that non-specialists should be encouraged to play a major role.125  General 
guidance was given to all doctors who might encounter addicts and more specific 
advice was included for GPs, psychiatrists, hospital-based staff, police surgeons and 
prison medical officers.  Yet, despite this call to involve a wider range of medical 
practitioners only a relatively minimal role was afforded the non-specialist doctor by 
the Guidelines.  It was noted that certain types of patient were best suited to treatment 
in general practice.  These were young, intermittent drug users who were not 
physically dependent, stable therapeutic addicts and those individuals who had been 
using opioid drugs for less than a year and were not regularly injecting.  In contrast, 
patients who were ‘chaotic,’ or on very high doses were not considered suitable for 
treatment in general practice and it was suggested that those who were ‘physically 
dependent’ should be referred to the local DDU.126  The implication was, therefore, 
that GPs could treat those who took drugs but not those who were addicted to them.  
This was reinforced by the guidance on the kind of treatment that should be offered to 
drug ‘misusers.’  It was recommended that for the type of patient GPs were expected 
to see (the young, intermittent drug ‘misuser’) the most appropriate and effective form 
of treatment might be counselling about drug misuse and personal or family problems.  
If drug ‘misusers’ seen by GPs did require a prescription (and the Guidelines stressed 
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that this was not always the case) this should be given for a short period only, and in 
an oral form.127  Furthermore, it was declared that 
a doctor should not undertake to treat drug misusers by long-term prescription 
of opioids unless in consultation and conjunction with a specialist in a drug 
treatment clinic or elsewhere who has experience of this approach.128
 
The Guidelines were clearly suggesting that GPs should not treat those drug misusers 
who required long-term prescription; these should be left to the specialists to handle. 
 As well as making a pronouncement on who should (or should not) treat 
addicts, the Guidelines also expressed a clear view on how they should be treated.  
They stated that the aim of treatment was to ‘help the individual to deal with the 
problems causing as well as caused by his drug use, and eventually to become drug-
free.’  Treatment, it was asserted, should go beyond the mere prescription of a 
substitute drug.129  Although these were statements that all of those involved in the 
treatment of addiction would have readily agreed with, the emphasis placed on 
particular elements indicates the existence of a powerful sub-text in support of clinic-
based, short-term withdrawal targeted at abstinence.  The practices recommended for 
use in the treatment of drug ‘misusers’ were those utilised by DDUs.  The report 
stated that doctors should carry out a physical examination of the patient and conduct 
diagnostic tests to ensure the patient was taking opioid drugs.  It championed the use 
of ‘contracts’ with patients’ agreeing to cut down their drug use by so much by such a 
date and argued that if drugs were to be prescribed, these should be in an oral form 
and dispensed on a daily basis.130  Doctors like Dally who operated outside the clinics 
did not always agree with, or adhere to these practices, but there was no suggestion in 
the report that the value of any of these was a matter for debate.  Nor was there any 
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indication in the Guidelines that alternative ideas about treatment philosophy or 
method existed.  Maintenance was mentioned, but this term was not explained, nor 
was the rationale behind it concerning the social functioning of the patient.  
Moreover, the conditions in which the report suggested maintenance might be used 
(in conjunction with a specialist at a DDU) made it extremely unlikely that this would 
take place, as very few DDU doctors supported maintenance for all but a handful of 
patients.  Emphasis throughout the report was on rapid detoxification, preferably 
within three to six months.  Prescription over a longer period than this was ‘too close 
to a self-perpetuating maintenance type schedule’ and was to be avoided.131  Once 
more, clinic practices were presented as orthodoxy.  The Guidelines, like the 
committee that produced them, were dominated by the methods and philosophies of 
the London DDUs.   
 
2.4  The reception of the Guidelines and implications raised 
Although the Guidelines initially excited little interest upon their publication in 1984 
they had a significant impact upon the debate over the treatment of addiction.  This 
was recognised by an editorial in the British Journal of Addiction in 1985, which 
argued that ‘[it] is the meaning and implications of this publication [the 
Guidelines]…which repay scrutiny, rather than the dissection of any one line of its 
sometimes inevitably ambiguous recommendations.’132  The journal also expressed 
surprise ‘that sufficient agreement should have been achieved between the various 
factions…represented on this committee’ and contended that ‘the committee would 
still be arguing’ if it had ‘definitively addressed itself’ to questions such as ‘whether 
injectable drugs still have a place in the treatment of addiction, or whether “long-term 
                                                 
131 Ibid. p. 14, p. 18. 
132 Editorial, ‘Guidelines of good clinical practice in the treatment of drug misuse’, British Journal of 
Addiction, 80, (1985) 113-114, p. 114. 
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prescription of opiates” is or is not acceptable practice.’  The report ‘certainly edges 
up to at least some of these questions, but then tends to retreat.’133   
The most serious criticism of the Guidelines came from within the working 
group that produced them.  Dally sent a list of critical comments to Black at the 
DHSS asserting that ‘I cannot believe that [the Guidelines] will encourage doctors to 
help addicts and it will help them only marginally if they already wish to do so.’134  A 
similar critique was also produced and distributed by AIDA, whose members included 
Beckett, another ‘dissident’ on the working group.135  They argued that ‘The 
“Guidelines” are largely an extension of DDU practice’ but failed to appreciate the 
difficulties of applying this outside the clinics.  AIDA felt that the Guidelines were 
‘more like a prescription for control than as guidelines for clinical practice’ and did 
not recognise that ‘addicts differ enormously and need individual attention.’  They 
were particularly concerned that the needs of long-term addicts were being ignored 
and there was ‘too much emphasis on control and not enough on caring.’136  AIDA, 
Dally, and Beckett felt that the Guidelines did little to encourage the GP to become 
involved in the treatment of addiction, offered only one side of the treatment debate 
by advocating DDU treatment philosophies and methods that ignored the needs of the 
individual, particularly the long-term addict patients that they saw.  This kind of 
criticism of the Guidelines stemmed from the position of the doctors in AIDA.  
Members of AIDA existed by default outside the DDU system and this affected their 
view of addiction, their practices and treatment philosophy.  They criticised the DDU 
treatment methods which were encapsulated in the Guidelines because they 
                                                 
133 Ibid. p. 113. 
134 CMAC PP/DAL/B/5/1/6, Dally’s General Comments on the Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in 
the Treatment of Drug Misuse sent to Dr Dorothy Black, DHSS, September 1984. 
135 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 129. 
136 CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/1/1/8, Association of Independent Doctors in Addiction comments on 
Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment of Drug Misuse, July 1985.  
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represented a more ‘clinical’ view of addiction that saw the disease not the patient, 
whereas they practised a more ‘biographical’ approach which stressed the 
individuality of the patient.   
 The most significant practical consequence of the publication of the 
Guidelines was the apparent willingness of the GMC to use these as ‘yardstick in 
disciplining doctors.’137  The Council welcomed the Guidelines, stating explicitly in 
their annual report that the PCC would use these in determining cases of irresponsible 
prescription.138  Although the British Journal of Addiction felt that the referring to the 
Guidelines in such cases was ‘by no means sinister,’ Spear noted in his annual report 
that those who did not follow the Guidelines, for example by prescribing injectable 
drugs rather than oral methadone, faced the danger of automatically being regarded as 
guilty of irresponsible prescription.139  The Guidelines were rapidly becoming rules.  
This development was accentuated by the powerful support that the Guidelines had 
from DDU doctors.  They were presented as the orthodoxy on treatment.  This was 
significant as this orthodoxy afforded a limited role for the non-clinic based doctor 
and advocated a form of treatment widely practiced in the DDUs, but not universally 
supported outside them.   
 Yet, non-DDU doctors continued to treat addicts despite the apparent 
dominance of the clinics and short-term withdrawal.  The Guidelines were clearly not 
enough on their own to deter the involvement of the non-clinic doctor.  A handful of 
community-based practitioners, like Dally, persisted in offering maintenance 
treatment to addict patients.  This presented a threat to authority of the DDU 
psychiatrist and the clinical view of addiction, already under attack from external non-
                                                 
137 Ashton, ‘Doctors at war, part two’, p. 16. 
138 GMC Annual Report, 1985.  Quoted in Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 289. 
139 Editorial, ‘Guidelines of good clinical practice’, British Journal of Addiction, p.113; Spear quoting 
his annual report in Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 277. 
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medical bodies as well as those within medicine.  To remove this threat and allow 
DDU psychiatrists to present a unified clinical approach to addiction through rapid 
withdrawal, the role of the community-based doctor in the treatment of addiction 
needed to be conscribed and maintenance treatment discredited.  This could be 
achieved by using the Guidelines to enforce the supposed ‘consensus’ on treatment.  
The Guidelines, as will be seen in Chapter Five, became a key document in an attempt 
to eliminate maintenance and the community-based doctor from the treatment of 
addiction through the GMC’s case against Dally for serious professional misconduct 
in 1986-1987.  
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Chapter Five 
Withdrawal and Maintenance?  Towards Plurality in the Treatment of Heroin 
Addiction – the GMC versus Dr Ann Dally, 1986-1987 
 
Introduction 
In December 1986 Dr Ann Dally appeared before the Professional Conduct 
Committee (PCC) of the GMC charged with serious professional misconduct with 
respect to irresponsible prescription of opioid drugs for the second time.  This case, 
like the one three years earlier, was not just about disciplining one doctor but about 
fighting a wider battle within the treatment of addiction.  The issues at stake were, 
however, slightly different.  Whilst the 1983 case was chiefly concerned with the 
involvement of the private practitioner in the treatment of addiction, the later hearing 
was much more clearly about dictating what methods should and should not be used 
to treat addict patients.  In the 1986-1987 case maintenance, as well as Dally herself, 
were on ‘trial.’  This case was brought within the context of a bitterly contested 
dispute between those who supported the short-term withdrawal of drugs from 
addicts, mainly DDU psychiatrists, and those who advocated long-term maintenance, 
mainly private and general practitioners.  As seen in Chapter Four this clash was 
underlain by a deeper battle between conflicting philosophies of medicine: short-term 
withdrawal fitted well with hospital-based clinical medicine and maintenance was 
broadly endorsed by the community-based, individual centred, biographical approach.   
This conflict not only formed the backdrop to the Dally case but the hearing 
itself became an arena in which this dispute was actively contested.  A case was 
brought against Dally not just because of alleged irresponsible prescription of 
controlled drugs to addict patients but because she represented a group of doctors who 
advocated the long-term prescription of drugs to addicts, a method that posed a threat 
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to both clinical medical approaches to disease and its treatment, and the position of 
this kind of medicine as an authority looking for a key position in the ‘war’ against 
drugs.  Discrediting Dally, maintenance treatment and the biographical approach to 
addiction would remove opposition within medicine to short-term withdrawal and the 
particular view of addiction and disease that underlay this.  This was not, however, to 
be the outcome of the case.  Although Dally was found to have prescribed controlled 
drugs to an addict patient irresponsibly and was subsequently pronounced guilty of 
serious professional misconduct, this verdict did not represent an outright victory for 
short-term withdrawal and the clinical view of addiction.  The GMC were unable to 
successfully demonstrate that maintenance treatment alone constituted serious 
professional misconduct.  It was tacitly accepted that a case could be made for the 
long-term prescription of drugs to addicts.  Indeed, this was an approach that was 
already beginning to find support amongst those who recognised the growing threat to 
public health posed by HIV and AIDS amongst injecting heroin addicts. 
 This chapter will examine the origins of the GMC’s case against Dally, it 
explain how this was prosecuted and how it was defended.  To establish how far this 
was a ‘political’ case about discrediting maintenance and those that supported this, the 
balance between Dally’s actions and the influence of the wider debate in bringing this 
case needs to be assessed.  Dally repeatedly failed to adhere to advice (official and 
unofficial) on the treatment of addict patients from the Home Office, the GMC and 
other doctors.  She undoubtedly made some questionable decisions about the 
treatment of individual patients, and one in particular, as will be seen.  However, the 
GMC were more than usually active in investigating Dally’s practices and bringing a 
case against her, suggesting a political agenda.  The GMC were traditionally not in 
favour of anything that could be described as ‘social medicine’ and were in many 
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ways the embodiment of the ‘medical establishment’ dominated by clinical 
medicine.1  Dally, as a leading proponent of maintenance, offered a form of treatment 
that did not adhere to these principles.  Furthermore, DDU psychiatrists were 
themselves influential at the GMC and elsewhere within the medical establishment.  
This influence, whilst not necessarily directly leading to the construction of the Dally 
case, was a powerful force in creating a climate where any doctor offering 
maintenance treatment was closely scrutinised.  
The case was significant not just because it was driven by a political dynamic 
but also because it polarised the key issues in the treatment debate.  This chapter will 
reconsider elements of the debate (such as the specialist/generalist and NHS/private 
divide and the importance of the Guidelines) within the context of Dally’s ‘trial’ and 
its implications.  It will also look at how the outcome of this case was determined and 
assess the importance of the ‘politics’ of the GMC in trying the case and reaching a 
verdict.  The hearing attracted a considerable amount of media coverage in both 
medical and non-medical circles and the significance of this needs to be evaluated, as 
much of this also suggested the case had deeper implications.  Finally, the 
ramifications of the cases’ outcome need to be considered.  Though Dally was found 
guilty of serious professional misconduct in respect to her treatment of one individual 
patient, the GMC were unable to wholly condemn maintenance as a treatment method 
for addiction.   This coincided with an apparent shift in the position of those who 
advocated the short-term withdrawal treatment of heroin addiction.  Some arch 
supporters of rapid detoxification were beginning to accept that maintenance was of 
value in the treatment of some addict patients.  There was a possibility that plurality 
                                                 
1 Oswald, ‘Training doctors for the National Health Service’, p. 77. 
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could exist within the treatment of addiction, as the dominance of short-term 
withdrawal appeared to weaken. 
 
1.  The origins of the case 
After her ‘conviction’ for serious professional misconduct as a result of prescribing 
controlled drugs to an addict in an irresponsible manner in 1983 Dally continued to 
treat addict patients.  She was perfectly at liberty to do so, as she had merely been 
admonished for her conduct by the GMC.  However, the Home Office Drugs Branch 
and Inspectorate continued to closely monitor her prescription of controlled drugs, as 
they did with many other doctors involved in the treatment of addiction.  Inspection of 
prescription records and enquires into the administration of drugs to addicts by 
doctors had taken place since 1922, first by Regional Medical Officers of Health from 
the Ministry of Health, and later by members of the Home Office’s Drugs Branch 
Inspectorate.2  Dally claimed that throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s Home 
Office Inspectors visited doctors that treated addicts every year or so to discuss their 
practice, suggest improvements and issue warnings if needed.3  She also stated that 
the inspectors who came to see her (often Spear himself) were ‘anxious not to make 
trouble but to save it’ and were ‘friendly’ and ‘interested’ in her work.4   
Though these visits may have been routine, Dally’s contact with the 
Inspectorate increased in the run up to her second appearance before the GMC in 
1986-1987.   On 26 April 1984 Dally received a visit from Drugs Branch Inspectors 
John Lawson and John Gerrard.5   Although Lawson was keen to assure her that she 
                                                 
2 Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, pp. 39-41. 
3 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 70 
4 Ibid. p. 134. 
5 Ibid. pp. 134-135; CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2  [Where documents cannot be located in the new catalogue 
the old box system is referred to]  Note of interview between John Lawson, John Gerrard and Ann 
Dally, report by John Gerrard, 26 April 1984. 
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was not being singled out and was one of a number of doctors to be interviewed, 
before the official interview began Dally asserts that he told her that the ‘drug 
dependency establishment’ were trying to ‘make trouble’ and get her charged before a 
Home Office tribunal.6  According to Dally, Lawson said that she would be judged by 
the standards of the DDUs, and if found wanting could be deprived of her right to 
prescribe controlled drugs to addicts.  This would depend, he said, ‘on how much you 
[Dally] conform to what the clinic doctors want.’  He advised Dally to ‘pull in her 
horns’ as these doctors were out to ‘get’ her.7  Once the interview proper got 
underway Lawson cautioned Dally that the Home Office would use this to determine 
whether or not she should be brought before a tribunal and anything she said could 
also be passed on to the GMC.8  Lawson asked Dally about her prescription of 
injectable drugs to patients.  She told him that many addicts found orally administered 
methadone made them nauseous and that it was better to prescribe a preparation 
designed for injection to patient who was going to inject regardless, and would 
otherwise buy illegal drugs.9  Dally also assured Lawson that she always checked to 
see if a new patient had been notified to the Home Office and made sure that the 
addict was working and could afford her fees.10  Lawson commented that the number 
of patients she saw was on the high side, but Dally countered that she rejected more 
than she accepted and had taken on no new patients that month.  Lawson told Dally 
that the Inspectorate would consider her prescription and decide whether or not this 
should be referred to a tribunal, and the interview ended. 11
                                                 
6 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 134. 
7 Ibid. p. 134. 
8 Ibid. p.134; CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2, Note of interview between John Lawson, John Gerrard and Ann 
Dally, report by John Gerrard, 26 April 1984. 
9 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2 Note of interview between John Lawson, John Gerrard and Ann Dally, report 
by John Gerrard, 26 April 1984. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 134. 
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 In May 1984 Dally wrote to Spear complaining about the clinics and their 
policies, particularly about the lack of a relationship between the patient and the 
doctor who treated them.  She also stated that she had changed her own prescription 
policy by speeding up the transition of patients from injectable to oral methadone.  
She told Spear that she felt she was being forced out of the treatment of addiction and 
intended to retire within the following year.12  Spear replied in June, responding to 
her letter and informing her of the outcome of Lawson and Gerrard’s visit.  Spear told 
Dally that the Home Office believed her prescription of controlled drugs to addicts 
could be considered ‘irresponsible’ within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 
(1971) and that details of this might be referred to a tribunal or to the GMC.  
However, as Dally proposed to make changes to her practice, they did not think this 
necessary at present, although they would continue to monitor the situation.  Spear 
reminded Dally of  
the need for extreme caution in prescribing controlled drugs to persons who 
may be drug addicts or misusers.  A doctor who is prepared to accept and 
prescribe to such persons may well unwittingly become an important source of 
drugs circulating in the illicit market.13
 
The Home Office remained concerned about aspects of Dally’s prescribing and she 
received another visit from the Drugs Inspectorate on 3 December 1985.  The 
interview was conducted by Inspector Donald McIntosh.14  McIntosh had information 
on 189 addict patients of Dally’s, 134 of which were receiving prescriptions for 
controlled drugs.  He asked Dally in detail about a number of them, particularly those 
who were unemployed, lived at a distance from London, or were receiving large 
doses.  McIntosh was concerned that those who were out of work would be unable to 
pay Dally’s fee without resorting to selling some of their prescription and that those 
                                                 
12 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 4, Letter from Ann Dally to HB Spear, 4 May 1984. 
13 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2, Letter from HB Spear to Dally, 5 June 1984. 
14 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2, Interview between Senior Inspector D. McIntosh, Home Office Drugs 
Branch and A. Dally, 3 December 1985; Dally, A Doctor’s Story, pp. 147-149. 
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who lived a long way away could not effectively be ‘controlled.’  He stated that 
although the Home Office were ‘in no doubt that you [Dally] are genuinely motivated 
in treating addicts’ he felt that by prescribing large doses of opioid drugs she did not 
encourage her patients to stop taking these and simply perpetuated their condition.15  
Dally defended her actions by arguing that there were no facilities for long-term 
addicts and that she did her best to ensure that her patients eventually came off drugs.  
McIntosh reminded Dally that she had said she would retire during 1985, and Dally 
assured him that she was in a ‘transitional’ stage to retirement but in the meantime 
needed an income of £75,000 to cover overheads.16  This statement became 
significant during the GMC’s case against her for serious professional misconduct as 
Dally admitted that half her patient list (and so half her income) was made up of 
addicts.  At the end of the interview McIntosh told Dally that the Home Office would 
consider whether or not there was a case to answer before a tribunal. 
 In February 1986 Spear himself came to see Dally.  He told her that lawyers 
working for the Home Office thought there was enough evidence of irresponsible 
prescription to bring Dally to tribunal.  According to Dally, Spear also said that he 
could prevent this if she agreed to make radical changes and close down her addict 
practice as fast as possible.  Dally agreed.17  In March 1986 she wrote to Spear telling 
him that she would make arrangements for all her addict patients to be treated 
elsewhere within three months.18  Spear wrote back stating that ‘the arrangements you 
propose are quite acceptable to us.’19  During this period Dally asserted that she found 
                                                 
15 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2, Interview between Senior Inspector D. McIntosh, Home Office Drugs 
Branch and A Dally, 3 December 1985 
16 Ibid 
17 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 149. 
18CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 7, Letter from Ann Dally to HB Spear, 4 March 1986.  
19 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 7, Letter from HB Spear to Ann Dally, 11 March 1986. 
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it hard to discharge addict patients, as she could not find suitable facilities for them.20  
Spear later wrote to Dally in an unofficial capacity, stating that he did not think 
McIntosh would ‘descend’ on her within three months if she had not given up treating 
addicts altogether, and that he would tell McIntosh about the difficulties she was 
experiencing.21  Perhaps as a result of Spear’s protection Dally did not face a Home 
Office tribunal.  However, the Drugs Inspectorate passed on information about 
Dally’s prescription of controlled drugs to the GMC, who did decide to take action 
against her in September 1986. 
 On 2 September Dally received a letter from the Registrar at the GMC 
alleging that she had abused her position as a medical practitioner on two separate 
grounds.  The first charge was that she had issued ‘in return for fees, numerous 
prescriptions for methadone hydrochloride in an irresponsible manner.’  The second 
related to one patient in particular, a man Dally called ‘Khalid’ in her book.  Again, it 
was alleged that she had prescribed for Khalid in an irresponsible manner and 
furthermore, had failed to conduct a ‘conscientious and sufficient physical 
examination,’ to have monitored his progress inadequately and that she discharged 
him without making proper arrangements for his ongoing treatment.22  Khalid had 
been a patient of Dally’s since 1982.  He was a self-employed roofer who had been 
addicted to heroin for 11 years when he first saw Dally.23  Dally prescribed Khalid 
injectable methadone on a slowly reducing basis, so that by 1985 he had cut his drug 
intake by around a half, something she regarded as ‘a good result.’24  In addition to 
his drug addiction, Dally believed Khalid was experiencing marital problems, 
                                                 
20 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 149. 
21 CMAC PP/DAL/ Box 2, Letter from HB Spear to Ann Dally, Spring/Summer 1986. 
22 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/22, Letter from the GMC to Ann Dally 2 September 1986. 
23 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 146; CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing 1986-1987, 10 December 
1986, p. 2. 
24 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 146. 
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asserting that when she first began to treat him he had left his wife and was living 
with his mother.25  In 1983 Dally received a telephone call from Khalid’s wife 
alleging that her husband was currently unemployed and was selling methadone 
ampoules prescribed by Dally.26  Mrs Khalid refused to visit Dally and as she had 
seen no evidence to indicate that Khalid was either out of work or selling his script 
she regarded this as a symptom of the couple’s relationship difficulties.  In September 
1985 Mrs Khalid sent Dally an unemployment slip to prove that her husband was not 
working.  Dally disregarded this, as the slip was over a year old and ‘it would not be 
beyond Khalid to draw unemployment benefit while he was working, which was none 
of my business.’27  Mrs Khalid called Dally again, alleging that her husband was 
selling drugs and that his addiction was getting worse.  Dally felt that this was 
unlikely, as Khalid had recently requested a reduction in his dose.  She asked Mrs 
Khalid to come and speak to her in person, but she refused.  Some time later Dally 
received a solicitor’s letter setting out what Mrs Khalid had alleged.28  Dally became 
concerned and asked for advice from the Medical Defence Union (MDU), who told 
her to discharge Khalid immediately.  At her next consultation with Khalid in 
December 1985 Dally showed him the solicitor’s letter, and told him that she would 
not be able to resume treatment until the matter was sorted out.  She told him to go to 
his GP to see what help he or she could give him.  Dally wrote in Khalid’s notes that 
she had discharged him, but she did not write a discharge letter to Khalid’s GP.  She 
argued that she did not want ‘to write a discharge letter only to find that Khalid and 
his wife returned in a week or two and I would have to write another letter.’29  Khalid 
                                                 
25 Ibid. p. 146. 
26 Ibid. p. 146; CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing 1986-1987, 10 December 1986, p. 26. 
27 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 146. 
28 Ibid. p. 147. 
29 Ibid. p. 147.  See also CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 26 January 1987, pp. 72-
73. 
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went to his GP, who referred him to a DDU.  Khalid did not go the clinic, and turned 
instead to the black market.  He was arrested for selling heroin a few weeks later.30      
 The GMC’s charges were based on information received from the Home 
Office.  Much of this had come from the Inspector’s interviews with Dally, but the 
information on Khalid came from Dally herself.  She knew that Spear liked to be 
informed of interesting cases so she sent him copies of the correspondence with Mrs 
Khalid’s solicitors.  Dally thought that this was then passed on to someone interested 
in ‘damaging’ her.31  Indeed, Dally saw the whole case as part of a conspiracy to 
impose a particular method of treatment for addiction and to stop her and other 
‘independent’ doctors from treating addicts.  She had long maintained that the 
addiction treatment was being controlled by a powerful clique of London based DDU 
consultants.32  This group, led, she argued, by Connell and comprising, among others, 
of Bewley, Ghodse and Mitcheson, sought to impose their system of treatment even if 
it was ‘failing.’33  This (according to Dally) was to be achieved in two ways.  The first 
was to get ‘themselves elected to every powerful committee that is in any way 
relevant to the problem and then, with the power gained, [impose] an orthodoxy.’34  
The second was to eliminate the ‘independent’ doctor from the treatment of addiction, 
either through the Home Office tribunals or the GMC’s Professional Conduct 
Committee (PCC).35  Dally told her defence team that the DDU consultant group built 
the case against her and were using the GMC to remove her from the field.36  She 
argued that: 
                                                 
30 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, p. 147. 
31 Ibid. p. 147. 
32 CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/2/5, ‘Some problems in the treatment of heroin addiction’ by Dally, May 1984. 
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34 CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/2/5 ‘Some problems in the treatment of heroin addiction’ by Ann Dally, May 
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36 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/20, ‘The drug clinic consultant group’. 
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Strongly influenced by the Connell-Bewley faction, the GMC has got itself 
into a power game which few of its members understand or are even aware 
of…They do not realise they are being used for political ends by a particular 
group of doctors.37
 
Dally felt that ‘everyone at the GMC who has any connection with drug dependency 
is either Connell’s stooge or his disciple on the subject.’38  She stated in the diary she 
wrote during the ‘trial’ in 1986-1987 that she had heard that the GMC’s solicitors, 
Waterhouse, had been instructed to look for ‘dirt’ on her so that a case could be 
brought.39   
There is evidence to suggest that this was not simply paranoia.  Dr David 
Marjot, a former NHS DDU consultant and ally of Dally’s told her that a private 
detective working for the GMC had telephoned him asking for the names of addict 
patients to check if any of Dally’s patients were also receiving prescriptions from him 
(a practice known as ‘double-scripting’).40  Dally’s defence team and an interested 
freelance journalist chased this lead up and found that the GMC had indeed employed 
a private detective called Dave Kingham, a former policeman who had worked for the 
drugs squad inspecting pharmacists records.41  Although the GMC were not acting 
outside their remit by bringing in the services of a private detective they were perhaps 
acting contrary to their usual stance.42  The Merrison Committee had recommended in 
1975 that the GMC set up an investigation unit to examine alleged instances of 
serious professional misconduct, but the proposal was rejected by the GMC who felt 
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40 Ibid. 20 November 1986, p. 70 
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that this was not part of their role.43  Likewise, the circumstances in which the case 
was brought, whilst not unprecedented, were perhaps unusual.  The GMC called 
doctors to answer charges of serious professional misconduct either as a result of a 
reported criminal conviction or when a complaint was made about a doctors’ conduct.  
This might come from other doctors, officials or members of the public.44  In Dally’s 
case no specific complaint was made about her; information was passed on to the 
GMC by the Home Office about her prescription of controlled drugs.  This was 
probably fairly common with cases of suspected irresponsible prescription, but it 
helped to fuel Dally’s notion that she was being ‘persecuted’ by the GMC itself rather 
than facing charges as the result of an individual complaint.45
 This notion of persecution and the allied belief that there was a conspiracy 
between DDU consultants and the GMC to besmirch Dally’s reputation and stop her 
treating addicts requires careful consideration.  The ‘evidence’ for the existence of 
this conspiracy was predominately based on hearsay and comes from material found 
in the Dally’s papers, largely her own writing on the subject, rather than any 
independent, corroborative source.  Moreover, it was clearly vital for Dally to locate 
her case in a bigger battle.  She needed to show that she was not guilty of serious 
professional misconduct and pointing to a wider conspiracy to ‘get’ the independent 
doctor shifted focus from her own behaviour.  Yet, there was much that could have 
brought Dally to the attention of the GMC without a ‘conspiracy.’  At a meeting of 
the GMC in May 1985 the Professional Standards Committee directed doctors to 
consider three issues when prescribing to addicts.  These were: firstly, not to ignore 
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were based on suspected irresponsible prescription, there are no corresponding figures indicating the 
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warnings from the Home Office or the police about the effects of prescribing in some 
areas; secondly, that it was inadvisable to prescribe to patients who lived a long 
distance from their surgery, especially when there were other facilities available, and 
thirdly, the danger that prescribing privately to an addict without sufficient funds 
would lead to him or her to sell part of that prescription to a third party.46  Dally, it 
could be argued, ignored all three of these warnings.  As well as disregarding general 
advice she also failed to recognise the seriousness of the cautionary words spoken by 
Home Office Drug Inspectors directly to her in both an official and an unofficial 
capacity.  The Home Office nearly took her to tribunal; this was prevented only by her 
promise to change her treatment policies and to gradually retire altogether within 
three months, a promise she did not keep.  However, the fact that Dally’s behaviour 
was hardly blameless does not negate the significance of the case.  It does seem likely 
that there was a concerted effort, in her words, to ‘get’ Dally and other independent 
doctors who were treating addicts contrary to DDU policy.  Moreover, regardless of 
whether or not there was a ‘conspiracy’ surrounding the case it clearly had wider 
political implications.  To make an evaluation of these, a detailed examination of the 
hearing and its ramifications is required.              
 
2.  Maintenance and the treatment debate in the Dally case 
The Professional Conduct Committee (PCC) hearing of the Dally case began on 9 
December 1986 chaired by Professor Duthie, professor of surgery at the University of 
Wales.47  Dally faced the same charges made in the GMC’s letter of September; 
firstly, that she had abused her position as a medical practitioner by prescribing 
methadone irresponsibly and secondly, she had failed to examine a patient (‘Khalid’) 
                                                 
46 GMC Annual Report, 1985.  Quoted in Spear, Heroin Addiction Care and Control, p. 289. 
47 A full transcript of the hearing can be found in CMAC, PP/DAL/E/4/17, Transcripts of the case 
1986-1987. 
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adequately, not monitored his progress effectively or made arrangements for his 
ongoing care once discharged.48  These two charges were representative of the two 
factors at work in the Dally case: Dally’s own faulty practices in dealing with specific 
patients and the more general political campaign against maintenance treatment. 
 Both these elements can be detected in the conduct of the case from its outset 
and throughout.  Timothy Preston, QC (appearing on behalf of the GMC) argued in 
his opening statement that a doctor embarking on a course of long-term prescription 
to an addict patient needed to take elementary precautions, precautions not taken by 
Dally.49  This could be observed in five areas.  Firstly, Dally treated so many addicts 
that it was beyond her capacity to treat them all conscientiously or properly.50  
Information passed to the GMC from the Home Office showed that Dally had treated 
189 addict patients between March and October 1985, but this figure did not include 
temporary patients, and no-one, not even Dally herself, had an accurate idea of the 
precise number seen.51  Secondly, Preston argued that Dally treated patients who 
could not have been expected to afford her fees and the other costs involved in private 
treatment without recourse to crime, particularly the sale of prescribed drugs.52  
Khalid himself had admitted selling methadone prescribed by Dally.53  Thirdly, it was 
asserted that Dally prescribed excessively large amounts of methadone on single 
prescriptions, that seeing patients on a weekly or fortnightly basis did not amount to a 
sufficient level of supervision.54  Fourthly, Preston felt Dally prescribed for patients 
who lived too far away from her surgery and in areas where there were already 
                                                 
48 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 9 December 1986, p. 1. 
49 Ibid. p. 21. 
50 Ibid. p. 21. 
51 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 2. 
52 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 9 December 1986, p. 21. 
53 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 10 December 1986, p. 7.  
54 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, p. 21; CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17 PCC Hearing, 
1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 4. 
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adequate NHS facilities.55  Finally, it was argued that Dally had made no attempt to 
reduce the doses prescribed to her addict patients and had not followed the guidelines 
which she helped to produce.56  Preston noted that only half of the 189 patients 
treated between March and October 1985 had their dose reduced.57  This caused him 
to question whether Dally was simply selling prescriptions rather than ‘properly 
treating patients.’58   
 Dally’s irresponsible prescription to addict patients was exemplified, 
according to Preston, by her treatment of Khalid.59  Preston maintained that when 
Dally took Khalid on as a patient she gave him a ‘perfunctory’ examination and did 
not test his urine for the presence of opioid drugs, but still issued him with a 
prescription for a week’s supply of methadone ampoules.60  Preston stated Khalid 
claimed that he never spent more than five or ten minutes in Dally’s surgery and  
the “treatment”, in inverted commas, rarely amounted to anything more than 
the respondent saying to him, “How are you today?” writing out his 
prescription and handing over the cash.  During all this period [Khalid] was 
unemployed and living on social security.61
 
If Khalid’s evidence was correct, then, Preston argued, he was not properly treated.62  
Khalid was later ‘summarily dismissed’ by Dally after the ‘apparently unwelcome 
intervention of his wife and the solicitor’s letter,’ and without proper arrangements 
being made for his ongoing care.63  Thus, Preston asserted, Dally was clearly acting 
irresponsibly towards one specific patient and to all her addict patients in general.   
 The political ramifications of the Dally case were immediately apparent to all 
those involved in the hearing.  In both his opening and closing statements Preston 
                                                 
55 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 9 December 1986, p. 21. 
56 Ibid. p. 21. 
57 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 6. 
58 Ibid. p. 6. 
59 Ibid. p. 8. 
60 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 10 December 1986, p. 1. 
61 Ibid. p. 1. 
62 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 8. 
63 Ibid. p. 8. 
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commented on the significance of the case.  At the beginning of the hearing he noted 
that ‘there may be more than one school of thought as to whether it is medically…or 
socially, advisable to prescribe long term maintenance doses to addicts’ and he would 
‘deprecate any attempt to turn this inquiry into a political debate.’64  However, 
Preston’s presentation of the GMC’s case to the PCC was itself ‘political’ and took a 
clear stance within this debate.  In his final words to the committee Preston stated that 
whilst he accepted that long-term maintenance might be necessary for some patients it 
was ‘very much a second best solution to an individual patient’s problem.’65  The 
‘best’ solution, presumably, was short-term withdrawal.  Just as Preston tried to deny 
the political elements of the case Dally’s defence was contingent on proving that she 
was not at fault, but was instead the victim of a conflict over the treatment of 
addiction.  Dally’s barrister, William Gage, argued in his closing statement that ‘Dr 
Dally has had the misfortune to get caught up in the backwash of a medical dispute in 
the particular field in which she practices.  It is our submission that that dispute lies at 
the heart of the charge against her.’66  Dally’s case was based around the assertion 
that there was not one correct way of treating addicts: there were a number of 
different ways.  Gage stated that ‘Nobody can be dogmatic as to precisely what is 
right for the individual.  It is our case that there is a place for her [Dally’s] type of 
treatment in the spectrum.’67  Indeed, he found there to be a substantial body of 
opinion that supported Dally’s methods, the existence of which demonstrated that she 
was not guilty of irresponsible prescription.68   
                                                 
64 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 9 December 1986, p. 21. 
65 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 1. 
66 Ibid. p. 9. 
67 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 26 January 1987, p. 47. 
68 This will be discussed in greater detail below.  CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 
January 1987, p. 11. 
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 On a more detailed level, Gage refuted each of the five allegations made by 
Preston about Dally’s treatment of addict patients.  Firstly, he asserted that Dally did 
not treat too many addicts and she worked hard to provide appropriate care for her 
patients.  He argued that there were simply not enough facilities for the treatment of 
addiction and she offered a valuable service.69  Secondly, Gage explained that Dally 
made every effort to see that her patients could afford her fee, but some would 
inevitably ‘slip through the net.’70  Thirdly, he argued that Dally did not prescribe 
excessively, and that with long-term addicts it might be necessary to go above the 
80mg daily limit set by the Guidelines.  It was essential to treat each patient as an 
individual and not to reduce their dose to a level that they could not tolerate, or else 
they would turn to the black market.71  Fourthly, Gage noted that no attempt had been 
made to define how far away from Dally’s surgery patients had to live to be 
considered too far away.  Again, he argued there were insufficient treatment facilities 
available in some areas for some addicts.72  Finally, Gage dealt with the allegation 
that Dally made no attempt to reduce the dose prescribed to many of her addict 
patients.  He stated it was Dally’s belief that halting prescription of opioid drugs to a 
long-term addict too rapidly was to risk relapse and the purchase of illegal drugs.73  
Gage also argued Dally’s treatment of Khalid was not indicative of irresponsible 
prescription.  He noted that Dally had achieved a reduction in Khalid’s daily dose 
from seven ampoules of injectable methadone and 50ml of methadone linctus to four 
ampoules and 25ml of linctus.74  Furthermore, Dally had every reason to believe 
                                                 
69 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 26 January 1987, p. 44. 
70 Ibid. p. 44. 
71 Ibid. pp. 44-45. 
72 Ibid. p. 45. 
73 Ibid. p. 45. 
74 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 21. 
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Khalid was employed as he had done some building work for her daughter.75  Gage 
felt that when it came to discharging Khalid, Dally was in a position where she could 
not win.  She had been advised by the MDU to discharge him and if she had gone on 
treating Khalid she would have been asked why she had continued to do so.  It was 
Gage’s submission that Dally had done ‘everything she properly and conscientiously 
should.’76  He concluded that she was doing nothing worse that treating long-term 
addicts.  Dally was not simply selling prescriptions, but providing ‘a good deal more’ 
in the way of treatment to her patients.77
Considering how the two charges in the Dally case were dealt with allows for 
an assessment to be made as to the relationship between the factors that were 
instrumental in bringing the case and deciding its outcome: Dally’s apparent failings 
and the more general campaign against maintenance.  Khalid stated that when he was 
first referred to Dally she did not conduct a physical examination of him, or conduct 
blood or urine tests for the presence of drugs, but she did examine his arms for needle 
marks.78  He asserted that though he saw her for half an hour initially, most of his 
consultations lasted ‘for ten minutes, give or take five minutes.’79  These meetings 
were weekly, until the last six months of his treatment when he could no longer afford 
to see her so regularly, so he asked to come fortnightly instead.80  Khalid told the 
PCC that Dally prescribed injectable methadone for him and admitted under cross-
examination that she did achieve a reduction in his dose over the time he was in her 
care.81  But, the ‘prosecution’ raised serious questions were about the nature of the 
                                                 
75 Ibid. pp. 21-22.  See also: CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 29 January 1987, pp. 
68-70; Dally, A Doctor’s Story, pp. 214-215. 
76 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 30 January 1987, p. 23. 
77 Ibid. p. 23. 
78 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 10 December 1986, p. 4, p. 18. 
79 Ibid. p. 6, p. 10. 
80 Ibid. p. 5. 
81 Ibid. p. 5, p. 18. 
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treatment Dally provided.  Preston asked Khalid: ‘During the two and a half years or 
so that you were seeing Dr Dally, did you ever receive from her anything that could 
be described as treatment, other than being handed a prescription for methadone?’  
Khalid replied: ‘Not really, no.’82  Dally’s treatment of Khalid also appeared 
unsuccessful when compared to the apparent success of the clinic he was attending at 
the time of the hearing in getting him off drugs.  Khalid told the committee that he 
had been going to a DDU for five weeks and was completely abstinent.83  
Serious questions were also raised about how Khalid could afford to pay for 
private treatment.  He admitted that though he had been in work when he first went to 
see Dally, he had been unemployed and drawing benefit since 1983.  Sessions with 
Dally cost £30 each and Khalid told the PCC that his prescription charges could be as 
much as £33 and averaged £25.  As he was only receiving £72 a week in 
unemployment benefit Khalid said he was forced to sell some of his ampoules of 
methadone for around £5 each.84  Dally, it seemed, was unwittingly supplying the 
‘grey’ market with drugs, something that was of great concern to many DDU doctors 
(see Chapter Three).  It was hardly surprising, therefore, that the PCC judged the 
second charge levelled against Dally, irresponsible prescription to Khalid, to have 
been proven.  Indeed, the impression that Khalid was something of a ‘dodgy’ patient 
was confirmed by the fact that since he had left Dally’s care he had been arrested and 
was to stand trial for attempted possession of heroin.85   
Yet, the eight-day hearing was about more than Dally’s failings with respect to 
one individual.  Through the examination of the other, more general charge, the case 
brought many of the key issues in the treatment debate into sharp focus.  There was a 
                                                 
82 Ibid. p. 8. 
83 Ibid. p. 21. 
84 Ibid. p. 7.  See CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/12, Statement of Annette Lingham, 20 November 1986 for the 
prices of Dally’s treatment sessions. 
85 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 10 December 1986, p. 16. 
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recurrence of interest in who should be responsible for the treatment of the addict.  
Concern was expressed by two expert witnesses for the ‘prosecution’ about the 
vulnerability of the single-handed practitioner when dealing with addict patients.86  
Dr Farrington, consultant psychiatrist at Lady Chichester Hospital, Hove, felt that 
doctors working alone could easily be manipulated.87  Dr Fleming, director of Wessex 
regional drug dependence services, agreed.  In addition, he felt that there was a 
limitation to the services that a single-handed practitioner could provide to the addict 
when compared to the multi-disciplinary teams found in DDUs.88  The Dally case was 
also used to question once more the place of the private practitioner in the treatment 
of addiction.  Many of the same problems with the payment of fees by addict patients 
raised in the 1983 case were reconsidered.  McIntosh told the committee that concern 
about how some of Dally’s patients were raising money to pay her fees underlay his 
line of questioning in his interview with her in December 1985.  He felt that 
‘somebody without sufficient legitimate income would be compelled to sell part of his 
prescription or resort to other criminal activity in order to finance his consultation and 
dispensing fees.’89  This had clearly been the case with Khalid.  The committee also 
heard about the separate financial issue of how much money Dally earned from her 
addict practice.  Much was made of Dally’s remark made during the Home Office 
interview about needing an income of £75,000 to cover overheads.  McIntosh told the 
hearing that he thought this was a ‘curious thing’ to say and that it gave him ‘slight 
pause for concern as to whether the doctor was motivated by financial reasons for 
continuing to treat [addict] patients.’90  However, McIntosh admitted that he thought 
                                                 
86 Technically, as the GMC was not a court of law Preston and his team were not the ‘prosecution,’ nor 
were Gage and his associates the ‘defence,’ but it is convenient short-hand used to refer to each side. 
87 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 11 December 1986, p. 42. 
88 Ibid. p. 61. 
89 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 9 December 1986, p. 76. 
90 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/17, PCC Hearing, 1986-1987, 9 December 1986, p. 90. 
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Dally was acting in a genuine manner and was prescribing to patients in what she 
believed to be their best interests.91  Dally claimed that the comment about needing 
£75,000 was taken out of context.  She stated that this represented the costs for the 
whole practice which she shared with her ex-husband Dr Peter Dally.92  She argued 
that she could have maintained her level of income by treating more general 
psychiatric patients and fewer addicts if she had only been concerned about making 
money.  She said that she continued to treat addict patients because she could not just 
abandon them and force them onto the ‘street.’93   
During the hearing questions were raised about Dally’s suitability for treating 
addicts that fed into broader debates about the position of the generalist and the 
specialist in this field.  McIntosh stated that the Home Office Drugs Branch had 
always regarded Dally as a general practitioner with a special interest in the treatment 
of drug addiction.94  Dally on the other hand, told the committee that she described 
herself as a psychiatrist, not as a GP, despite her lack of formal training.95  This was 
significant, as the Guidelines recommended different practices for psychiatrists and 
GPs when dealing with addicts.  Moreover, Farrington told the committee that the 
Guidelines were of limited use to someone like himself with a good deal of 
experience in treating addicts.  It was not, he said, a document to which he referred to 
regularly.96  The implication was that an individual with expertise in the field could 
disregard some of the Guidelines’ recommendations, something Dally frequently did.  
However, the Guidelines were a crucial document referred to throughout the hearing 
as being representative of  ‘standard’ treatment for drug addiction.  Preston argued 
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93 Ibid. pp. 63-64. 
94 Ibid. p. 59. 
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that Dally ‘breached, or at any rate ignored’ many of the recommendations made in 
the Guidelines.97  He compared Dally’s practice to that outlined in the Guidelines.  
Preston noted that doctors were advised not to undertake the long-term prescription of 
opioid drugs to addicts unless in conjunction with a specialist at a DDU.  Dally 
countered that the Guidelines stated that it did not have to be a DDU specialist, but 
could also be someone who had experience in the area.  She felt she had considerable 
experience and thus considered herself to be a specialist.98  Preston also used the 
Guidelines to suggest that Dally did not follow accepted practice.  He pointed out that 
the Guidelines recommended conducting a physical examination of the patient, 
something Dally did not always do.  Dally argued that as her patients were sent to her 
on referral it was not necessary to carry out an examination as this should have been 
done by the referring physician.99  She claimed that she conformed to the Guidelines 
as far as possible, but that they did not provide for the type of patient she saw: the 
long-term addict.100  Other doctors who gave evidence to the PCC were also critical 
of the Guidelines.  Dally’s friend and supporter Dr Marjot told the committee that he 
did not agree with every word of the Guidelines and felt that they were of use to some 
GPs, but of less value to those working within the field.  He too felt they did not 
address the problem of the long-term addict.101  Beckett also thought that the 
Guidelines were intended for those without experience of treating addiction, and was 
in agreement with Marjot and Dally that they failed to deal with the chronically 
addicted patient.102  However, it was Marks who presented the most damning 
condemnation of the Guidelines.  He told the committee that he referred to them as 
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the ‘misguidelines.’  He argued they deserved this sobriquet because whilst they 
claimed to present guidance on good clinical practice they did not deal with 
maintenance, the implication being that maintenance was not good practice.  He 
strongly disagreed with this, branding it a ‘false inference.’103   
Indeed, Marks’ evidence on the subject of maintenance was crucial for Dally 
and the wider debate as he helped to establish that this was an accepted method of 
treatment, albeit practised by a minority of doctors working with addicts.  Marks 
freely admitted to prescribing to addicts on a maintenance basis.  He asserted that 
addicts who were determined to take drugs would continue to do so.  The choice was 
not, he said, ‘between getting those drugs [on prescription] and not getting drugs at 
all; it is between not getting these injections or injecting street rubbish.’104  Marks 
believed that maintenance itself was not ‘treatment,’ it was a way of keeping the 
patient healthy and in contact with the appropriate services until they were prepared to 
stop taking drugs altogether.105  Dally’s defence team presented other doctors who 
agreed with maintenance and criticised rapid withdrawal.  Beckett stated that there 
was nothing wrong with prescribing to an addict over a long period of time, indeed he 
argued ‘in fact it might be thought wrong not to.’106  Short-term withdrawal might 
result in abstinence but the addict too often returned to drugs.  He believed that 
addicts could lead perfectly ‘normal’ lives whilst being prescribed opioid drugs.107  
Beckett also argued that there was no one method that could be applied to the 
treatment of addiction, as did Marjot.108  Marjot asserted that whilst the aim in 
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treating addicts was for them to eventually be drug-free, prescription was sometimes 
‘the least worst option.’109  
Dally presented her treatment of addicts to the PCC in this light, defending her 
own practices through a defence of maintenance.  She asserted that her philosophy 
was ‘To improve their [the addict’s] general health and social situation and to help 
them reduce their drug need, with the hope that they would eventually become drug 
free.’  This treatment was designed to help the addict patient hold down a job and 
maintain a normal family life.110  She argued that the patients she treated were older, 
long-term addicts that ‘had been addicted for so long that there was not any question 
of getting them off quickly.’111  Dally felt that there was not one single method 
available for treating addict patients, rather that ‘one has to deal with the patient 
according to that patient; it is a very individual matter.’112  This meant trying to 
‘assess each person as an individual and to decide the right treatment for that 
particular person and to carry it out, modifying it as circumstances change, aiming 
always at being drug-free in the end.’113  Dally’s general treatment philosophy and 
methodology thus fitted into a pattern of individual centred maintenance designed to 
improve social functioning, with the ultimate goal of abstinence, but not necessarily in 
a short, fixed period of time.   
In contrast to this view, the drug addiction experts presented by the 
‘prosecution’ were largely advocates of short-term withdrawal.  Farrington told the 
committee about the practices adopted in his clinic.  The goal of treatment, he 
asserted, was for the patient to become abstinent from drugs.  He did not believe that 
any addict had a long term need for opiate drugs.  Most patients were offered a 
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‘prescription contract’ aimed at getting them off methadone in between four and six 
months.114  However, Farrington did admit to prescribing to a small number of addicts 
(ten out of 112) on a long-term basis.  These were what he termed ‘stable’ addicts, 
older and less problematic than the rest of the patients he saw.115  Fleming also 
prescribed on a long-term basis to a handful of patients.  He treated between five and 
ten stable addicts who were employed, in good relationships and mostly in their late 
thirties or early forties.116  He conceded that for these patients there might be a case 
for allowing them to continue to take injectable drugs on prescription.117  However, 
he also stated that he had not prescribed injectable drugs to an addict in eleven years.  
He estimated that he had prescribed drugs in any form to only a third of his patients; 
the remainder received counselling.  Prescription, he believed was a minor part of 
treatment.118  So, despite the tacit admission that there might be a case for long-term 
prescription to a small number of addict patients the evidence of both Fleming and 
Farrington was broadly supportive of rapid withdrawal.  It is intriguing to note they 
were the only medical witnesses called by the ‘prosecution.’  None of the London 
DDU doctors gave evidence.  This is surprising, as they were widely recognised to be 
the leading experts in the field and were the strongest advocates of short-term 
prescription.  Dally actually wanted Connell and Bewley to appear as witnesses so 
that they would be forced to justify their policies.  She believed under cross-
examination the fallacy of these would be exposed.119  It is unclear why they, or any 
of the other London DDU consultants, were not asked by the GMC to give evidence.  
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It is appealing to suggest that perhaps they were too close to the case.  Whilst they 
may not have deliberately orchestrated the hearing it was obvious that they had much 
to gain by forcing a doctor like Dally out of practice.  Being seen to be so directly 
involved in its outcome would have exposed the political motives of this group of 
clinicians.  Nonetheless, these political dimensions were widely recognised as being 
vital in determining the course of the case and particularly its outcome.   
 
3.  Reaching a verdict: the politics of the GMC 
The conduct of the PCC during the hearing indicated that the GMC did not take a 
neutral view of Dally’s case or the treatment debate that underlay it.  The GMC were 
prepared to bend their own rules on patient confidentiality to ensure that the case 
continued.  On the second day of the hearing the cross-examination of the mother of a 
former patient of Dally’s led to a complex legal debate about the use of patient 
records.120  The GMC’s ‘Blue Book’ permitted the disclosure of information gleaned 
from medical records without the consent of the patient if the doctor was directed to 
do so by a judge or other officer of the court.121  Both counsels in the Dally case were 
using patient records without necessarily having the approval of each individual.  The 
Legal Assessor determined that as the PCC was not a court, the confidentiality ruling 
should apply, and the chairman ruled that evidence of agreement or attempts to obtain 
agreement should be provided before any patient’s notes were used.122  However, on 
the fourth day of the hearing, after a six-week adjournment for Christmas, the 
committee reconsidered the issue, and the ruling was reversed.123  It was decided that 
evidence based on medical records could be heard without the consent of the patient 
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concerned as long as they were not identified in public.124  The rules on 
confidentiality did not apply, the Chairman explained, because it was ‘in the public 
interest’ for confidential information to be used as evidence in this case.125  This 
ruling provoked the resignation of one of the committee members, Dr Michael 
O’Donnell.  O’Donnell felt that the ruling was ‘at odds with my understanding of the 
position and purpose of this Council.’126  O’Donnell devoted his column in the British 
Medical Journal a few weeks later to attacking the committee’s decision.  He argued 
that the committee had got themselves into a procedural mess because of the way the 
charges were framed and as a result were ‘bending the rules to suit our own 
convenience.’127  O’Donnell noted that the GMC’s Blue Book stated confidential 
information could be disclosed on rare occasions if it was in the public interest to do 
so, in circumstances such as the investigation by the police of a serious crime.  
According to O’Donnell these were not applicable in this case: ‘The GMC’s post hoc 
explanation reads like a desperate attempt to excuse what, at the time, I thought was 
inexcusable.  I still do.’128
 The admissibility or otherwise of patient records was not a crucial issue in 
determining the actual outcome of Dally’s case.  The ‘prosecution’ were able to refer 
to them to condemn her actions, but she was also able to use her notes to defend these.  
It was the decision to allow the use of confidential information without prior consent 
and the justification made by the committee for this that was more significant.  Patient 
confidentiality is a central tenet of medical practice, and has been since Antiquity.  It 
is a principle that the GMC are supposed to defend; divulging confidential 
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information about a patient can itself constitute serious professional misconduct.129  
The fact that the PCC were prepared to disregard this indicates the seriousness with 
which the case was viewed.  Without evidence based on patient records the case 
would have failed; neither ‘prosecution’ nor ‘defence’ would have been able to 
sustain an argument.  The hearing would have had to be adjourned until consent from 
every patient could be obtained, or quashed completely.  The PCC clearly wanted the 
hearing to continue, even at the cost of ignoring the ‘sacred principle.’130
 It is tempting to suggest that elements within the PCC and the GMC as a 
whole wanted the hearing to continue because they sought to convict Dally of serious 
professional misconduct and use the case to deter other practitioners who might be 
tempted to offer maintenance treatment to addict patients.  Between March 1986 and 
January 1987 Russell Smith observed PCC hearings for a doctoral thesis, and later 
book, on the self-regulation of medicine.131  Having witnessed the Dally case he felt it 
raised a number of important issues about the operation of medical discipline.  Smith 
noted that a problem occurred in determining what constituted serious professional 
misconduct in a field such as the treatment of addiction where medical opinion was 
divided.132  There was, he argued, a potential risk that ‘Committee members 
adjudicating upon a particular case could be chosen expressly because of the views 
they entertain of a given theory of treatment, thus resulting in a biased tribunal.’133  
Although Smith thought such a case to be ‘extreme’ and ‘unlikely’ and could find no 
evidence to suggest that this had ever taken place, it can be argued that questions 
directed at witnesses by members of the PCC during Dally’s hearing revealed a 
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certain degree of antipathy towards her methods.134  The questions asked by one 
member of the committee in particular, Dr Henry Ashworth, a retired GP from 
Manchester, betrayed a personal disapproval of maintenance.  Ashworth asked Khalid 
about his attitude towards treatment immediately after his discharge from Dally’s 
care.  He said: ‘Would it be fair to say that at the time your thoughts were only really 
in terms of getting drugs?’  Khalid agreed.  Ashworth went on ‘And you were not 
really satisfied with any sort of treatment that did not supply you with drugs, because 
that was your aim, was it not?’  Khalid replied ‘Yes it was.’  Ashworth concluded by 
saying ‘Now that you see there is some other kind of treatment.  Is that true?’  Khalid 
agreed.135  Ashworth was clearly using his opportunity to ask witnesses questions to 
put his own views about drug addicts, addiction and its treatment.  Ashworth said to 
‘Miss B’ a former addict patient of Dally’s: ‘Madam, for years you have been a 
member of that dark, dreary, unhappy culture, the drug scene.  Do I gather Dr Dally’s 
name is well known in your culture?’  Miss B replied ‘It is renowned.’  Ashworth 
continued ‘Do I understand that it is renowned because she maintains you and makes 
no effort to reduce or refer you to any detoxification centres?’  Miss B replied 
‘Yes.’136  The chairman did object to this as a leading question, but Ashworth had 
made his point, just as he had obviously already decided that by prescribing for 
patients on a maintenance basis Dally was not providing treatment.  This was evident 
in the questions Ashworth directed at Dally herself.  Ashworth asked what ‘stimulus’ 
there was for her patients to come off drugs if she ‘prescribe[d] for them according to 
their demands?’  Dally replied ‘As I do not prescribe according to their demands I 
cannot answer that question.’  Ashworth said: ‘There is a difference, is there, between 
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your type of prescribing and prescribing on demand?’  Dally replied ‘Yes, a very 
great difference.’137   
Dally devoted much attention to the conduct of Ashworth and other members 
of the PCC in her diary and autobiography.  She and her lawyers even considered 
making it the subject of her appeal.  Dally felt that Ashworth’s line of questioning was 
‘hostile’ and ‘sarcastic.’138  She reported that her supporters observed that Ashworth 
and other committee members, such as Dr Scott and Reverend Smith, affected 
‘mutual despair’ when Dally’s barrister made an argument in her defence and smiled 
and nodded when a point went against her.139  Ashworth and Scott were both 
members of the PCC that had found Dally guilty of serious professional misconduct 
in 1983.140  It is impossible to say if they were deliberately selected for the later 
committee because of their views on Dally’s methods or maintenance treatment 
generally, but this is not implausible.  Dally’s friend, the writer George Mikes, told 
her that O’Donnell had told him that the GMC had decided to find Dally guilty of 
serious professional misconduct and strike her off the register of licensed medical 
practitioners before the ‘defence’ had even been heard.141  This is, of course, hearsay, 
but it does indicate that the verdict in the Dally case may not have been reached by 
reliance upon the evidence presented alone. 
The hearing finally concluded on 30 January 1987.  The committee found that 
the second charge against Dally (her treatment of Khalid) had been proven to their 
satisfaction, but there was insufficient evidence to support the first, more general 
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charge.142  The PCC believed that the second charge alone did constitute serious 
professional misconduct.  The Chairman stated that as a result of this finding and 
Dally’s ‘blatant failure to heed the warning issued’ at her ‘previous appearance before 
the Committee in 1983 in relation to similar matters’ her continued registration was 
made conditional on her not prescribing or possessing any controlled drugs for a 
period of 14 months.143  Given the PCC’s findings in other similar cases this could be 
considered a fairly lenient punishment.  Between 1983 and 1989 47 cases of non 
bona-fide prescription of controlled drugs came before the PCC.  Of these, five were 
found not guilty.  In 15 cases the doctor’s name was erased from the register, in 11 
cases the doctor was admonished, in 8 cases the doctor was suspended for a fixed 
period, 4 cases were adjourned and in 4 cases the doctor’s registration, like Dally’s, 
was subjected to future conditions.144  Whether this was a ‘fair’ verdict is another 
matter.  Diana Brahams, barrister and legal correspondent for the Lancet, produced a 
detailed analysis of the case.145  She noted that Home Office inspectors were 
convinced that Dally was well motivated and believed she was acting in the best 
interest of her patients.  Brahams conceded that whilst Dally may not have been 
vigilant enough in respect of a single patient (Khalid) ‘and for this she can be 
criticised’ it was ‘difficult to see what will be gained by forbidding her from 
prescribing in the area if the alternatives (supplies of impure drugs, dirty needles and 
the wave of crime committed to pay for supplies of street heroin) are worse.’146  The 
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‘street addict’ she argued was a danger to ‘himself’ and to the ‘community at large.’  
Had the ‘medical establishment’ Brahams concluded, ‘got its priorities right?’147
Questions were raised by both Brahams and Smith about the way in which the 
treatment Dally offered had been interpreted as being ‘irresponsible’ and, therefore, 
constituting serious professional misconduct.  Brahams argued that ‘treatment which 
is medically respectable cannot at the same time be irresponsible.’148  As a 
‘respectable body of medical opinion’ approved of Dally’s treatment methods she 
could not be considered to be guilty of irresponsible practice.149  Smith was of a 
similar opinion.  He argued a doctor should not face a misconduct hearing merely 
because they had adopted a ‘practice of medicine which, while having its opponents, 
is none the less justifiable as one manner of treatment.’150  In the Dally case 
one was left with the unhappy situation of a doctor having her conduct 
adjudicated and its undesirability declared, presumably for the benefit of the 
whole medical community in knowing what was acceptable conduct in the 
eyes of the GMC, when she had merely been following one school of thought 
which had its own substantial body of advocates.151
 
The PCC were clearly not only judging one doctor’s conduct but also the suitability of 
maintenance as a form of treatment for heroin addiction. 
 In this sense, the conviction of Dally on the lesser of the two charges 
represented a partial failure for those who wished to see maintenance utterly 
discredited.  Dally felt that the GMC had ‘been unable to condemn my method of 
treatment’ although they ‘ensured that no one would be tempted to follow it.’152  This 
was a broadly accurate assessment.  Whilst Dally’s treatment of Khalid was exposed 
as being somewhat slipshod she was able to demonstrate that her general methods and 
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philosophy were acceptable as a form of treatment by offering a successful defence of 
maintenance.  The GMC were able to denounce the practitioner, but not the practice.  
Even those doctors who had appeared for the ‘prosecution’ conceded that some addict 
patients might require long-term prescription.  Marks’ powerful testimony on the 
benefits of this was particularly important, both as an endorsement of Dally’s methods 
and maintenance treatment more generally.  Though the verdict effectively compelled 
Dally to retire from the treatment of addiction and other doctors mindful of their 
careers may well have followed suit, maintenance treatment persisted, and was even 
strengthened as a result.   
 
4.  The aftermath 
The Dally case was important not just because it polarised many of the issues in the 
treatment debate, but also because it brought these issues into the centre-field.  Media 
coverage of the case helped to expose its political significance, highlighting the 
medical dispute at its core and raising questions about the most appropriate way to 
handle the burgeoning drug ‘problem.’  Letters in support of Dally and denouncing 
the PCC’s verdict appeared in the medical press.153  Beckett, writing in the Lancet, 
hoped that the GMC would begin to question the treatment offered to long-term 
addicts as a result of the case.154  Orthopaedic surgeon and father of an addict patient 
of Dally’s, Patrick Monahan, wrote to both the Lancet and the British Medical 
Journal, arguing that Dally’s treatment by the profession had fallen short of expected 
standards.  He asserted that ‘impartiality, untarnished by prejudice, must be re-
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established in all matters related to drug abuse.’155  Others were keen to highlight the 
more general implications the Dally case raised.  Writing in the BMJ Marjot argued 
the case demonstrated a need for reform of the GMC that acted as ‘prosecutor, judge, 
jury and executioner.’  Or else, ‘no doctor will be safe if he or she offends medical 
orthodoxy.’156  Not all voices expressed disgust with the PCC’s decision.  In a 
carefully worded letter Connell attacked Brahams’ assertion that what was medically 
respectable should not be considered irresponsible.  Connell argued there were many 
types of treatment that whilst universally accepted could, nonetheless, be practised 
irresponsibly.157  Connell may have had a point, but his argument ignored the more 
significant issue that Brahams tried to raise: in the Dally case a particular type of 
treatment in and of itself was being held up as irresponsible, irrespective of the way it 
was practised. 
 Despite Connell’s attempt at diminishing the political significance of the case 
its importance was widely recognised outside medical circles.  Indeed, Dally’s case 
received a range of coverage from sources as diverse as the BBC’s Panorama to 
Cosmopolitan magazine.  The broadsheet newspapers reported daily proceedings of 
the hearing throughout the case, initially picking out only the most negative and 
sensational details.158  As the hearing continued and the ‘defence’ was presented more 
analytical pieces began to appear.  Despite Dally’s fears that the left-wing press would 
be uninterested in the case because it concerned private practice, some of the most 
sympathetic coverage came from the Guardian and the Observer.159  On the eve of 
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the hearing an article by Arnold Trebach was published in the Guardian.  Trebach 
argued that ‘they’ (the GMC, the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the Home Office) 
were ‘after’ Dally again.  He believed that prominent people within the medical 
establishment wished to impose their orthodoxy on the treatment of addiction.  Dally 
was being pursued as a result of her criticism of these policies and also because she 
was in private practice.160  Carmel Fitzsimons, writing in the Observer, noted that the 
case raised questions about the best way to treat heroin addiction.  She interviewed 
Dally during the six-week break in the hearing, publicising her views on the treatment 
of addiction and her ‘battle’ with the ‘drug-dependency establishment.’161  Another 
favourable piece appeared in the Guardian once the hearing resumed in January 1987.  
Ed Vulliamy highlighted a number of key points about the case; that it was a ‘test’ of 
the ‘medical establishment’s’ view that maintenance was inappropriate, that the 
GMC’s lawyers had employed a private detective to investigate Dally’s prescription 
and also that the GMC had threatened the BBC with an injunction over the content of 
a Panorama programme about the case.162  Dally was approached by John Ware, the 
producer of Panorama in November 1986, about making a programme on her case 
and the issues that surrounded it.163  When the GMC found out about the documentary 
they tried to get a High Court injunction to ban its transmission.164  After watching 
the programme, the GMC’s lawyers felt they would not win an injunction and the 
case was dropped.165  Nonetheless, Dally asserted that considerable changes were 
made to the programme before it was broadcast as a result of pressure from the GMC.  
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She stated that film of addicts leading a ‘normal’ life was cut.  An interview with 
Connell was omitted after he withdrew his consent for it to be used.  There was no 
mention of the threatened injunction and the alterations made as a result.166  The 
programme did, however, heighten the profile of the Dally case and the debate over 
the treatment of addiction, bringing the issues to a wider audience. 
 Many other observers of the Dally case drew parallels with that of obstetrician 
Wendy Savage who had faced disciplinary action as a result of her unorthodox views 
about childbirth.  Savage too had faced opposition from the medical establishment, 
although she won her case and retained her job.  She offered advice to Dally 
throughout the case, wrote a supportive article in the Guardian at the time of Dally’s 
(unsuccessful) appeal, and later contributed a foreword to Dally’s autobiography 
pointing out the similarities in their cases.167  One of these was clearly their gender, 
an issue dealt with by Miranda Ingram in Cosmopolitan magazine.  Ingram speculated 
that authority punished dissident women more heavily.  She drew parallels between 
Dally’s case and that of Savage, noting that:  
Both are women, strong-minded and outspoken.  And both are guilty of 
essentially the same crime…[they] have, by their methods, challenged the 
status quo of one of the most conservative professions in this country.  Worse 
still, they have caused the profession to score two home [sic.] goals since its 
efforts to disgrace them inadvertently inspired public debate about the very 
issue it wished to ignore.168
 
Comparisons were also made about the way evidence was accumulated against Dally 
and Savage.  In both cases no complaint was received about the doctor’s behaviour; 
instead their medical records were scrutinised by officials looking specifically for 
                                                 
166 Ibid. pp. 171-173; CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/18, Personal account of the case by Dally, 1986-87, 7 
December, 8 December. 
167 Dally, A Doctor’s Story, pp. xiii-xv, pp. 160-161, p. 173, p. 184, p. 237, pp. 239-242; W. Savage, 
The Guardian, 3 June 1987, p.  
168 CMAC PP/DAL/E/4/1, Articles and newspaper cuttings, 1974-1987, M. Ingram, ‘Why women 
doctors are in the dock’, Cosmopolitan, (August 1987) pp. 8-10. 
 258
information that might lead to a charge being brought.169  Marjot coined a new verb to 
describe this process: ‘to be Savaged.’170
 Through coverage of the Dally case in a wide range of media the issues at the 
heart of the treatment debate were brought to a non-medical audience.  Within 
medicine, there was a gradual reconsideration of the role of maintenance in the 
treatment of heroin addiction.  This was partly as a result of the Dally case and the 
publicity it generated.  In a commentary on the case the legal correspondent for the 
British Medical Journal, Clare Dyer, observed that ‘the move to curb Dr Dally’s 
prescribing comes at a time when the threat of acquired immune deficiency syndrome 
[AIDS] is giving new fuel to the debate over prescribing policy for drug addicts.’  
Dyer noted that an argument was being made that flexible prescription would bring 
more addicts into clinics, and through this contact the risk of HIV infection and its 
transmission to the ‘general population’ could be reduced.171  Concern about 
incidences of HIV and AIDS amongst heroin addicts was growing in the immediate 
aftermath of the Dally case.  This prompted a re-examination of the position of long-
term prescription of opioid drugs to addicts.  The impact of HIV and AIDS upon drug 
addiction treatment policy will be considered in more detail in the Conclusion, but it 
is worth noting that medical opinion appeared to be changing towards maintenance 
quite apart from the issue of AIDS.  At a conference of the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists a few months after the Dally case concluded Marks proposed a motion in 
support of the long-term prescription of opioid drugs to addicts.  Although the vote 
went against the motion (38 opposed, 29 in favour and 9 abstentions) it was indicative 
                                                 
169 A. Dally, ‘Dally’s defence’, New Society, 25 September 1987, 20-21, p. 21. 
170 Marjot, ‘Dally, O’Donnell and the GMC’, p. 573.  He also used this term in an interview with BBC 
Radio Four’s programme File on Four, broadcast 24 September 1987.  A transcript of this programme 
and an audio copy of the broadcast are available at CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/2/11, ‘Long term drug 
addicts’, File on Four, 1987. 
171 C. Dyer, ‘Dr Ann Dally’s continued brushes with the GMC’, British Medical Journal, 295, (26 
September 1987) p. 774. 
 259
of a gradual shift in opinion.172  Even some of the strongest advocates for short-term 
withdrawal were forced to change their stance.  In a televised debate on the treatment 
of addiction in March 1987 Connell agreed that maintenance should be re-examined 
as a possible form of treatment for addiction.173  In May, he announced the Guidelines 
would be revised to reconsider the position of long-term prescription to addicts, 
especially in the light of the problems presented by HIV and AIDS.174  An editorial in 
the Lancet that same month was staunchly in favour of the long-term prescription of 
opioids to addicts.  A number of arguments were made for maintenance, including the 
futility of expecting a rapid ‘cure’ to addiction and the problems arising from the 
illicit trade in drugs, such as rising crime.175  Drug Scenes, a special report on drugs 
and drug dependence by the Royal College of Psychiatrists also published in 1987, 
discussed maintenance as a method of treatment in an even-handed manner.  The 
report asserted that ‘it is not a question of whether methadone maintenance is in some 
intrinsic sense “good” or “bad” but whether it is likely to be the best option for a 
particular patient in particular circumstances.’176  Maintenance, it seemed, was being 
‘brought in from the cold.’177     
Whilst it is impossible to quantify the impact of the Dally case on this thawing 
of attitudes, it did help to create a climate where a reconsideration of the long-term 
prescription of opioids to addicts was possible.  The case had been brought by 
advocates of short-term withdrawal and the clinical method in order to discredit 
maintenance and the more ‘social’ approach to disease this represented.  Given the 
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power of both clinical medicine at a general level and the supporters of rapid 
withdrawal within the medical establishment it is all the more surprising that a 
wholesale condemnation of maintenance was not produced.  Indeed, the Dally case 
represented something of a minor victory for the supporters of the long-term 
prescription of opioids to addicts.  This was part of, and in a small way helped to 
cause, a rapprochement towards maintenance as a form of treatment for heroin 
addiction.     
To assess why maintenance ‘won,’ it is necessary to return to the fluctuating 
relationship between the medical and the social in determining the response to heroin 
addiction.  Changes taking place in broader drugs policy fed into the specific 
approach to heroin.  Initiatives such as Tackling Drug Misuse placed greater emphasis 
on crime and the social problems caused by drug use.  The range of agencies involved 
in drug issues expanded still further, representing a move away from purely medically 
dominated approaches into what Berridge has called the ‘new policy community.’178  
Within this, clinicians needed to prove that they retained a distinct and crucial role.  
This could be achieved by addressing the primary concerns of this policy community, 
such as the social problems arising from drug use.  Maintenance appeared to offer if 
not a solution, at least a potential way to alleviate some of these by placing 
individuals rather than their disease at the centre of treatment.  The ‘triumph’ of 
maintenance in the dispute over drug addiction treatment does not, therefore, 
necessarily represent the victory of community-based biographical medicine over 
hospital-based clinical medicine, but is more indicative of the continued adaptability 
of medicine in applying itself to ‘social problems.’  The conflict between competing 
styles of medicine was less significant than medicine’s conflicts with outside forces.   
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It is ironic then, that to retain its role in addiction, as in other areas, ‘medicine’ 
became ever more ‘social.’   
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Conclusion 
 
Epilogue: Drug Policy, AIDS and Beyond 
 
 
Debates about the treatment of heroin addiction shifted in focus from 1987 onwards 
as it became apparent that HIV, and with it the possibility of developing full-blown 
AIDS, could spread between intravenous drug users sharing injecting equipment.  
HIV and AIDS posed very real challenges to addiction treatment policy in the late 
1980s, forcing a re-examination of previously rejected approaches as well as the 
adoption of seemingly novel initiatives.1  The ACMD’s assertion that AIDS was a 
greater threat to public health than drug misuse meant that prevention of the spread of 
HIV amongst intravenous drug users was accorded more importance than curing them 
of their addiction.2  Those who had previously been staunchly opposed to the long-
term prescription of drugs to addicts, such as John Strang, reconsidered their 
position.3  Needle exchanges, providing addicts with clean needles and syringes in 
return for used ones, sprang up all over England and Scotland, initially as pilot 
schemes, and later as part of the established ‘harm minimisation’ response to drug 
use.4   It is questionable, however, if these developments constituted an entirely ‘new’ 
direction for addiction treatment policy.  Virginia Berridge has pointed to the 
existence of important continuities with the past, such that ‘despite the apparent 
revolution in the rhetoric of drug policy achieved by AIDS, many aspects of post 
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AIDS policy were inherent in drug policy in the 1980s.’5  Gerry Stimson asserts that 
‘new’ ideas about how to deal with heroin addiction in the wake of AIDS had their 
roots in earlier work, that change was ‘perhaps a matter of emphasis and direction, 
rather than abrupt rupture with the recent past.’6  Susanne MacGregor has also 
expressed doubts as to whether AIDS prompted the development of a distinct phase of 
drug policy, suggesting there was more a modification of existing practices.7  
 Indeed, there are startling parallels between debates about the treatment of 
addiction after AIDS and those of the pre-AIDS era that have formed the basis of this 
thesis.  Examining the impact of AIDS on drug policy is a useful tool for reflecting 
back on earlier issues.  This conclusion, therefore, will use AIDS to do three things.  
First, it will consider how the discovery of HIV and AIDS amongst intravenous drug 
users impacted upon the way drug addiction was seen and responded to, especially 
through the paradigm of public health.  It is argued that relating addiction to public 
health was not a new occurrence, that concern about the dangers posed to collective as 
well as individual health was a concept that had informed drug policy since at least 
the 1960s.  Second, this conclusion will assess how far the recognition of AIDS as a 
greater threat to public health than drug use led to real change in drug addiction 
treatment policy.  It is suggested that there were strong echoes of past debates, given 
new impetus by the threat of AIDS.  Finally, there will be an attempt to take the ‘long 
view’ to determine whether there was continuity or change in drug addiction policy 
over the period examined by this thesis.  Questions about continuity or change post-
AIDS can equally be applied to the pre-AIDS period and even to the present day.  
                                                 
5 Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy: continuity or change?’, p. 152.  For an earlier version of this 
article see V. Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy: history repeats itself?’ in Whynes & Bean (eds.) 
Policing and Prescribing, 176-199. 
6 G.V. Stimson, ‘Revising policy and practice: new ideas about the drugs problem’ in Strang & 
Stimson, AIDS and Drug Misuse, p. 129. 
7 MacGregor, ‘Choices for policy and practice’, p. 197. 
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Considering the influence of AIDS on drug addiction treatment policy thus allows for 
reflection on the key issues dealt with by this thesis and places these in their 
contemporary context. 
 
1.  A greater threat?  AIDS, drugs and public health 
The identification of AIDS as a disease in its own right is usually dated to a report on 
the deaths of five young, previously healthy, homosexual men in Los Angeles from 
pneumocystis pneumonia, a condition found almost exclusively in people with 
defective immune systems, published by the Centers for Disease Control in June 
1981.8  The Lancet reported the first British case in the same year, in which another 
previously healthy homosexual male succumbed to pneumocystis pneumonia.9  As 
these early cases were all gay men it was thought that there was a link between male 
homosexual activity and immunodeficiency, and the condition became known as 
GRID (Gay-Related Immuno-Deficiency).10  In the subsequent months there were 
reports of immunodeficiency related diseases in heterosexuals too, particularly in 
haemophiliacs, those who had recently received blood transfusions and intravenous 
drug users.  GRID no longer seemed an appropriate label and the condition was 
renamed AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) at a conference in 
Washington D.C. in 1982.11  In 1983 and 1984 the virus HIV (Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus) was identified as the putative agent responsible for causing 
                                                 
8 P.A. Treichler, ‘AIDS, gender and biomedical discourse’ in E. Fee & D.M. Fox (eds.) AIDS: The 
Burdens of History, (Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of California Press, 1988) p. 197; 
G.M. Oppenheimer, ‘In the eye of the storm: the epidemiological construction of AIDS’ in Fee & Fox 
(eds.) AIDS: The Burdens of History, p. 270; R. Shilts, And The Band Played On: Politics, People and 
the AIDS Epidemic (New York: St Martins Press, 1987) pp. 53-112. 
9 V. Berridge, AIDS in the UK: The Making of Policy, 1981-1994 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) p. 15. 
10 Ibid. p. 28; Treichler, ‘AIDS, gender and biomedical discourse’, p. 198. 
11 Treichler, ‘AIDS, gender and biomedical discourse’, p. 198. 
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AIDS.12  HIV was passed on through blood and blood products, through sexual 
intercourse or from mother to child during pregnancy.  Though there was evidence 
from as early as 1983 that the virus could spread through heterosexual as well as 
homosexual sex, the issue of HIV/AIDS in heterosexuals was largely ignored in 
Britain until 1985, when the possibility of the spread of AIDS amongst intravenous 
drug users was first seriously considered.13  By 1986, it was clear that this possibility 
was rapidly becoming a reality.  A study of injecting drug users in Edinburgh found 
that 50 per cent of the sample tested had HIV.14  GP Roy Robertson, whose patients 
had formed the sample group, called for the widespread availability of syringes and a 
less ‘punitive approach towards drug control’ to prevent the deaths of large numbers 
of intravenous drug users.15
 Robertson’s pleas, and those of others, fell initially on stony ground.  
Ministers at the Scottish Home and Health Department felt that needle exchanges 
would condone and even encourage drug use, as well as being prohibitively 
expensive.16  They did, however, concede that the problem required further 
investigation and a committee was convened to provide advice on HIV and drug use.  
The committee, chaired by the regional director of the Blood Transfusion Service Dr 
D.B. McClelland, reported in 1986.17  McClelland’s central recommendation was that 
the threat of the spread of HIV to the general population from intravenous drug users 
justified a ‘harm minimisation’ approach; that those addicts who could not or would 
                                                 
12 Berridge, AIDS in the UK, pp. 45-46.  
13 Treichler, ‘AIDS, gender and biomedical discourse’ pp. 192-195; Berridge, AIDS in the UK, pp. 90-
91. 
14 Berridge, AIDS in the UK, p. 92; Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy’, p. 143; R. Robertson, 
‘The Edinburgh epidemic: a case study’, in Strang & Stimson, AIDS and Drug Misuse, pp. 95-107; 
Lart, HIV and English Drug Policy, p. 83. 
15 Berridge, AIDS in the UK, p. 93. 
16 Ibid. p. 93. 
17 Scottish Home and Health Department, HIV Infection in Scotland: Report of the Scottish Committee 
on HIV Infection and Intravenous Drug Misuse, (Edinburgh: Scottish Home and Health Department, 
1986). 
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not abstain from intravenous drug use should be brought into contact with treatment 
services in order to prevent them from spreading HIV.  Ernst Buning (a psychologist 
involved in harm minimisation programmes in Amsterdam) stated that the rationale 
behind harm minimisation was that ‘If it is not possible to cure drug users, one should 
at least try to minimise the harm that is being done both to them and the wider social 
environment.’18  The implications of harm minimisation for drug policy will be 
discussed in greater detail below, but it is important to note that the McClelland report 
led not only to the establishment of pilot schemes to test the value of needle 
exchanges, but also foreshadowed the later findings of the ACMD investigation into 
AIDS and drug use.19
 In the wake of the McClelland report and amid increasing signs of the spread 
of HIV amongst intravenous drug users the ACMD decided in May 1987 that a 
working group should be set up to consider the implications of HIV and AIDS for 
drug services.20  The working group were to report on measures which should be 
taken to ‘help combat the spread of HIV infection,’ concentrating particularly on how 
‘drug misusers’ could be brought into contact with treatment services ‘with a view to 
preventing or minimising unsafe injecting and other harmful behaviour.’21  The 
group, chaired by Ruth Runciman of the Citizens Advice Bureau, met for four 
months, hearing evidence from those in the drug ‘misuse’ and AIDS fields and were 
ready to report in the autumn of 1987, but government reticence meant the final report 
was not published until March 1988.22  The Runciman committee’s most important 
                                                 
18 E. Buning, ‘The role of harm reduction programmes in curbing the spread of HIV by drug injectors’ 
in Strang & Stimson, AIDS and Drug Misuse, 143-161, p. 154. 
19 Lart, HIV and English Drug Policy, pp. 87-89; Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy’, p. 143; 
Berridge, AIDS in the UK, p. 120. 
20 ACMD, AIDS and Drug Misuse: Part One, p. 5. 
21 Ibid. p. 82. 
22 The significance of the membership of the ACMD working group will be discussed in greater detail 
below.  Ibid. p. 5; Berridge, AIDS in the UK, p. 221; Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy’, p. 144. 
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and oft repeated conclusion was that ‘HIV is a greater threat to public and individual 
health than drug misuse.’23  This led them to recommend, as had the McClelland 
committee, that services concentrating on harm minimisation should take precedence.  
Not all intravenous drug users would stop injecting, ‘We must therefore be prepared 
to work with those who continue to misuse drugs to help them reduce the risks 
involved in doing so, above all the risk of acquiring or spreading HIV.’24   
Stimson has argued that this outlook reflected a ‘new public health paradigm 
of drug problems’ that: 
HIV has simplified the debate.  Rather than seeing drug use as a metaphorical 
disease, there is now a real medical problem associated with drug use.  All can 
agree that this is a major health problem for people who inject drugs, their 
sexual partners and their children.25
 
HIV and AIDS did reiterate the potential danger posed by drug use to collective 
health but, as this thesis has shown, it is misleading to refer to the public health 
paradigm as a ‘new’ way to view drug addiction.  By describing heroin addiction as a 
‘socially infectious condition’ the second Brain report (published in 1965) was 
drawing on contemporary notions of public health, of the social as well as the 
individual body.26  Notions of public health and drug use clearly pre-dated the 
Runciman report.  Parallels between the 1960s and the post-AIDS era were drawn by, 
among others, Alan Glanz of the ARU in 1988.27  Glanz asserted that ‘Drugs policy in 
Britain has entered a new phase and returned to an old phase.  The public health 
                                                 
23 ACMD, AIDS and Drug Misuse: Part One, p. 1, p. 17, p. 75. 
24 Ibid. p. 17. 
25 Stimson, ‘Revising policy and practice’, p. 125, p. 124. 
26 Drug Addiction: The Second Report of the Interdepartmental Committee, p. 8.  For further discussion 
of this issue See Chapter One, p. 52; A. Mold, ‘The “British System” of heroin addiction treatment and 
the opening of the Drug Dependence Units, 1965-1970’, Social History of Medicine, (forthcoming, 
December 2004). 
27 Berridge also cites an observer who drew parallels between Brain and Runciman.  See Berridge, 
‘AIDS and British drug policy’, p. 148. 
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imperative has re-asserted itself in the face of the AIDS emergency.’28  Berridge has 
also pointed to the public health aspects of the Brain report, noting that ‘The remedies 
suggested by Brain – including notification and compulsory treatment – were classic 
public health responses.’29  Public health has, she argues, formed a dimension to drug 
policy since the nineteenth century, that the attention paid to opium adulteration, 
infant doping and working-class opiate use reflected concerns about collective 
health.30  There was clearly nothing ‘new’ about a public health understanding of 
drug use in the late 1980s. 
 Examining the nature of this response in more detail does, however, suggest 
some differences with past understandings, even if the framework in which these were 
located was not entirely novel.  Public health was not a static collection of concepts 
and approaches and this is exemplified in its interaction with drug policy.  The public 
health of the 1960s focused on sickness within the social body, on the relationship 
between individuals as a source of disease.  Epidemiology came to the fore as a way 
of observing the pattern of disease and predicting where this might occur next.  This 
was reflected in Brain’s understanding of addiction as a ‘socially infectious condition’ 
that required ‘epidemiological assessment and control.’31  By the late 1980s 
understandings of public health had moved away from relationships between 
individuals and began to centre on the behaviour of the individual.  In this ‘new public 
health,’ according to Petersen and Lupton, ‘Individuals are expected to take 
responsibility for the care of their bodies and to limit their potential harm to others 
through taking up various preventive actions.’32  Here the concept of risk is central; 
                                                 
28 A. Glanz, ‘Drug misuse and AIDS prevention: policy on the right track’, British Journal of 
Addiction, 83, (1988) 1237-1239, p. 1237. 
29 Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy’, p. 148. 
30 Ibid. p. 149; Berridge, Opium and the People, pp. 75-109.  
31 Drug Addiction: The Second Report of the Interdepartmental Committee, p. 8.   
32 Petersen & Lupton, The New Public Health, p. ix. 
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‘risky’ activities such as smoking, drinking and taking drugs must be prevented to 
preserve the health of the individual and the community.  If risky behaviours cannot 
be altered, then the damage they cause must be controlled and reduced.  This is 
clearly the philosophy that underpinned the recommendations of the McClelland and 
Runciman reports: if injecting drug use could not be halted then the danger it posed 
should be minimised.  Harm minimisation was a rationale rooted in the ‘new public 
health.’ 
 Changes in the public health paradigm allowed for the creation of the concept 
of harm minimisation, but there were specific reasons as to why this was applied to 
drug ‘misuse’ in the late 1980s.  Recognition of the potential damage that addiction 
could cause to society was also nothing new; this had been documented by Brain in 
the 1960s and recognised to a greater or lesser extent by all of those involved in the 
treatment of addiction from this point on.  The ‘discovery’ of HIV and AIDS amongst 
intravenous drug users did, however, add another important dimension to this danger.  
AIDS was unquestionably a killer: of the 671 British cases reported in 1987 605 died 
before April 1995.  Of the total 10,693 people diagnosed with AIDS between 1982 
and 1994 7,346 are known to have died before April 1995.33  The threat AIDS posed 
to individual and collective health seemed to far outweigh that of drug addiction.   
 
2.  A new response?  Heroin addiction treatment post-AIDS 
Establishing AIDS as the greater threat had significant implications for drug addiction 
treatment, not least as a result of the desire to work towards two not always mutually 
agreeable goals: the prevention and treatment of HIV and the prevention and 
treatment of drug ‘misuse.’  However, it is questionable how far heroin addiction 
                                                 
33 Figures taken from Berridge, AIDS in the UK, p. 338. 
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treatment after 1987 differed from the pre-AIDS era.  This section will consider two 
key aspects of drug policy to demonstrate that though AIDS brought about change it 
was within the confines of existing initiatives and coterminous with the general 
direction of policy.  Firstly, it will examine the role of medicine in the response to 
heroin addiction post-AIDS, looking particularly at the involvement of specialists and 
generalists, revisiting the key debates over who should treat the addict discussed in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three.  Secondly, this section will consider how the 
concept of harm minimisation effected the treatment offered to addicts, the 
philosophy behind treatment and the place of the prescription of drugs to addicts.  
This allows a reconsideration of issues discussed in Chapters Four and Five and 
returns to the central problem of reconciling the ‘medical’ with the ‘social’ in 
approaches to addiction.   
 
2.1  The role of medicine 
The ‘discovery’ of HIV amongst intravenous drug users resulted in the continued 
expansion of the drug ‘policy community.’  The role of non-medical agencies in drug 
policy had gradually increased since the 1960s, when Brain’s definition of addiction 
as a social disease brought a wider range of actors into the arena.  In the 1980s, this 
trend appeared to pick up speed, as the drug taker became ‘normalised.’34  The 
ACMD, in Treatment and Rehabilitation, called for the ‘development of a range of 
services to help those with problems arising from the misuse of drugs,’ the Central 
Funding Initiative (CFI) pumped £17.5 million into community-based services 
between 1983 and 1987 in a direct attempt to shift focus from hospital-based 
treatment provision and civil servants actively encouraged a more ‘bottom-up’ 
                                                 
34 For a discussion of the normalisation of drug use see Chapter Two, p. 128.  See also V. Berridge, 
‘Historical issues’ in MacGregor, (ed.) Drugs in British Society, 20-35, pp. 21-25; Strang, ‘A model 
service’, p. 147. 
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approach, bringing voluntary agencies, former drug users and even current drug users 
into the ‘policy community.’35  According to drug and alcohol expert Jerome Jaffe 
medicine no longer sat ‘at the top of the table.’36  On one level, AIDS seemed to 
reinforce this drift away from the medical.  Emphasis was placed less on curing the 
addict of their addiction and more on reducing the harm that this could pose to the 
individual and society.  As harm minimisation became the orthodoxy those who had 
often existed outside the mainstream ‘policy community,’ such as voluntary 
organisations and user groups, were admitted to the fold.37
 However, the proliferation of bodies and individuals involved in drug policy 
both before and after AIDS must not be over-emphasised.  As this thesis has shown, 
medicine, and within this hospital-based clinical psychiatry, retained a powerful, and 
even dominant, role in shaping policy towards drug addiction.  Through their 
positions as consultant psychiatrists at leading London teaching hospitals DDU 
doctors were able to acquire expert status in dealing with the problems of the addict.  
This claim to expertise undermined the position of the community-based generalist 
treating addicts and at the same time afforded the specialist a greater role in the 
shaping of drug policy.  Leading DDU doctors were expert advisors to the Ministry of 
Health and later the DHSS on drug issues, members of drug advisory bodies such as 
the ACMD and other powerful medical organisations like the Royal College of 
                                                 
35 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 2; Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy’, pp. 141-142.  
For a more thorough exploration of the impact of the CFI see MacGregor, ‘Choices for policy and 
practice’, pp. 182-186; S. MacGregor, ‘Promoting new services: the Central Funding Initiative and 
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36 J. Jaffe in 1986 Okey Lecture to the Institute of Psychiatry, quoted in Berridge, ‘AIDS and drug 
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37 The origins of ‘harm minimisation’ within the voluntary sector will be dealt with in more detail 
below.  See particularly, G.V. Stimson, ‘Minimising harm from drug use’ in Strang & Gossop, Heroin 
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 272
Psychiatrists and the GMC.  This allowed consultant psychiatrists’ unparalleled 
opportunities to shape and direct drug policy, often to the exclusion of community-
based physicians, whether in private or general practice.   
There is evidence to suggest that this influence continued to be felt in the post-
AIDS era despite a ‘re-medicalisation’ of drugs that might have threatened the 
position of the psychiatrist.  AIDS and HIV presented a number of clearly ‘medical’ 
problems for infected drug users and those treating them.  AIDS could result in a 
range of other diseases: respiratory conditions such as pneumonia and tuberculosis, 
neurological disorders and dementia, gastrointestinal diseases and bacterial infections, 
problems with liver functioning and skin conditions.38  According to Stimson, this 
resulted in a partial ‘re-medicalisation’ of drug addiction treatment, as psychiatrists 
had to relearn physical medicine in order to conduct examinations for signs of HIV 
and AIDS related conditions.39  Berridge also notes the revival of ‘medical’ 
involvement in drug addiction as a result of AIDS, pointing to the greater emphasis 
placed on the general health of the drug user.40   
The complications presented by HIV and AIDS to the treatment of addiction 
did not, however, prevent psychiatrists from continuing to take a leading role in the 
drug ‘policy community.’  Of the thirteen members of the ACMD working group on 
AIDS and drug ‘misuse’ only six were from a non-medical background.  Of the 
remaining seven doctors four were psychiatrists, the largest single group.41  A parallel 
can clearly be drawn here with the earlier ACMD report Treatment and 
Rehabilitation, when four of the seven doctors on the working group were 
                                                 
38 These are just some of the conditions associated with HIV and AIDS.  For a more detailed account of 
these and how they affected drug users in particular see R. Brettle, M. Farrell & J. Strang, ‘Clinical 
features of HIV infection and AIDS in drug takers’, in Strang & Stimson, AIDS and Drug Misuse, 38-
53 and M. Riccio & D. Hawkins, ‘Neuropsychiatric complications of HIV infection’ in Ibid. 54-63.  
39 Stimson, ‘Rethinking policy and practice’, pp. 128-129. 
40 Berridge, ‘AIDS and British drug policy’, p. 147. 
41 ACMD, AIDS and Drug Misuse: Part One, p. 81. 
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psychiatrists.42  Further evidence to suggest that psychiatry remained central to the 
formulation of the response to drug addiction can be found by examining the nature of 
this response more closely.  The Runicman report stressed that GPs and ‘other generic 
professions’ should play a greater role in the treatment of addiction.43  The working 
group argued that the advent of HIV made it ‘essential that all GPs should provide 
care and advice for drug misusing patients to help them move away from behaviour 
which may result in them acquiring and spreading the virus.’44  However, the part 
GPs were expected to play in the treatment of addiction was constrained.  It was 
recommended that GPs should be equipped to deal with short-term detoxifications 
and medium-term withdrawal regimes.  Furthermore, it was suggested that these be 
undertaken in co-operation with the Community Drug Teams (usually headed by a 
psychiatrist) and specialists, at either the district or regional level, were to deal with 
more ‘difficult’ cases, that is, those involving non-reducing long-term prescriptions or 
the use of injectable drugs.45  Once more, there were echoes with the recent past.  
Treatment and Rehabilitation (1982) and the Guidelines (1984) similarly suggested a 
limited role for the generalist: supervision of GPs treating addicts by specialists and 
limitations to their prescription of drugs to addicts.46  It would appear that AIDS had 
done nothing to diminish the importance of the clinical psychiatrist in drug policy.    
 
2.2  Harm minimisation 
The continued dominance of the psychiatrist meant that the actual treatment of heroin 
addiction altered little in the wake of AIDS.  This is all the more surprising given the 
                                                 
42 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, pp. 87-88.  See Chapter Two, pp. 117-118. 
43 ACMD, AIDS and Drug Misuse: Part One, p. 1. 
44 Ibid. p. 30. 
45 Ibid. pp. 49-50. 
46 ACMD, Treatment and Rehabilitation, p. 56; Medical Working Group on Drug Dependence, 
Guidelines, p. 17, p. 8.  For an elaboration of the recommendations of both of these reports with respect 
to GP involvement and prescription see Chapter Two, pp. 115-124 and Chapter Four, pp. 206-221. 
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apparent conflict between a harm minimisation approach to drug use and the goals of 
addiction treatment.  Harm minimisation gained widespread acceptance because 
AIDS was established as the greater threat to public and individual health.  Bringing 
the drug user into contact with services in order to prevent them from spreading HIV 
was more important than stopping them from using drugs altogether.  This implied a 
prioritisation not just of public over individual health, but of the prevention and 
treatment of HIV over the prevention and treatment of drug addiction.47  It could be 
supposed, therefore, that this philosophy was at variance with abstinence-orientated 
treatment services.  Yet, harm minimisation did not result in the abandonment of 
long-standing clinical objectives; abstinence remained the focus of treatment for 
addiction.  These two seemingly conflicting concepts were brought together through 
the development of a ‘hierarchy of goals.’  The Runciman report recommended that 
‘services need to adopt a hierarchy of goals in dealing with drug misusers’ and that 
‘the following goals will all reduce the risk to the individual and to others: a) 
becoming drug free, b) switching from injection to oral use, c) avoiding sharing 
equipment.’  They concluded ‘Services should therefore strongly encourage drug 
misusers towards a goal of abstinence, but for drug misusers who are not immediately 
motivated to give up, goals (b) and (c) will be more realistic for the time being.’48
This approach was not, however, entirely new.  John Marks offered treatment 
based around a set of structured goals at the Liverpool DDU from 1986 onwards.49  
Ann Dally similarly claimed that treating addiction was about priorities, stabilising 
the addict, before switching from injectable to oral drugs, reducing the dose when the 
                                                 
47 Stimson and Buning both suggested that a choice needed to made as to which was the higher priority, 
the fight against HIV or the fight against drugs.  See Stimson, ‘Revising policy and practice’, p. 126; 
Buning, ‘The role of harm reduction programmes’, p. 161. 
48 ACMD, AIDS and Drug Misuse: Part One, p. 37. 
49 CMAC PP/DAL/B/4/2/8, Fazey, ‘The evaluation of Liverpool Drug Dependency Clinic’, pp. 29-30.  
See Chapter Four, pp. 197-199. 
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addict was ready and finally reaching abstinence.50  Indeed, the entire concept of 
harm minimisation clearly predated HIV and AIDS.  Stimson has argued that British 
drug policies have contained elements of harm minimisation since the publication of 
the Rolleston report in 1926.51  By suggesting that the addict could be prescribed the 
drug of their addiction when all other attempts to remove the drug had failed, the 
Rolleston report was recommending a course of action that reduced harm to the 
addict.52  Another source of ideas about harm minimisation, according to Stimson, 
was the drug ‘underground’ of the late 1960s and 1970s.  He notes that the drug using 
subculture of this period produced numerous books and manuals on how to use and 
enjoy drugs whilst limiting their potentially damaging effects.53  This was the 
philosophy of many voluntary organisations interested in drug issues, such as Release.  
Release was set up in 1967 initially to provide legal advice to young people arrested 
for drug offences, but its work rapidly widened to deal with a range of drug-related 
problems.54  Their approach, disseminated through numerous publications, talks and 
active casework was to encourage those using drugs to do so in a manner that reduced 
the possible dangers.  This was epitomised in the establishment of a telephone drug 
information service in 1975, designed to ‘prevent physical and psychological damage 
resulting from the use and abuse of licit and illicit drugs, adulterated or otherwise’ by 
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providing ‘objective, non-hysterical information’ to drug users.55  Moreover, 
voluntary organisations were not the only place were harm minimisation objectives 
were practised.  The stated purpose of the DDUs in 1968 was to treat the addict at the 
same time as preventing the development of the black market, a clear attempt to 
reduce the potential damage resulting from heroin use.     
Though there was nothing new about harm minimisation, there was something 
different about its adoption in the post AIDS era.  Crucially, there was a shift in the 
intended beneficiary of harm minimisation.  The harm minimisation of Rolleston and 
Release was designed to protect the individual user; the harm minimisation of 
Runciman was intended to protect the entire community.  Of course, this was not 
‘new’ either, since by sanctioning the prescription of heroin to addicts at DDUs in the 
late 1960s the Ministry of Health had been clearly thinking of the benefit to society in 
preventing the development of a black market rather than the health of the addict.  
What was different about the harm minimisation of the AIDS era was the appearance 
of consensus that it enjoyed, even within clinical psychiatry.  As Stimson has 
indicated, harm minimisation had not always been widely accepted.  He asserts that 
reducing harm from drug use was a minority point of view throughout most of the 
1970s and 1980s, found in the ‘underground,’ but rarely in clinical practice.56  The 
DDUs of this era did not retain their harm-reducing outlook, switching to 
‘confrontational’ methods of treatment such as prescribing addicts rapidly reducing 
doses of oral methadone in an effort to cure them of their addiction, rather than 
offering them heroin in order to prevent the development of a black market.57  DDUs 
pursued abstinence-orientated programmes aimed at getting the addict off drugs as 
quickly as possible.   
                                                 
55 MSS.171/3/44/1, The Release Drug Hotline, draft press release, 1975. 
56 Stimson, ‘Minimising harm from drug use’, p. 253. 
57 See Chapter One, pp. 58-59. 
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AIDS prompted a re-evaluation of these policies.  The Runicman report 
identified two ‘wider purposes’ for the prescription of drugs to addicts to assist in the 
containment of the spread of HIV: firstly, ‘attracting more drug users to services and 
keeping them in contact’, and secondly, ‘facilitating change away from HIV risk 
practices.’58  The working group noted there was evidence to suggest that ‘a 
prescribing function in a drug service can be successful in attracting some drug 
misusers who would not otherwise approach services.’  This was important because 
‘drug misusers in contact with prescribing agencies are less likely to share injecting 
equipment.’  The group concluded that ‘prescribing can be a useful tool in helping to 
change the behaviour of some drug misusers either towards abstinence or towards 
intermediate goals such as a reduction in injecting or sharing.’59  A more flexible 
approach to prescribing was thus legitimated. 
 As seen in Chapter Four and Chapter Five, this was not solely as a result of 
HIV and AIDS.  A similar approach had long been adopted by a number of doctors 
involved in the treatment of addiction, mainly outside the DDUs.  Despite repeated 
attacks from those who advocated short-term withdrawal (mainly doctors inside the 
DDUs) this approach did not disappear during the late 1970s and early 1980s, and 
there is evidence to suggest that maintenance was enjoying something of a 
renaissance even before AIDS began to make significant inroads into policy 
formulation.  The inability of the GMC to wholly condemn maintenance in the Dally 
case in 1986-1987, the public concession by Connell that long-term prescription 
required reconsideration, the narrow loss of a vote in favour of maintenance at the 
1987 Royal College of Psychiatrists conference, followed by the suggestion in the 
College’s report, Drug Scenes, that this might be an acceptable method of treatment 
                                                 
58 ACMD, AIDS and Drug Misuse: Part One, p. 47, p. 48. 
59 Ibid. pp. 47-48. 
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for some addicts, all point to a gradual acceptance that long-term prescription needed 
re-evaluation.60  According to the Lancet ‘all the arguments for a review would hold 
even if AIDS had never existed…a return to some form of controlled availability, 
which exercises control over inevitable use by rendering alternative methods 
uneconomic, is not a retrograde step – on the contrary…it is the only feasible way 
forward.’61  AIDS, therefore, added impetus to a pre-existing drift towards the 
reconsideration of long-term prescription.                
Examining the response of a leading DDU consultant to AIDS and the 
prescribing issue does, however, highlight tensions between this and existing ideas 
and debates.  John Strang, a DDU consultant psychiatrist who had been opposed to 
the long-term prescription of drugs to addicts, pointed to a number of roles for 
prescribing in the light of HIV.  Strang stated that prescribing could be used for ‘relief 
of withdrawal’, as ‘bait to capture the drug taker,’ as ‘adhesive to improve retention’ 
or as a ‘promoter of change.’62  This could be seen as a retreat from the abstinence 
orientated policies he had pursued in his Manchester DDU.63  Yet, allusions to more 
negative consequences of prescription suggest the extent of change was limited.  
Strang also noted that prescription might ‘obstruct change’ and there was a danger of 
prescription becoming the ‘end state,’ where the user would be indefinitely 
maintained on an opioid drug.64  Strang’s position was that prescribing might have its 
uses but it must not lead to maintenance.  Maintenance should be replaced with ‘a 
                                                 
60 See Chapter Five, pp. 258-259. 
61 ‘Editorial – Management of drug addicts: hostility, humanity and pragmatism’, Lancet, (9 May 1987) 
1068-1069. 
62 Strang, ‘The roles of prescribing’, pp. 144-146. 
63 See Chapter Four, p. 186; Strang, ‘Abstinence or abundance – what goal?’, p. 604. 
64 Strang, ‘The roles of prescribing’, pp. 147-148. 
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more active approach which sought to identify a series of intermediate goals…so as to 
encourage appropriate changes in behaviour.’65
Long-term prescription, it seems, did not become the widespread method of 
treatment offered by DDUs despite its perceived benefits in terms of preventing the 
spread of HIV.  Steve Cranfield, Charlotte Feinmann, Ewan Ferlie and Cathy Walter, 
a group of researchers from a range of backgrounds including clinical psychiatry, 
argue that the DDUs were largely resistant to change. AIDS forced a re-evaluation of 
maintenance but this remained ‘highly controversial and difficult for established 
centres to accept.’66   Cranfield and his colleagues assert that there were few changes 
in DDU prescription policies in the wake of AIDS, with the only exceptions being 
those patients who were HIV positive.  They note that the traditional autonomy of the 
DDUs was threatened by the apparent need to collaborate with a range of services as a 
result of the threat posed by AIDS.  Cranfield and his colleagues observed the drug 
treatment services in one District Health Authority and found that there was open 
hostility and rivalry between staff at the DDU and those running the needle exchange, 
such that needle exchange staff stopped referring patients to the DDU, sending them 
to local GPs instead.67  This led the researchers to argue that though DDUs remain 
central to the response to drugs in the wake of AIDS ‘Like other psychiatric 
institutions, they sometimes resist attempts to move towards a community-based 
approach.’68    
The reason for this resistance can be related to the central divide between 
hospital and community, between clinical and biographical and between the medical 
and the social at the heart of debates about the treatment of addiction.  Clinical 
                                                 
65 Ibid. p. 149. 
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psychiatrists working at DDUs often saw and responded to disease in a particular 
way.  As a result of their location within hospitals and their adoption of clinical 
methods DDU doctors largely emphasised the cure of addiction.  Maintenance was 
seen as merely perpetuating the disease.  Though there might be benefits to society by 
prescribing to the addict in order to prevent them from spreading HIV, this did 
nothing to cure them of their addiction.  As Strang noted:  
If the drug addict is on a slippery slope from which the only escape route is 
complete abstinence, then discussions of reducing dose, cutting back on 
injecting or moderating the extent of use will merely encourage the drug taker 
to consider unrealistic options.69
 
This contrasted with the view of many community-based physicians involved in the 
treatment of addiction.  As a result of paying greater attention to the patient rather 
than the disease these doctors frequently placed more emphasis on intermediate goals, 
of improving the patients’ social functioning before working towards abstinence.  For 
this reason, community-based practitioners frequently offered long-term prescription 
to addict patients.  This brought them into conflict with the DDUs because they 
offered an alternative view of addiction and subsequently an alternative way of 
treating this.   
Far from closing the divide between the hospital and the community HIV and 
AIDS may actually have served to separate the two spheres even further.  The relative 
danger of HIV compared to drug addiction suggested that a community-based 
approach, stressing intermediate goals and in tune with harm minimisation, was a 
more appropriate response than the abstinence-orientated, hospital-based, clinical 
method.  In order to retain a role in the treatment of addiction DDUs needed to adopt 
elements of the community-based, harm-minimisation approach, at least in principle.  
As Cranfield and his colleagues indicate, however, the extent to which this effected 
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real change in clinical practice is more questionable.  It seems likely that the divide 
between the clinical and the biographical approach to addiction, between the medical 
and the social, persisted beyond 1987, beyond AIDS, and is still present today. 
 
3.  Continuity or change?  Heroin addiction treatment policy past and present 
3.1  Past 
The limited extent of change in the practical treatment of addiction in the wake of 
AIDS suggests there are a number of significant continuities within drug addiction 
policy.  The hospital/community and public/private divide, the dominance of clinical 
psychiatry and the understanding of addiction within a public health context were 
common to both the pre-AIDS and post-AIDS periods.  An explanation for this 
continuity lies in the endlessly dynamic relationship between the medical and the 
social.  The dual conception of addiction as both medical disease and social problem 
resulted in a series of tensions manifested in conflict over the treatment of this 
condition.  These took two forms: firstly, debates over who was best suited to deal 
with the problem and secondly, debates about what this response should comprise.  
Examining the nature of these debates revealed a deeper conflict between differing 
types of medicine and medical practitioner.  There was clearly a conflict not just 
between medicine and other groups over who was able to deal with the problem of 
addiction, but also within medicine: between specialists and generalists, and between 
state provided and private care.   
This conflict was rooted in a clash of medical philosophies.  NHS hospital-
based specialist clinical psychiatrists often saw addiction as a disease to be cured, 
whereas community-based generalists (whether in private or general practice) were 
more concerned with ameliorating the patient’s experience of addiction, with 
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lessening the negative consequences of this condition for the individual and society.  
The hospital-based, specialist approach could thus be characterised as more ‘medical,’ 
and the community-based, generalist approach as more ‘social.’  A battle between 
these groups was fought out in the pages of medical journals and in the 1983 Dally 
case, which seemed to caution against the involvement of the private, non-DDU 
doctor in the treatment of addiction.  Yet, the most bitterly contested area in which 
this conflict was to be found was over the actual methods used to treat the addict.  To 
most clinical psychiatrists short-term withdrawal of the drug from the addict was the 
preferred method of treatment, whereas for many community-based doctors involved 
in the treatment of addiction maintenance, or long-term prescription, was an 
acceptable approach.  Here again there was an apparent medical and social divide, as 
short-term withdrawal could be regarded as a more ‘medical’ approach because of its 
stress on removing the drug from the addict, and maintenance could be seen as a more 
‘social’ approach, because of its emphasis on the social functioning of the addict. 
Such a characterisation does, however, draw the distinction between the 
medical and the social too starkly.  The unity between these two seemingly distinct 
forces should not be underplayed.  There is evidence to suggest that the medical and 
the social worked together as well as in opposition throughout this period to shape and 
define the response to heroin addiction.  No better expression of the conflation 
between the medical and the social can be found than in Brain’s description of 
addiction as a ‘socially infectious condition.’  This recognition of the danger posed by 
heroin addiction to individual and collective well-being located the condition firmly 
within the framework of public health, itself a project which unites medical and social 
goals.  As indicated above, changing understandings of addiction reflected shifts in 
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understandings of public health, but the concern for individual and social health 
remained.   
However, as this thesis has indicated, reconciling these two objectives and 
formulating a response that treated the disease of addiction and resolved the social 
problems associated with this was problematic.  The clearest example of the 
difficulties encountered and conflicts generated by this dual target was the issue of 
prescription of drugs to addicts.  The supposed benefits and drawbacks of 
maintenance had divided the medical community since before the Rolleston report, 
but the re-definition of addiction as a social disease in the late 1960s added a new 
dimension to the debate.  It was suggested that prescribing heroin to addicts might 
prevent the development of a black market and the spread of the disease of addiction 
within society.  DDUs established by the Ministry of Health in 1968 were set up along 
these lines, again combining the medical and the social by providing treatment at the 
same time as offering heroin on prescription to compete with illicit supplies.  Many 
clinical psychiatrists tasked with the running of these clinics disliked maintenance, 
and felt this perpetuated the disease of addiction instead of curing it.  Over the next 
decade the DDUs gradually switched heroin addicts from prescriptions of injectable 
heroin to injectable methadone, and eventually to oral methadone in rapidly reducing 
doses, as this was felt to be a more therapeutic and, therefore, ‘medical’ approach 
more likely to result in the ‘cure’ of the addict.  This contrasted with the treatment 
offered to addicts by many community-based doctors, who continued to see 
maintenance as a way of lessening the problems associated with addiction for the 
addict and for society by improving the addicts’ social situation, their work, their 
relationships, their general health and so on before withdrawing from the drug.  This 
issue polarised the drug addiction treatment community, seen most clearly in the 
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1986-1987 Dally case where the arguments for and against the long-term prescription 
of drugs to addicts were played out in the disciplinary hearing of a leading advocate 
of maintenance.   
There are inevitably limitations to any work on an area as large as drug policy.  
The Dally case was not the only significant event during this period; many aspects of 
the field remain under-explored.  More work is needed in a number of areas.  It would 
be instructive, for example, to investigate more thoroughly the view of the DDU 
psychiatrists.  Further research examining their justification for the switch to 
methadone and short-term, abstinence orientated withdrawal would complement the 
in-depth analysis presented here of the arguments put forward in favour of 
maintenance.  Moving away from a specifically doctor-focused account could also 
prove enlightening.  Looking more closely at the expanding ‘policy community’ 
around drugs and the relative roles of politicians, civil servants, social scientists, 
voluntary workers and those in criminal justice and their changing ability to shape 
policy over time might challenge a specifically ‘medical’ view of this field.   
But, by concentrating on treatment this thesis has been able to lay bare the 
debates that directed a central aspect of drug policy over the years from Brain to the 
impact of HIV/AIDS.  Its potential usefulness, however, is not just limited to the 
history of heroin addiction treatment policy.  The disputes between NHS doctors and 
private practitioners, between generalists and specialists and between supporters of 
short-term withdrawal and advocates of maintenance illustrate long-running, more 
general conflicts within medical practice.  Yet, medicine was not necessarily 
dominant.  This thesis has shown the important degree to which ‘social’ factors were 
bound up with supposedly ‘medical’ approaches to addiction in this period, thus 
questioning the comprehensiveness of the medicalisation of social problems.  A 
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‘social’ dimension to addiction clearly persisted despite the strongly ‘medical’ efforts 
introduced to deal with this.  Work such as this can help contribute to broader 
discussion by providing examples of these processes in action. 
 
3.2  Present 
Moreover, as drug use and the problems associated with this endure, historical 
research can inform current debate.  Conflicts over the key issues highlighted in this 
thesis continue.  The prescription of drugs to addicts remains contentious, though 
there does seem to be more support for maintenance for a very limited number of 
addicts.  A softening of hard-line attitudes can be detected in the advice given to 
doctors on the clinical management of drug addicts.  The first edition of the 
Guidelines of Good Clinical Practice in the Treatment of Drug Misuse published in 
1984 strongly suggested that long-term prescription of drugs to addicts was 
inappropriate and should only be offered by doctors working at or with a DDU.70  The 
1991 edition of the Guidelines indicated ‘There is at least a small proportion of 
patients for whom this [maintenance] is a helpful approach’ though this was ‘a 
specialised form of treatment best provided by, or in consultation with, a specialist 
drug misuse service.’71  The most recent incarnation of the Guidelines, published in 
1999, state that 
Methadone maintenance treatment, incorporating psychosocial interventions, 
can enable patients to achieve stability, reduce their drug misuse and improve 
health.  For these reasons, such treatment should form an important part of 
drug misuse services.72
 
                                                 
70 See Chapter Four, pp. 215-218. 
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This might suggest that maintenance has achieved some degree of mainstream 
acceptance.  But, as the 1999 Guidelines aimed to present ‘the pros and cons of some 
controversial issues such as maintenance and injectable prescribing’ it is likely that 
support for this method is far from universal.73   
Indeed, renewed interest in the prescription of heroin to addicts has exposed 
continued divisions within the medical profession and the wider ‘policy community’ 
over addiction treatment.  In December 2001 the Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) called for the wider prescription of heroin to heroin addicts and the 
establishment of ‘shooting galleries’ where addicts could inject under medical 
supervision.74  This followed Home Secretary David Blunkett’s submission to the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee that there should be a five-fold 
increase in the number of addicts prescribed heroin to around 1,500.75  Yet, not all 
evidence to the Home Affairs Committee was supportive of the measure.  Claire 
Gerada, representing the RCGP, told the committee that there was ‘no added value’ to 
be gained from GPs prescribing heroin to addicts as the drug has a low therapeutic 
index (the difference between a safe dose and a toxic dose) and could easily result in 
overdose in the inexperienced user.  Furthermore, she noted that heroin prescription 
was prohibitively expensive, costing £10,000-£15,000 a year compared with £2,000 a 
year for methadone.76  However, other GPs were in favour of increased prescription 
of heroin to addicts.  General Practitioner Ian Guy argued that heroin should be 
prescribed more often and that GPs should be licensed to do so, as did GP Chris Ford, 
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chair of the Methadone Alliance.77  Voluntary agencies such as the drug campaign 
group Transform and the charity Drugscope were also in favour of the measure.78  
The Home Affairs Committee were largely in agreement and their report published in 
May 2002 called for a trial programme of supervised heroin prescription to addicts 
and the establishment of safe-injecting rooms, or ‘shooting galleries.’79  According to 
the Observer, heroin was to be available on the NHS for addicts.80  This apparent 
sanction of the wider prescription of heroin to addicts did not receive universal 
approval; Les Vasey, a former police officer and chair of a drug rehabilitation clinic, 
told the BBC the proposal was ‘tantamount to the NHS giving out alcohol to 
alcoholics.’81   
The impact of these measures on treatment services seems to have been more 
equivocal than the headlines would suggest.  The National Treatment Agency (NTA) 
conducted an investigation into the potential roles for injectable heroin and injectable 
methadone in the treatment of addiction in 2002, publishing their findings in May 
2003.82  They recommended that the ‘prescribing of injectable substitute opioid drugs 
for maintenance may be beneficial for a minority of heroin misusers.’83  However, the 
NTA were clear that injectable maintenance prescription should only be undertaken in 
certain circumstances and very much as a last resort.  This was emphasised by the 
report’s presentation of a summary of their key recommendations.  They asserted that 
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‘optimised oral methadone maintenance should be the maintenance treatment for the 
majority of heroin users’ and ‘injectable heroin and methadone treatments should only 
be considered for the minority of patients who are genuinely unresponsive to an 
optimised oral maintenance response.’84  Furthermore, the NTA’s enquiry revealed 
that doctors were increasingly reluctant to prescribe and there had actually been a 
reduction in injectable prescribing in ‘both absolute terms and as a proportion of 
overall opioid substitute treatments.’85  It would appear that injectable maintenance 
remains a divisive issue. 
Other debates highlighted by this thesis show little sign of abating.  Home 
Office proposals to extend the licensing system for the prescription of heroin to addict 
patients to all controlled drugs except oral methadone have provoked a resurgence of 
conflict over licensing and the wider issue of who should and who should not be 
involved in the treatment of addiction.86  In a letter to Druglink in January 2001, a 
group of GPs and consultant psychiatrists asserted that these proposals were being 
introduced to curb the prescribing habits of a few private doctors practising in 
London.  The authors felt that licensing would ‘deter doctors from working in this 
area.  This was exactly why a similar licensing proposal was rejected in 1984.’87  An 
editorial written by some of the same authors also appeared in the British Medical 
Journal.  Here too, similar arguments were made as had existed fifteen years 
previously.  It was suggested that ‘The proposals…convey a negative message about 
drug misuse treatment, reinforcing the disinclination of generalists to prescribe for 
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drug misusers.’88  This article provoked two letters.  Andrew Byrne, a GP in 
Australia, was critical of the editorial.  Byrne contended that ‘self-regulation has 
apparently failed to encourage British doctors to follow the advice on supervision and 
dose levels.’89  The second letter was from Arnold Trebach, professor of 
jurisprudence, commentator on heroin addiction and advocate of maintenance 
treatment.  Trebach restated many of his earlier arguments about the virtues of the 
‘British System’ and attacked the ‘drug misuse establishment’ and the GMC for its 
‘persecution’ of doctors who abided by the ‘British System.’  He asserted that:  
The planned extension of the licensing system to all controlled drugs would be 
an illness masquerading as cure.  Stricter controls signal the death knell for a 
humanitarian and efficacious system of addiction prevention and treatment.  
The GMC has a duty to keep that tragedy from happening.  Yet it almost 
seems intent on creating it.90
 
Trebach’s words were strongly reminiscent of statements he made (in public and in 
private) in support of Ann Dally at the time of her second GMC PCC hearing.91
Indeed, the echoes between past and present debates continue.  In February 
2004 a case came before the GMC that once more places maintenance prescription 
and the treatment of addiction in private practice on ‘trial.’  Seven doctors working at 
the private drug addiction treatment clinic the Stapleford Centre have been accused of 
serious professional misconduct in relation to the irresponsible prescription of drugs 
to addict patients.  The doctors are alleged to have failed to assess patients properly 
and acted irresponsibly with respect to the type, quantity and combination of drugs 
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prescribed.92  One addict treated by the centre’s founder, Dr Colin Brewer, died in 
September 2001 after being sent home with a ‘DIY home detox’ kit.  The patient 
choked on his own vomit after taking a combination of drugs prescribed by Brewer.  
It is has been suggested the patient’s mother was not told that additional drugs 
prescribed were to be taken instead of, not as well as, the original prescription.93  The 
hearing has been adjourned until September 2004 due to the ill health of Brewer, but 
it is clear there are important parallels with the Dally case regardless of its outcome.94  
There is even a direct link between the two cases: Brewer was asked to take on 
Dally’s patients by the Home Office in 1987 when she was no longer able to prescribe 
to addicts.95   
It is clear that the conflict between the private and public sectors over the 
treatment of heroin addiction and between those who support maintenance and those 
who advocate withdrawal is being fought once again in the chambers of the GMC.  
The Stapleford Centre is reported to have offered maintenance prescriptions of both 
heroin and methadone to addicts who felt unable to come off drugs.  According to the 
Guardian ‘the technique is legal but tends to be resisted in the public sector, where 
the preference is for drugs such as methadone to be used on a short term basis to wean 
the patient off illegal substances.’96  Owen Dyer, writing in the British Medical 
Journal, noted that ‘Heroin maintenance programmes have frequently been rejected 
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by NHS clinics, who prefer to wean patients off the drug.’97  Indeed, the significance 
of the Stapleford case has been widely recognised.  The Guardian reported that the 
enquiry was to ‘centre on conflicting schools of opinion regarding the prescription of 
drugs to recovering addicts.’98  The Independent noted that the outcome of the case 
‘may determine the future direction of drug addiction treatment’ and that it would 
‘ask profound questions of the liberal school of heroin treatment.’99  The Times stated 
that the hearing is ‘seen as a test case for the treatment of addiction in Britain’ and 
that it represented ‘a showdown between rival schools of thought on the treatment of 
drug addicts.’100
It has been suggested that the Stapleford case is being used to remove the 
private practitioner from the treatment of addiction.  Nick Davies (the journalist who 
assisted Dally during her disciplinary hearing in 1986-1987) quotes a source close to 
the Home Office as saying “They have been talking about getting rid of every private 
doctor who prescribes for heroin users.”101  This was also the argument made about 
the Dally hearings in 1983 and 1986-1987.  Parallels between the cases abound.  The 
alleged origin of the charge in the Stapleford case, as in the Dally case, reinforces the 
notion that this is a ‘political’ trial.  Davies states that Home Office inspectors 
combed through records of chemists’ dispensing to Stapleford patients looking for 
breaches in the rules in order to bring a case against doctors at the clinic.102  Though 
the British Medical Journal reports that the charges ‘seem to have originated after 
routine monitoring by the Home Office Drugs Inspectorate’ the suspicion remains that 
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the case has been deliberately brought in order to make a statement about 
maintenance prescription and the private treatment of heroin addiction.103  The same 
was said of the Dally case.  
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the obvious parallels that the 
Stapleford case raises with both the Dally case specifically and the wider issues 
considered in this thesis.  It is clear that the 1983 and 1986-1987 GMC cases against 
Dally did not issue an unequivocal and lasting warning about the dangers of private 
practice and maintenance as seen by the ‘drug dependency establishment’ of clinical 
psychiatrists.  A new generation of medical practitioners need to be reminded of the 
apparent appropriateness of the clinical approach to addiction and the authority of the 
psychiatrist in dealing with this problem.  In turn, this would suggest that the conflicts 
between specialist and generalist, between public and private and between withdrawal 
and maintenance are far from over.  This is because the deeper conflict between the 
medical and the social has not, and perhaps cannot, be resolved.  There is no neat 
conclusion.  What this thesis has done, however, is point to the origins of the central 
debates within drug addiction treatment.  And by understanding the roots of policy 
and practice we are better equipped to deal with current and future developments. 
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